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Abstract 
Economists have been somewhat remiss in dealing with the issue of worker 
absence. This is surprising given the figures involved. In the year of the last 
miners' strike, 27 million working days were lost as a result of strike activity, a 
figure which pales by comparison with the 375 million working days lost on 
average as a result of absenteeism over the 1980's [Economic Trends]. 
Furthermore, a study by management consultants, Arthur Anderson, recently 
estimated the cost of absenteeism to the UK industry at f: 6 billion per year [77le 
Independent, 22/10/91]. 
Despite all this, relatively little attention has been paid in the economic 
literature to either the causes and/or the effects of absenteeism. Nevertheless, 
the discipline has benefited from a basic yet rigorous theoretical structure 
founded on static neo-classical labour supply theory. The aim of this Thesis is 
to address two main weaknesses of the existing theory of absence behaviour. 
Firstly, there is a distinct shortage of models which explicitly 
incorporate labour demand considerations and, consequently, ways in which 
employers might attempt to control absenteeism. Hence, emphasis in this Thesis 
is placed on the analysis of methods of absence control such as the provision of 
experience rated sick pay and overtime. 
A second weakness of the existing theory concerns the somewhat 
limited 'static' approach which has generally been adopted in the economic 
literature. Thus, this Thesis acknowledges the role of risk and uncertainty in 
absence behaviour by setting the analysis within a dynamic framework. 
The key objective of this Thesis is to explore the determinants of 
absence behaviour and identify ways in which contractual arrangements and, 
therefore, labour demand considerations manipulate the incentive to absent from 
the work place. The empirical analysis supports the hypothesis that observed 
absence behaviour is primarily influenced by the nature of the employment 
contract and, therefore, by the interaction of labour supply and labour demand. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Worker absenteeism constitutes a significant loss of work-time and therefore has 
important implications for both household income and firm productivity. Empirical 
evidence from Doherty (1979), for example, shows that the loss in working days 
due to sickness absence in the United Kingdom over the 1970s was at least as great 
as that due to unemployment. Similar evidence is presented by Akyeampong (1988) 
for Canada. More recent evidence exploring the implications of lost working days is 
provided by a study undertaken by the management consultants, Arthur Anderson, 
who estimate the cost of absenteeism to UK industry at E6 billion per year [The 
Independent, 22/10/911. Furthermore, the CBI (1994), which conducted a survey 
of 1.2 million employees from over 500 employers, discovered that 171 million 
days were lost through sickness absence in 1993, whilst only half a million days 
were lost due to industrial disputes. The cost of the working days lost due to 
absence, incurred by employers, was estimated at f 11 billion in 1993 (f 13 billion 
in 1992). It seems somewhat paradoxical, therefore, that both media and academic 
interest has focused on the analysis of industrial disputes rather than on 
absenteeism. 
Despite all this relatively little attention has been paid in the economic 
literature to either the causes and/or the effects of absenteeism. 1 This is in stark 
contrast to other disciplines in the social sciences such as the field of applied 
psychology where much research has been undertaken to determine the 
psychological aspects underpinning a worker's decision to go absent. Steers and 
Rhodes (1978,1984), for example, identify job dissatisfaction as the main 
psychological cause of worker absence. There has been, however, some interaction 
between the disciplines of economics and applied psychology. The notion of job 
satisfaction, for instance, has been incorporated into several economic analyses of 
absenteeism; using self-reported survey data Drago and Wooden (1992), for 
example, find that if job satisfaction is high, work group cohesion is associated 
with low absenteeism. 2 This area is, however, problematic since concepts such as 
job satisfaction are difficult to define and measure. 
I 'Ibis is despite the fact highlighted by Treble (1990) that interest in absenteeism dates back to 
the 1920s. Treble (1990) describes two studies in detail: Vernon and Bedford (1928) and Vernon et 
al (1931) both of which examine absenteeism in the coal industry. The results of these pioneering 
studies suggest that absenteeism is affected by sick pay schemes, rates of pay and working 
conditions. 
2 Interest in recent years has been paid to profit-sharing and employee participation schemes, the 
potential benefits of which are argued to be increased morale, motivation and job satisfaction [Bell 
and Hanson (1984)]. 'Me results of Peel and Wilson (1991) indicate that firms operating employee 
participation schemes experience lower than average absenteeism. Kahana and Weiss (1992), 
however, demonstrate within their dynamic theoretical framework that circumstances exist where 
members of labour managed firms will absent when it is optimal to work. The impetus behind 
I 
Furthermore, the applied psychology literature has been handicapped by a 
distinct lack of theoretical rigour. In comparison, the economic literature that does 
exist has benefited from a basic yet rigorous theoretical structure. In general, 
absenteeism has been modelled in the economic literature in the context of static 
neo-classical labour supply theory which is based on the individual's choice 
between income and leisure. The labour supply decision reached represents the 
solution to the individual's constrained utility maximisation problem [see 
Killingsworth (1983) for a comprehensive survey of this literature]. In the simple 
static labour supply model individuals are able to choose the amount of labour 
supplied subject to time constraints. If the individual is able to choose the exact 
amount of labour supplied then the concept of absenteeism does not exist. The 
potential for absenteeism emerges when workers are obliged to supply a certain 
amount of labour within a specified time period. As a consequence of such 
contractual obligations, individuals have an incentive to absent from the workplace 
if the contractual hours fixed by the employer exceed the level of labour supply 
which maximises the individual's utility. 
This conventional approach to absenteeism relies almost exclusively on 
supply side modelling, i. e. modelling the response of an individual to a given 
employment contract. Hence the standard approach to modelling absence behaviour 
is concerned with voluntary as opposed to involuntary absence - absence is 
modelled as a conscious decision not to attend work as opposed to sickness absence 
wherein the individual is physiologically and/or psychologically unable to attend. 
The contributions made by economists to the theory of absence are surveyed 
extensively in Chapter 2. The conventional labour supply approach to absence is 
set-out formally in Section 2.2 whilst Section 2.3 examines the ways in which 
economists have attempted to extend this basic model. The aim of the survey is to 
highlight weaknesses of the existing literature in order to illustrate the contribution 
to the analysis of absence behaviour made by this Thesis. 
The general conclusion from Chapter 2 is that economists have made a 
somewhat limited contribution to the theoretical modelling of absence behaviour. To 
be specific, there are two fundamental weaknesses of the theory which can be 
identified. Firstly, there is a distinct shortage of models which explicitly incorporate 
labour demand considerations and, consequently, ways in which employers might 
attempt to control absenteeism. This lack is clearly surprising given that the 
interaction between supply and demand is central to economic analysis. Secondly, 
there is a widespread ignorance of the influence of risk and uncertainty on absence 
decisions which stems from the 'static' (i. e. single time period) approach which has 
this result lies in the free riding problem redolent of an egalitarian division of profits throughout 
the work force regardless of an individual's absence history. 
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generally been adopted in the economic literature. The associated concepts of risk 
and uncertainty are likely to be of considerable importance when analysing - 
particularly involuntary - absence decisions since whether an individual becomes 
sick is predominantly an uncertain or risky event. 
Despite these shortcomings a number of empirical investigations have 
emerged, shedding some light on the analysis of observed absence behaviour. 
Given the limited theoretical framework, however, the results from the empirical 
investigations have tended to be rather inconsistent and, therefore, difficult to 
interpret. As well as surveying the results of the various empirical studies, Chapter 
2 highlights the perplexity that stems from such a lack of theoretical rigour. 
The aim of this Thesis, therefore, is to extend the theoretical foundations of 
the analysis of absence behaviour. In addition, some empirical analysis of observed 
absence behaviour is undertaken in order to interpret the observed behaviour in the 
context of the proposed richer and more realistic theoretical framework. In general, 
the objective of this Thesis is to explore the determinants of absence behaviour and 
identify ways in which contractual arrangements and, therefore, labour demand 
considerations can affect or even manipulate an individual's incentive to absent 
from his/her workplace. Furthermore, the theoretical analysis is set within a multi- 
time period rather than a static framework in order to acknowledge the significance 
of the dimension of time for the absence decision-making process. 
Prior to extending the model of absence behaviour, it is important to ascertain 
the significance of absenteeism as a labour market phenomenon. As mentioned 
above, the concept of absenteeism is only capable of definition if the notion of an 
hours constraint is incorporated into labour supply theory. The huge literature 
exploring the supply of labour by individuals is dominated by research into the 
decision problem facing an individual over the amount of hours worked. As such it 
is concerned with the modelling of desired rather than actual work hours, implicitly 
assuming the non-existence of an hours constraint [Ilmakunnas and Pudney 
(1990)]. This is clearly an unrealistic assumption to make and its implications are 
discussed in detail in Chapter 3. To summarise an employee may find that a given 
hours constraint falls short, exceeds or corresponds to his/her unconstrained utility 
maximising supply of labour, rendering the individual in a state of under- 
employment, over-employment or unconstrained utility maximising employment 
respectively. The second-best scenarios give rise to the potential for moonlighting 
(under-employment) or, of particular interest to this Thesis, absenteeism (over- 
employment) as the individual attempts to bring his/her utility maximising and 
contractual hours into conjunction. 
The aim of Chapter 3 is to construct the profiles of an over-employed 
individual, an under-employed individual and an individual who is satisfied with 
3 
his/her contractual hours in order to determine the type of individual who may be 
regarded as a 'potential absentee'. Consequently, the analysis of Chapter 3 
acknowledges that individuals may be constrained with respect to their hours of 
labour rather than unrealistically assuming that desired and actual work hours are in 
accord. In order to construct such a set of profiles, data from the British Social 
Attitudes Survey9 a data source which is largely untapped by economists, is 
analysed. Indeed, the finding that over a third of the individuals surveyed indicate 
that their labour supply is constrained in some way provides a further mandate for 
any additional research into the implications of hours constraints for labour market 
behaviour. 
Furthermore, the appendix to Chapter 3 contains the results of the estimation 
of a selection of labour supply schedules. By identifying those individuals in the 
sample who are satisfied with contractual hours, the results from labour supply 
schedules estimated on both desired and constrained hours can be compared. The 
differences between the estimates provides a useful insight into the implications of 
implicitly assuming that individuals are able to choose hours of work. 
Given that the evidence reported in Chapter 3 suggests that hours 
constraints are an important feature of observed employment contracts, Chapter 4 
extends the simple labour supply model of absence decision-making by setting the 
analysis within a multi-time period framework and focusing on the implications of a 
specific type of absence control scheme, an experience rated sick pay scheme, for 
the worker's absence decision-making process. It would seem particularly 
appropriate to assume, in the context of absence behaviour, that an individual's 
current behaviour may have important implications for future opportunities. If an 
individual, for example, goes absent today he/she may be eligible for a lower level 
of sick pay tomorrow. The essence of such a sick pay scheme is incorporated into 
this model for workers employed under a two period contract. 
The probability of attendance derived from the theoretical model is a 
function of wages, sick pay and contractual hours, i. e. it is a function of the 
characteristics of the employment contract. Moreover, the effect of future 
opportunities on current decisions serves to inflate the probability of attendance in 
the current time period, with individuals taking account of the effect of current 
absence on future sick pay entitlement. 
The theoretical results obtained thus predict that individuals facing 
experience rated sick pay schemes should be characterised by a lower probability of 
current period absence. The empirical analysis presented in Chapter 4 explores the 
determinants of the absence rates observed from a set of workers who face just 
such a scheme. The results confirm a priori' expectations suggesting that 
4 
characteristics pertaining to the employment contract are important determinants of 
absence behaviour. 
Appendix A4.1 expands the theoretical model of Chapter 4 by making a 
distinction between 'acceptable' absence (i. e. absence due to illness) and 
'unacceptable' absence (i. e. shirking). The theoretical results suggest that the nature 
of absence decisions is a complex product of the interaction between two different 
types of absence control since 'unacceptable' absence, if detected, is assumed to 
lead to dismissal. Moreover, the theory illustrates how 'acceptably' sick workers 
may still choose to attend work on account of the threat of job loss resulting from 
the level of monitoring chosen by the fin-n. Such a scenario has important practical 
implications since if a worker's productivity is a function of sickness then situations 
may arise when individuals attend work when employers would prefer them to stay 
away. 
Appendix A4.2 presents results from an alternative empirical analysis of the 
implications of experience rated sick pay using a discrete panel of weekly data 
representing the work history of each employee. The aim here is to estimate the 
probability of attendance for each weekly observation and then to estimate the 
parameters of the sickness distribution which maximise the likelihood of the 
observed absence history occurring. These parameters were derived for each 
employee and then regressed on factors such as age and sex which one would 
expect to influence the distribution of an individual's health. The relationship 
between the nature of the distribution of sickness and personal characteristics 
appears to be broadly in line with the findings of the medical statistics literature. 
Emphasis in Chapter 5 is placed on the implications of an alternative penalty 
system for the absence decision making process where the provision of overtime 
working is conditional on past absence behaviour. A worker with an 'unacceptable' 
absence history is effectively banned from working any overtime for a specified 
time period. The penalty system is therefore similar to that analysed in Chapter 4 
where remuneration levels are conditional on past absence behaviour. Thus, both 
absence penalty schemes emphasise the temporal link between absence decisions of 
the past, present and future. The experience rated sick pay scheme analysed in 
Chapter 4 operates by making sick pay entitlements more generous if an individual 
displays a satisfactory attendance record. As outlined in Chapter 4, it is difficult to 
justify the provision of fin-n-financed sick pay in excess of the statutory minimum, 
although such an assumption is a necessary feature of an effective experience rated 
sick pay scheme. In contrast, the absence control mechanism explored in Chapter 5 
does not rely on such an arrangement but focuses, instead, on the income earned 
from attendance. 
5 
The empirical analysis of Chapter 5 explores a set of discrete panel data 
thereby allowing for the effects of both dynamic and cross-sectional influences. The 
panel of data consists of work histories derived from daily attendance records for a 
sample of individuals employed by a British manufacturing firm which operates an 
overtime ban absence control mechanism similar to that portrayed in the theoretical 
model described above. Given that individuals make attendance decisions on a day- 
by-day basis it is clear that such a micro data set is an appropriate starting point. 
Moreover, the analysis of such absence records explicitly introduces a time 
dimension, which has attracted scant attention in both the theoretical and the 
empirical literature, into the absence decision-making process. 
It is reassuring to discover that the results of Chapter 5 are in accordance 
with those of other studies. In general, the analysis of this panel of daily data 
confirms that absence behaviour is primarily affected by contractual characteristics 
such as the prevailing wage rate and the penalty system operated by the firm. 
Moreover, the penalty system appears to be effective in exerting a moderating 
influence on absence behaviour whilst the theoretical and empirical findings suggest 
ways in which the effectiveness of the system could be further enhanced. 
Chapter 6 explores a further influence on the incentive to absent from the 
work place, namely dissatisfaction with the current employment contract. Such 
dissatisfaction may ultimately lead to the individual seeking alternative employment 
and so the relationship between quits, job search and absence behaviour is 
considered. Job search and quit behaviour have been modelled extensively as a 
means for workers to counteract dissatisfaction with employment contracts. 
Likewise absence behaviour can be recognised as a symptom of dissatisfaction with 
the employment contract since it implies a degree of mismatch between the 
employment contact and the individual's utility- m aximising strategy. In this 
Chapter, the implications of job search for absence behaviour are explored in a 
theoretical model in order to highlight the interaction between these types of worker 
behaviour which, to date, have been analysed as distinct phenomena. 
The model developed illustrates how the potential benefits of job search may 
affect the absence behaviour of workers employed under both single- and two- 
period contracts. To be specific, the potential benefits of job search serve to raise 
the probability of absence. Assuming that on-the-job search is ruled out and that 
sick pay is greater than unemployment benefit, sick pay serves to subsidise off-the- 
job search and, hence, inflates the incentive to absent from the workplace. A trade- 
off exists, however, between the benefits of search and the costs of search in terms 
of the amount of non-work term devoted to job search. Furthermore, the 
implications of the relative magnitudes of these costs and benefits for an 
6 
individual's expected utility is dependent on the state of the individual's health 
which in turn determines the individual's valuation of income and leisure. 
As regards the relationship between quits and absence behaviour, some 
empirical analysis of an infon-native panel of firm level data is undertaken. The aim 
here is to ascertain the nature of the determinants of quit rates and the results 
obtained accord with the predictions of the theoretical analysis suggestive of a 
positive association between observed quit rates and absence rates. 
Finally, Chapter 7 collects general concluding remarks relating to the 
analysis of the incentive to absent from the work place and highlights potential 
avenues for future research. 
To summarise, this Thesis presents a selection of original theoretical and 
empirical results relating to the economics of absence behaviour. The theoretical 
modelling serves to enhance the realism of the theory of absence decision-making in 
ways which have, to date, been overlooked by economists. Furthermore the 
empirical analysis yields results which are broadly in line with those from other 
studies as well as being capable of interpretation within the proposed richer 
theoretical structure. 
7 
Chapter Two: The Economics Of Absence Behaviour, 
2.1 Introduction 
Economists have been somewhat remiss in dealing with the issue of worker 
absence. This is surprising given the figures mentioned in Chapter One. 
Absenteeism is clearly important for what it says about the deten-ninants, of worker 
behaviour occurring for either valid (i. e. 'sickness') or invalid (i. e. 'shirking') 
reasons. An understanding of the factors motivating the latter can yield valuable 
insights into how workers value their employment contracts. 
Despite all this, relatively little attention has been paid in the economic 
literature to either the causes and/or the effects of absenteeism. This is in marked 
contrast to other disciplines in the social sciences such as the field of applied 
psychology. The situation is, however, changing and recent years have witnessed a 
mild flurry of activity on the part of economists in attempting to understand this 
most pervasive worker behaviour. The aim of this Chapter is twofold: first, to give 
some perspective to these studies in relation to the economics literature and, where 
appropriate, the literature of other disciplines; and second, to highlight the 
contribution to the analysis of absence behaviour made by this Thesis. 
The Chapter is set out as follows: Section 2.2 outlines some of the central 
theoretical issues underpinning the economics of absence. Section 2.3 reviews the 
existing economics literature, highlighting the links with the theoretical foundations 
discussed in Section 2.2. Issues for future research and final remarks are collected 
in Section 2.4. 
2.2 Absenteeism as a Labour Supply Response 
Fxonomists have tended to analyse absence within the framework of the static neo- 
classical labour supply model. The potential for absenteeism, it is argued, emerges 
when individuals are obliged to supply a certain amount of labour within a given 
time period. Such constraints are common because employers are unlikely to be 
indifferent as to how much labour individuals supply. For example, where 
production takes place on an assembly line workers may be technically constrained 
to supply the same amount of labour at specified times [Deardorff and Stafford 
(1976)]. Balchin and Wooden (1992) remark that cost minimisation generally 
dictates that workers perform tasks at specified times in order to prevent 
I Some of the analysis presented in this Chapter is published in Brown and Sessions (1995). 
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bottlenecks, meet co-ordination requirements or, perhaps, to promote the effective 
utilisation of capital. 
Absenteeism arises in this context when the level of contractual hours 
specified by the employer exceeds that which maximises the individual's utility. It 
is implicitly assumed in this Chapter that the utility obtained from accepting the 
employment contract is greater than that derived from not accepting, such that the 
individual's second best (i. e. constrained) utility maximising option is to supply 
labour under the specified contractual obligations. An individual may accept such a 
contract, as opposed to seeking a first best (i. e. unconstrained) contract which 
specifies a supply of labour which equates the individual's marginal and economic 
rates of substitution between income and leisure, because job search is costly in 
terms of both income and leisure time. 
The formal analysis of the incentive to be absent is set out below. An 
individual has a utility function of the form: 
u= U(X, l) 
and is endowed with a stock of time: 
T=h+l (2.2) 
where x represents a vector of consumption goods, h, labour supply and 1, leisure. 
The individual's budget constraint is represented by: 
x:! ý m= mo + wh (2.3) 
where mo is unearned income and w is the exogenous real wage. 2 
In the absence of any further contractual obligations, the individual's 
problem is to maximise Equation (2.1) subject to constraints (2.2) and (2.3). 
Assuming positive but declining marginal utilities, an interior solution to this 
problem implies: 
t9u(x 1*)Idl 
_ 
u, (x*, l*) 
=W (2.4) du(x 1*)Idx u., (x * 1*) 
x*= ino + wh* = m* (2.5) 
such that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure equals 
the economic rate of substitution. In terms of Figure 2.1 the individual faces the 
budget constraint [ T, E0, Ec, 1c ] and maximises utility by moving to the point on the 
For simplicity, the price level is normalised to unity throughout this Chapter. 
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budget constraint which is tangential to his/her indifference curve. Thus, if the 
individual were not supply-constrained then his/her equilibrium would appear at 
E*= (x*, 1*), where 1* =T- h* and h* represents the individual's optimal labour 
supply decision. 
M, x 
E' 
XC --- ---- 
--------- ------- ---- 
12 
I 
w 
Eo 
mo ------------------ L ------------------ ---------- 10 
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Figure 2.1: Over-Employment and the Labour Supply Decision 
If the employment contract specifies contractual hours h', where h' > h*, then the 
individual would still accept the contract, since +', T- h') =U (XC, 1C)>u (nio, T) 
(i. e. compare I, to 10). Acceptance of the contract moves the individual to 
EC= (xc, 1c), where 1c =T- hc. However, since at Ec his/her marginal rate of 
substitution between income and leisure exceeds the economic rate of substitution, 
[u, (xc, Ic)lu,, (xc, 1c)] > w, the individual would have an incentive to go absent in an 
attempt to move towards E*, where his/her marginal rate of substitution between 
income and leisure (i. e. the slope of his/her indifference curves) equals the 
economic rate of substitution (i. e. the slope of his/her budget constraint). 
Hence, it is apparent that in this framework absenteeism arises due to the 
discontinuity in the budget constraint, which causes the individual to be rationed as 
to the amount of labour he/she supplies. Furthermore, the discontinuity leads to a 
disequilibrium position. Discontinuous budget constraints are clearly a realistic 
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phenomenon since the majority of employment contracts specify a wage rate and 
work schedule which defines contractual hours. 3 
The comparative statics of absence behaviour in this simple model are 
relatively straightforward. An increase (decrease) in the wage rate produces an 
income effect which increases (decreases) the tendency to absent if leisure is a 
normal good, and a substitution effect which serves to decrease (increase) the 
tendency unequivocally. An increase (decrease) in unearned income acts as a pure 
income effect and so increases (decreases) the tendency to absent if leisure is 
normal. Finally, an increase in contractual hours will increase the tendency to 
absent on account of the diminishing marginal utility of leisure. This can be seen 
fon-nally by defining the temptation to absent as: 
cw ul(XC, lc)- 
- G(x lic, )- -x c, ic UX( 
(2.6) 
Partially differentiating Equation (2.6) with respect to contractual hours yields the 
following: 
dO(x C, ic )- Uxl (X C, ic )ul (X C, ic )- Uli (xc, l' )UX (xc, l' )>0 (2.7) 
dhc IU 
X(XC, 
lc )] 
2 
The above differential is positive since u, (x, 1) >0 if leisure is assumed to be a 
normal good. An increase in contractual hours increases the temptation to absent 
because as contractual hours lengthen, the utility derived from additional leisure 
(income) increases (decreases). 
This analysis may be supplemented with a more detailed appraisal of the 
costs incurred by the worker as a result of absence behaviour. The model depicted 
in Figure 2.1 assumes that the penalty to absence is simply lost earnings. It is 
likely, however, that any earnings lost as a result of absence are, at least partially, 
offset by sick pay, the provision of which will increase the temptation on the part of 
the worker to absent. The effect of a simple sick pay scheme on the individual's 
absence decision is illustrated in Figures 2.2 and 2.3 below. 
Assuming, for simplicity, that all individuals receive sick pay at the rate s< 
w for each hour of absence then two budget constraints are in operation; the 
conventional wage line increasing from fight to left and the new sick pay line 
increasing from left to right. If the individual supplies no work to the firm then 
3 The analysis above explores the situation in which the worker is over-employed. Alternatively, 
individuals may be under-employed, i. e. they may be constrained to work less hours than those 
which equate marginal and economic rates of substitution. In such a situation the individual may 
have an incentive to engage in moonlighting [see Shishko and Rostker (1976) and Killingsworth 
(1983)]. 
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he/she moves to point El with x' - mo being the sick payment to the individual 
(i. e. the point E, represents the position of a 100% absence record whereas the 
point E' is associated with 100% attendance record). If the individual takes only a 
portion of his/her total time allocation as absence, then he/she is effectively moving 
along the budget constraint [E,, E'] characterised by the slope w-s. 
It is apparent that the provision of s will raise the incentive of the worker to 
be absent since its provision partially offsets the costs of absence borne by the 
individual i. e. in the previous analysis where sick pay is not included in the 
employment contract, the opportunity cost of leisure is equal to the wage rate. Once 
sick pay is available, the opportunity of cost of leisure is modified to (w - s) < w. 
Intuitively, as the price of leisure falls, the demand for non work time rises. This is 
shown in Figure 2.3 where the introduction of such a sick pay scheme is examined. 
In Figure 2.3 contractual hours h' are, as in Figure 2.1, in excess of utility 
maximising hours h*. The introduction of a sick pay scheme, in which absence is 
compensated at a rate s<w for each hour of absence, enables a partial offset in the 
loss of earnings resulting from absence. The budget constraint facing the individual 
will pivot at E' to become [T, E,, Ec, 1c ]. The introduction of such a scheme creates 
an income and a substitution effect; the movement from E* to E** represents the 
substitution effect, which serves to increase absenteeism, whilst the movement 
from E** to E*** represents the income effect, which gives a further impetus to 
absence on account of the assumed normality of leisure. Thus, the provision of sick 
pay serves to increase the incentive to be absent since it reduces the loss of income 
sustained when absent. 
An interesting scenario would arise if sick pay were available to individuals 
at the same rate as wages. In tenns of Figure 2.2, assuming w=s would have the 
effect of pivoting the sick pay line upwards such that it bisects the wage line 
perpendicularly from below, shifting point El vertically upwards towards some 
point, say Eý , horizontally level with point E'. The individual's budget set in such 
a situation would be given by a rectangle [T, E,, Ec, 1c ], and given standard convex 
preferences, the worker would have an incentive to absent himself/herself fully. 
The assumption that w=s is not unreasonable and leads to an interesting paradox: 
many workers suffer no immediate monetary penalty for absence, yet still choose 
not to use up all their sick leave, even when they cannot roll sick leave over from 
year to year [see Brown (1994)]. 4 
4A possible explanation for this conundrum may be rooted in the gift-exchange model of 
efficiency wages developed by Akerlof (1982). Workers may be offering the firm a 'gift' of not 
taking all their sick leave in exchange for the finn's reciprocal 'gift' of, for example, leniency and 
compassion should the worker require excessive sick leave for any reason. 
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Figure 2.2: The Budget Constraint with Sick Pay 
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Figure 2.3: Over-Employment and the Provision of Sick Pay 
In this model absence arises out of a discrepancy between the individual's 
marginal rate of substitution and the economic rate of substitution at the specified 
level of contractual hours. Any change in the former, therefore, will affect the 
incentive to be absent. We would expect, for example, an individual's marginal rate 
of substitution to be particularly high when leisure is relatively highly valued as, for 
example, at important family events such as weddings, births and funerals. 5 This 
would lead to a steepening of the individual's indifference curves in Figures 2.1 to 
2.3 - recall Equation (2.4) - and an increased temptation to be absent as the 
individual attempts to equalise his/her marginal and economic rates of substitution. 
Similarly, it may be the case that an individual's marginal rate of substitution will be 
particularly high when the individual is sick. As sickness increases, leisure time 
may become more valuable because of the need for recuperation and/or the fact that 
work may become increasingly onerous. 6 
The key point underpinning any influence on an individual's marginal rate 
of substitution concerns the predictability of that influence. For example, family 
events are reasonably predictable ex ante and individuals affected by such events 
can tailor their behaviour accordingly. Other influences, such as health, are more 
random and so expose individuals to far greater risk and uncertainty. 
It is apparent from the above analysis that absence can only be defined if 
contractual hours are specified in the employment contract. If the individual is free 
to supply his/her desired hours then the phenomenon of absence would not exist. 
Such contracts are, however, rare. Although in principle the array of contracts on 
offer to a particular worker of given skills could be very large, in practice they tend 
to be quite small - normally a full-time contract of 35-40 hours per week or a part- 
time contract of 15-20 hours per week. The question as to why this is the case 
involves issues regarding the nature of the firm's production process. 
Some jobs require very precisely defined hours constraints on account of the 
co-ordination between factor inputs. Such contracts typically specify very clearly 
where and when workers are expected to be present. The type of contract offered to 
workers assembled on a production line, for example, will be characterised by the 
fact that the production line has an optimum staffing level. As a consequence, start 
and finish times will be carefully co-ordinated with the operating times of the line. 
Indeed, they are frequently staggered in order to ensure that the flow of the product 
5 Johns and Nicholson (1982) argue that absence is conditioned not only by the employment 
contract, but by the existence of an implicit social contract which exists between the individual, 
the firm and the fan-dly. 
6 Such an assumption, however, is not obvious. In a world where individuals can take 
'illegitimate' absence, they may prefer to recuperate on the firm's time and 'go sick' when healthy 
so as to enjoy unauthorised leisure. To deal with such issues would require a re-working of the 
simple bi-variate decornposition of time in the standard labour supply model. 
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through the line is matched by the staffing level. In such cases absenteeism is 
clearly defined [Barmby and Treble (1991a)]. Moreover, having specified 
contractual hours so clearly, one would expect such firms to be far more rigorous in 
enforcing the terms of the contract than firms for whom co-ordination is not so 
valuable. 
Other jobs do not rely on such co-ordination and work hours are more 
flexible, with other aspects of employee performance being relevant. For example, 
the process of academic research and teaching is extremely flexible. Time spent on 
research and teaching can be moved from one part of the day to another with little or 
no output loss. It can be concentrated in certain parts of the week or spread out over 
several days. For this reason the typical university academic's contract fails to 
specify contractual hours. Absenteeism in this case is impossible to define since 
attendance is not always required [Johns and Nicholson (1982) and Barmby and 
Treble (1991 a)]. 
A multitude of contractual arrangements lie between these two extreme 
situations, the nature of each arrangement being determined by the task to be 
performed. Flexi-time schemes, for instance, specify a fixed period of attendance 
over some period of time (usually a week or month) leaving the individual to 
decide, within some broadly defined parameters, when hours are to be supplied. 
Under such a regime, although absence on a particular day is not clearly defined, it 
is well defined for the period over which required attendance is specified [Ban-nby 
and Treble (1991b)]. 
Such considerations imply that it is inappropriate to interpret observed 
absence behaviour solely in terms of labour supply considerations. It is apparent 
that what constitutes absence is determined by labour demand aspects which, in 
turn, determine the nature of the employment contract with observed absence 
behaviour conditioned accordingly by such contractual arrangements. Thus, simply 
concentrating on the psychology of workers is only half the problem. A prime 
consideration must be to place the concept of absenteeism within the much broader 
context of contract design. As Johns and Nicholson emphasise: 
... particular attention must be paid to the probability that the very 
construct of absence differs across occupational groups. [Johns and 
Nicholson (1982), p. 1531. 
This line of thought raises several interesting questions: first, if absence-control 
mechanisms are costly then we would expect employment contracts to specify non- 
work time when leisure (income) is particularly highly (lowly) valued by large 
numbers of workers. Indeed, there are many instances when leisure time requires 
some degree of social co-ordination, for example, at weekends and Christmas - and 
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if a firm has to produce within these periods then, because workers' marginal rates 
of substitution between leisure and work are particularly high, the firm may be 
obliged to pay a wage premium in order to induce them into the market. 7 
Second, it is not obvious that absenteeism is in any way inefficient. If the 
worker is induced to take an employment contract at which the marginal and 
economic rates of substitution are in discord, then he/she will have an incentive to 
break that contract. If the worker realises this incentive then he/she is simply 
signalling the discord between his/her private valuation and the market's valuation 
of the allocation of time implied by the contract. Such behaviour is not inefficient 
for the worker because he/she is behaving rationally given the constraints he/she 
faces. 
The firm, for its part, when faced with such a worker, will have to chose 
between attempting to enforce the contract - through monitoring, fines, 
inducements, threats of dismissal and perhaps increased contractual flexibility - or 
simply permitting the non-compliant behaviour. This choice will depend on a 
number of complex issues related to the nature of the production process, the 
psychology of the available work force, and the relationship of the worker to other 
inputs (including other workers). If the firm chooses the latter option then it must 
be because it perceives the marginal cost of enforcing the contract to be in excess of 
the marginal benefit of so doing. The CBI (1994) found that many organisations do 
not operate schemes to reduce absence; 38% of firms surveyed do not have an 
occupational health program and 49% do not use absence as a basis to determine 
redundancy. In such cases observed absence is simply the manifestation of a 
solution to a market problem. 8 If, on the other hand, the firm chooses the former 
option, and thereby devotes valuable resources to ensuring contract compliance, 
then it is reasonable to infer that the employment contract was initially generating an 
inefficient solution to the contracting problem. 
More generally, given the dynamic aspect of the absence decision - and the 
related predictability of future marginal rates of substitution between income and 
leisure - permitting, and even planning on some absence, may provide an optimal 
response by both workers and firms to the problems of risk and uncertainty. 
Employers, for example, may experience higher costs for unpredictable absence 
7 Another aspect here concerns the presence of government mandated absence policies, such as 
statutory maternity leave. These may be rationalised in terms of an externality argument - the 
privately efficient level of absence might fall short of what is deemed to be socially desirable. 
8 The CBI survey of absenteeism indicated that employers felt that work related stress was one of 
the major contributory factors of sickness absence amongst non-manual workers. Hence, 
employers may feel that it is more efficient for such employees to absent themselves rather than 
attend. 
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relative to predictable absence, whilst employees may experience some stochastic 
costs to attendance. 9 
Third, in light of the above discussion it becomes meaningless to talk in 
terms of observed absence being in any way either supply or demand constrained. 
As with all economic behaviour it is the interaction of the two forces which is 
relevant. In terms of the above analysis, the market mechanism will determine not 
only observed absence behaviour, but also the system of absence control employed 
by the firm. This leads to an important identification problem. Observed variations 
in absence may be due to the behaviour of both the firm's management as well as its 
employees. An increase in absenteeism, for example, might induce a firm to amend 
its absence control mechanism by more stringently monitoring absentees. 
We turn now to the economic literature on absence and attempt to evaluate 
the extent to which economists have been successful in addressing these issues. 
2.3 The Literature 
In this Section I first survey the early economic literature on absence. I then discuss 
the revival in interest amongst economists into absence following the contributions 
of applied psychologists, particularly Steers and Rhodes (1978), before turning 
finally to the contemporary economic literature. The aim of this Section is to 
identify the extent to which the predictions of the labour supply model of absence 
behaviour have been empirically verified, and the ways in which economists have 
attempted to surmount its theoretical and empirical shortcomings. 
2.3.1 Early Contributions 
Treble (1990) argues that the first serious attempts to analyse absence were the two 
reports issued by the Medical Research Council in London [Vernon and Bedford 
(1928) and Vernon et al (1931)] which were based on micro-data on British coal 
miners from ten collieries in the Nottingham coal field over the periods 1920-26 and 
1926-28. The authors investigated the relationship between variables proxying 
working conditions (e. g. the depth and thickness of seam, temperature, humidity 
and airflow) with three different classes of absence; absence due to sickness, 
absence due to accidents, and a residual class, interpreted as voluntary absence. 
Total absence was found to increase with the depth of the workings for all 
classes of worker, whilst absence due to sickness was found to be positively related 
to underground temperature. Absence due to minor accidents was found to increase 
with underground temperature, although no such relationship was found to hold for 
9A worker's marginal rate of substitution may rise during the Wimbledon fortnight - unless it C, 
rains! 
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major accidents. The frequency of accidents was also found to increase with seam 
thickness, average output of coal per man, labour turnover, the average age of the 
work force and the timing of the shift. Finally, the residual category of 'voluntary' 
absence was found to increase with the distance walked underground to the 
workplace, labour turnover, with the distance of men's homes from the colliery, 
and with the proximity of a large town. 
While both reports are characterised by various deficiencies and 
shortcomings [see Treble (1990)], they highlighted for the first time the significance 
of the various characteristics of the employment contract, such as the remuneration 
scheme and the availability of sick pay, for observed absence - both studies found 
absence to be significantly affected by the presence of a sick pay scheme and to be 
highly sensitive to pay rates. The reports also highlighted the influence of the 
working environment (temperature and humidity) on absenteeism -a theme which 
has been stressed since in the applied psychology literature. 
Other notable contributions to the early [i. e. the pre-Steers and Rhodes 
(1978) literature] include Ehrenberg (1970), Flanagan et al (1974), Reza (1975) and 
Deardorff and Stafford (1976). The main results from these papers are summarised 
below. 
Ehrenberg (1970) challenged the conventional view amongst managers that 
absenteeism was the primary cause of overtime with attenders being asked to fill in 
the gaps created by the absentees in return for compensation at premium rates [see 
Hart (1987)]. The basic argument put forward by managers was that large firms 
attempted to allow for absenteeism by hiring stand-by workers; however, because 
of the stochastic nature of absence, it was impossible for them to have replacements 
always available, and so overtime must be worked by existing employees in order 
to meet production schedules. 
Ehrenberg argued against this conventional wisdom, showing that a rational 
economic response to an increasingly certain absence rate involves increasing the 
amount of overtime worked per employee, whilst the effect on the level of 
employment is ambiguous. An increasingly uncertain absence rate raises the stock 
of employment and reduces the average level of overtime. The intuition for his 
results lies in the 'fixity' of labour costs; many labour costs must be paid even 
when an employee is absent, being independent of the exact number of hours each 
employee works (e. g. paid vacations, paid public holidays, private welfare and 
insurance schemes and statutory insurance payments). Overtime hourly wage 
payments, however, need not be made to absentees such that an increasingly certain 
absence rate modifies the labour cost function asymmetrically, increasing the 
marginal cost of labour purchased through additional workers relative to the 
marginal cost of labour purchased through increased hours. 
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Flanagan et al (1974) explore the economic implications of job satisfaction. 
Their theoretical framework suggests that as the economy grows there will be an 
increase in workers' demands for both pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards. Since 
an individual is assumed to be concerned with the mix between these rewards, any 
combination which does not satisfy such preferences will lead to a situation of 
disequilibrium, which in turn will lead to lower productivity and higher levels of 
strikes, quits and absenteeism. Once allowances are made for differences in factors 
such as weekly hours and personal characteristics, however, Flanagan et al are 
unable to find any supporting empirical evidence for their theoretical priors. This is 
hardly surprising given that the empirical analysis is somewhat ad hoc, with data 
deficiencies leading to inconsistent estimations of essentially related expressions of 
job dissatisfaction. Time-series analysis is used to examine quit rates9 whilst 
absence is explored using cross-sectional techniques, such that any 
interdependencies between these expressions of job dissatisfaction are ignored 
[Kenyon and Dawkins (1989)]. The study nevertheless remains of interest since it 
places absenteeism into the realm of job satisfaction, a concept developed more 
fully in the applied psychology literature. 
Reza (1975) explores within a specific theoretical framework a firm's 
employment decision where the firm is assumed to take account of an exogenously 
given rate of absence. The predictions of the model suggest that as absenteeism 
rises, the optimal level of labour and capital falls whilst the optimal number of 
hours worked per worker in attendance rises. Reza analyses a fall in the real wage 
and shows that a worker will wish to supply fewer hours. Hence in order to supply 
fewer hours the individual can increase the amount of absence and, therefore, raise 
the absence rate. As outlined above, however, this would increase the number of 
hours worked by the worker's colleagues who are in attendance. Since individuals 
are assumed to be homogeneous, all members of the work force would have an 
incentive to reduce attendance. Thus, employees may find a more beneficial method 
of reducing the number of hours worked by acting collectively through a union and 
resorting to actions such as strikes. Strikes and absenteeism have been analysed as 
symptoms of contractual dissatisfaction with absence being regarded as individual 
level action and strikes as collective action. An individual may resort to absenteeism 
as a short-term measure, but resort to union activity as a longer term solution [see, 
for example, Kenyon and Dawkins (1989)]. 
Deardorff and Stafford (1976) examine labour demand and supply 
behaviour in a situation where the firm's production technology depends upon the 
simultaneous presence, during the workday, of two factors of production. Under 
such circumstances the firm would not be indifferent to the number of hours 
worked by an employee and traditional labour supply modelling, which assumes 
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that the length of the working day is supply determined with the worker choosing 
the utility maximising amount of labour supply, becomes inappropriate. In the 
presence of multiple factors of production, the firm's productivity hinges on its 
ability to collectively organise inputs, a point which leads the authors to Suggest 
that, '... the firm will itself decide the length of the working day. ' (p. 67 1). The 
relevance of the paper to the economics of absence is that it provides a rationale for 
demand determined contractual hours, a necessary condition for any definition of 
absenteeism. 
To summarise, it is clear that over the 1970's a small number of economists 
pinpointed a variety of important and interesting implications of absence behaviour. 
The studies were, however, largely unco-ordinated, emphasising the lack of 
coherence underpinning contemporary economic interest in this area. This 
pragmatism stands in marked contrast to other disciplines, notably the applied 
psychology literature, where the research agenda appears to be far more sharply 
focused. 
2.3.2 The Revival 
Despite the somewhat promising start, the economic literature on absence was 
rather neglected for the best part of fifty years. It is only in the past two decades that 
some form of revival can be observed, with the emphasis being placed largely on 
empirical analysis. 
The desultory performance of economists stands in marked contrast to that 
of applied psychologists, who have maintained a long tradition of investigation into 
the motivations underpinning the decision of a worker to absent. The general theme 
followed by these researchers has been that absence can be regarded as a 
withdrawal response to a negative work environment. 
One of the major contributions to this field is the paper by Steers and 
Rhodes (1978) in which the authors attempt to construct a theory of absence based 
on the results of the empirical investigations to-date. Although the authors do not set 
out a formal specification for their model, certain interesting features can be 
discerned. Following Chadwick-Jones et al (1973), a distinction is made between 
'unavoidable' ('Type A') absence, whereby the individual is unable to attend on 
account of sickness; and 'avoidable' ('Type B') absence, whereby the individual 
lacks the motivation to attend. Job satisfaction, the outcome of an interaction 
between job and personal characteristics, determines the former, whilst sickness is 
seen as crucial to the latter. Observed absence is then interpreted as the result of a 
complex interaction between both ability and motivation. 
20 
Barmby et al (1991a) conduct an economic critique of the Steers-Rhodes 
model. Essentially, the model is lacking in the sense that it is incapable of 
falsification. Many of the variables used are poorly defined and incapable of 
measurement (e. g. trole stress', 'work group norms' and 'personal work ethic'), 
plus the direction of many influences is not specified. For example, does the 
pressure to attend lead to an increase or decrease in observed absence? Similarly, do 
family responsibilities increase or decrease attendance? Moreover, for a model so 
grounded in empirical observation, the integrity of the empirical work on which 
their results are based is somewhat doubtful: 
... 
Steers and Rhodes themselves have some harsh things to say about 
the quality of the empirical work on which their results were based ... At the time of writing, studies had been largely based on the 
examination of simple bi-variate correlations. There are problems of 
comparability (partly caused by poor reporting practices), and a failure 
in experimental work to design experiments carefully. [Barmby et al 
(1991a), p2161. 
Despite its limitations, however, the Steers-Rhodes study remains an 
important contribution to the economic theory of absence. In particular it highlights 
the implications of efficiency for absenteeism, a significant consideration because, 
even today, many commentators, particularly in the field of management, regard 
absence as unequivocally bad. Steers and Rhodes, however, noted that: 
... some absenteeism may in fact be healthy for organisations in that 
such behaviour can allow for temporary escape from stressful situations 
... (R)igid efforts to ensure perfect attendance may lead to unintended 
and detrimental consequences on the job ... [Steers and Rhodes (1978), 
p4031. 
The Steers-Rhodes study has also attracted criticism from within the applied 
psychology literature. Fichman (1984), for example, criticises both the theoretical 
and empirical content of the Steers-Rhodes model, outlining a theoretical 
framework of absence based on a dynamic model of the allocation of time which is 
intended to overcome some of the more problematic areas of the Steers-Rhodes 
contribution. Indeed, Steers and Rhodes do themselves accept many of the 
weaknesses of their 1978 work and in a latter study [Steers and Rhodes (1984)] 
outline a number of extensions to their model in the light of contemporary 
criticisms. 
First, they respond to Chadwick-Jones et al's (1982) criticism that models 
such as Steers and Rhodes' are overtly focused on the role of the individual 
decision maker and that they pay insufficient attention to social considerations. 
Steers and Rhodes concede that, whilst their original model did recognise the 
existence of work norms as a pressure to attend, they could have made the influence 
of this concept somewhat more apparent. Second, they concur with the findings of 
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Cheloha and Farr (1980) that, amongst job attitudinal factors, job involvement may 
be a better predictor of absence than job satisfaction. Third, they concede Smith's 
(1977) argument that it is an individual's perception of his/her ability to attend, 
rather than the individual's actual ability to attend, which is relevant in determining 
absence behaviour. The same event may impact differently upon different 
individuals - what is important is how the individual treats the event and how he/she 
interprets its impact on his/her ability to attend. Finally, they acknowledge that 
absenteeism is merely one aspect of a more general withdrawal process that 
includes, for example, lateness and turnover. 
Steers and Rhodes also make the more general point that scientific modelling 
is an evolutionary process. This is certainly true of the applied psychology literature 
in which there has been a virulent, yet healthy debate between various researchers. 
The same, unfortunately, cannot be said of the economic literature, and it is this to 
which I now turn. 
2.3.3 Contemporary Economic Literature 
The 1980's witnessed a revival of interest amongst economists into the causes and 
consequences of worker absence, at last taking the lead from the advancements that 
had been made in other disciplines. These economists applied their traditional 
labour market modelling techniques to worker absence with mixed results. 
The Steers-Rhodes model is typical of the applied psychology literature in 
that it lacks a rigorous theoretical basis. Moreover, job satisfaction is highlighted as 
the key to an individual's voluntary absence decision. There is, however, a strong 
positive correlation between job satisfaction and wages [see, for example, Freeman 
(1978) and BorJas (1979)], hence the effect of job satisfaction on absence 
behaviour may have been exaggerated. But it was not until the 1980's, when 
economists at last re-entered the fray, that the role of the wage was illustrated 
formally. 
2.3.3.1 Absenteeism and Labour Supply 
The majority of economic studies have modelled absence in terms of the basic 
labour supply model set out in Section 2.2 with emphasis being placed on factors 
representing the employment contract. From that analysis it is clear that the effect of 
the wage rate on absence is ambiguous with conflicting income and substitution 
effects. Hence empirical evidence plays a key role in adjudicating. 
Dunn and Youngblood (1986), for example, analyse whether an individual 
faced with a situation where contractual hours are greater than desired hours will 
absent himself/herself in order to test the following hypothesis: 
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Absence = f(MRS - wage) (2.8) 
An empirical measure of an individual's marginal rate of substitution (MRS) 
between income and leisure is derived using survey techniques which require 
individuals to evaluate non-pecuniary job benefits in terms of time and money. The 
equivalence between the time and money evaluations yields the estimate of the 
MRS. The results show a significant positive relationship between absence and the 
difference between a worker's marginal rate of substitution and the wage rate. 
Supportive evidence for the result of a negative relationship between wage rates and 
absence is found in Drago and Wooden (1992), Chaudhury and Ng (1992) and 
Allen (1981b). This contrasts, however, with the results of Leigh (1991) which 
indicate that wages and paid sick leave are not statistically significant predictors of 
absence. 
Allen (198 1 a) analyses a sample of workers with self-reported measures of 
days absent in terms of an extended income-leisure model. It is extended by the 
incorporation of the assumption that the absentee suffers a lump sum penalty to 
cover the firm's losses from his/her absence. Such losses may arise since the firm 
may have to take costly measures to fill the gap created by the absentee i. e. the 
output of the firm may be reduced if a replacement worker cannot be found or, if a 
replacement is found, he/she will in general be less efficient at performing the task. 
In addition, the fixed costs of employment will raise the costs to the firm of 
employing substitute workers. Furthermore, the penalty imposed to cover losses 
such as these is in addition to any lost earnings which are not offset by sick pay. 
The penalty is assumed to be reflected in a decreased chance of promotion and/or an 
increased probability of being fired, with the opportunity cost of dismissal being 
proxied with industry dummy variables and personal characteristics. It should be 
pointed out, however, that the incorporation of dummy variables into the analysis 
does not prove to be particular informative. 
Allen's paper is largely bereft of any formal theoretical modelling and so, 
perhaps not surprisingly, his empirical results are somewhat difficult to interpret. 
He finds that wages are inversely related to absenteeism, but the significance of this 
result is questionable. For example, evidence of a significant wage effect is found 
only in an equation that excludes personal characteristics. When the data is divided 
into occupational subgroups (blue collar and white collar) a wage effect is only 
present for the blue collar workers, and only then when a dummy variable 
describing whether or not sick pay is payable is included. 
Scott and Markham (1983) re-test Allen"s basic hypothesis using aggregate 
firm data from a survey undertaken by the American Society of Personal 
23 
Administration which contains employer- reported absence rates for each fin-n as a 
whole. They do not, however, find a statistically significant relationship between 
the average hourly pay rates at the firms in the sample and their average absence 
rates. However, these results should be interpreted somewhat cautiously because 
the individual behaviour in question is being inferred from highly aggregated data. 
Other studies which attempt to assess the impact of wages and/or fringe 
benefits as explanatory variables include Chelius (1981), Dalton and Perry (1981), 
Deitsch and Ditts (1981) and Youngblood (1978,1984) and Winkler (1980), the 
last of whom analyses absenteeism amongst school teachers and discovers a 
significant inverse relationship between absence and wages. 
It should be borne in mind that the majority of empirical investigations are 
not conducted solely within the theoretical framework outlined in Section 2.2. The 
final equation estimated by Dunn and Youngblood (1986), for example, takes the 
following form: 
Absence =a+ P(mrs - w) + o5iZi (2.9) 
where a, P, 8j, are the parameters to be estimated and Zi is a vector of socio- 
economic variables such as sex, age and race and marital status. 
A common finding in many studies has been that females exhibit higher 
absence rates than males [Allen (1981a, 1984), Leigh (1981a, 1991), Drago and 
Wooden (1992) and Paringer (1983)]. Such a finding is somewhat difficult to 
interpret in terms of the standard income-leisure model of labour supply. It may be 
that women play a larger role in domestic duties and hence may absent themselves 
from work in order to gain a greater degree of flexibility. 10 Indeed, it has typically 
been argued that women tend to assume responsibility for the children within a 
household, and so will tend to stay at home if such dependants become ill. Leigh 
(1986,1991), for example, finds a positive and significant effect between absence 
and a 'sex - young dependants' interactive variable. This result accords with the 
empirical findings of the medical literature on absenteeism. II 
10 Morbidity indices indicate that women report more illness than men despite having a higher life 
expectancy. Nathenson (1975,1977) surveys sociological, psychological and biological 
explanations for this trend. McKeown (1989) and McKeown and Furness (1987) discover that 
males take fewer episodes of absence than females who in turn exhibit shorter but more frequent 
absence. 
II Emphasis in medical statistics is placed on the empirical analysis of health statistics as opposed 
to theoretical analysis. Relationships are examined between health status, sickness absence, 
personal and occupational characteristics [such studies include Pines et al (1985), Ryan (1981), 
Jenkins (1985), Broadhead et al (1990) and Parker et al (1987)]. Results are broadly in line with 
those found in the economics literature i. e. married females with young children exhibit a 
relatively high degree of sickness absence. It should be noted, however, that some of the statistical 
techniques applied in this area have been heavily criticised [Reidy (1990)]. 
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Figures 2.4 and 2.5 above illustrate the trends in the absence rates of males 
and females over the period 1984 to 1993.12 The graphs indicate how the absence 
rate for women has tended to exceed that for men in both the United Kingdom and 
Great Britain. A related explanatory variable is marital status. Evidence suggests 
that married people absent themselves less frequently. This may be due to, for 
example, financial pressures [Allen (1984), Keller (1983) and Leigh (1984,1986)]. 
The significance of such demographic factors is not, however, universally 
accepted. The results cited above concerning the significance of personal 
characteristics contrast with those of Barmby and Treble (1991a), for example, 
which stress the importance of contractual characteristics. Estimating the probability 
of an individual going absent through a probit model, Barmby and Treble find that 
personal characteristics such as age, sex and marital status do not exert a significant 
influence on the probability of absence. Significant factors include the wage rate, 
working conditions and contract type. Kenyon and Dawkins (1989) also find that 
variables pertaining to the composition of the labour force do not exert much 
influence on absence. Their results indicate that variables which affect the budget 
constraint faced by workers in turn affect labour absence. 
To summarise, it is apparent that some degree of confusion exists within the 
empirical literature. The puzzling results which have emerged are arguably due to 
weak theoretical priors. 13 Recently, there has been a slow yet emerging increase in 
the theoretical contributions to this area and it is to these which I now turn. 
2.3.3.2 Absenteeism and Labour Demand 
Ban-nby and Treble (1991a, 1991b) argue that the weakness and conflicting nature 
of the evidence obtained by many studies is due to a problem of identification which 
stems from the fact that absence behaviour has been examined with limited 
reference to labour demand. The basic premise is that labour demand considerations 
play a more active role in determining absence than those cast by the economic 
studies of absence behaviour. Kenyon and Dawkins (1987), for example, remark 
that: 
... labour absence originates on the supply-side of the market ... However, management practices can respond to labour absence by 
altering the environment within which the labour supply decision takes 
12 The data is taken from Regional Trends (1994) and represents the proportion of male and female 
employees reporting at least one day's absence from work during the week prior to the interview. 0 13 The shortage of theoretical foundations may have led to the myriad of empirical specifications 
employed in the empirical studies of absence. The majority of the studies reviewed in this section 
have used cross-section data [one exception is Kenyon and Dawkins (1989) who adopt a time series 
approach] and adapt logit models in order to analyse rates of absence. The various adaptations 
introduced may have had some bearing on any divergence in the results found across different 
studies. 
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place, and so alter the labour absence outcome. [Kenyon and Dawkins 
(1987), p. 41. 
Although Kenyon and Dawkins recognise the influence of labour demand on 
absence behaviour, labour demand is regarded as a response to absence as opposed 
to a determinant. It is inevitable, therefore, that the interpretation of empirical results 
becomes problematic given that labour demand and labour supply are clearly 
interrelated. Indeed, the exclusion of labour demand considerations may lead to a 
mis-specified model. In order to present a more balanced approach one should 
consider why certain employment contracts prevail in particular sectors of the 
economy. The labour demand question, therefore, should be explicitly addressed. 
It soon becomes apparent, however, when surveying the literature on 
absenteeism that there is a shortage of theoretical analyses which incorporate 
demand side aspects despite the fact that empirical evidence has indicated the 
importance of contract type on absence behaviour. The empirical conclusions 
reached by Allen (198 1 a), for example, suggest that work schedules and financial 
incentive schemes bear a significant influence on individuals' decisions to absent 
themselves from work. Similarly, Kenyon and Dawkins (1987) discover that it is 
variables which shift or change the slope of the budget constraint, rather than 
compositional variables such as sex and marital status, that predominantly influence 
absence behaviour. Thus, the nature of the employment contract appears to be of 
extreme importance when analysing the ways in which labour supply is affected by 
such considerations. Thus, empirical evidence implies that absenteeism should not 
be solely regarded as a supply side phenomenon and that the employer's demand 
for labour should be explicitly incorporated into the analysis. 
Some researchers have endeavoured to incorporate labour demand 
considerations into their analysis. Allen (198 1 b), for example, treats absenteeism as 
a non-pecuniary characteristic of the compensation package by developing the 
hedonic framework initiated by Rosen (1974). Allen derives an offer function for 
an employer which indicates the combinations of wages and absence rates that 
he/she is willing to provide at a given level of profit. Given that each employer is 
characterised by such an offer curve, the envelope of all such curves yields the 
trade-off between wages and absence which exists in the market. Similarly a family 
of indifference curves representing preferences between wages and absence are 
derived for each individual, each of whom will chose an employer such that his/her 
indifference curve is tangential to the envelope of the employer's offer curves. 
Given that absence is an 'agreeable' job attribute, the model predicts an inverse 
relationship between wage rates and absence. 14 Furthermore, implicit in the 
14 A more rigorous analysis of this relationship is presented in Allen (1983). 
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hedonic approach is the notion that some degree of absence is efficient. Although 
the hedonic approach incorporates both labour demand and labour supply 
considerations, it is somewhat disappointing that subsequent authors have failed to 
follow Allen's lead. 
From the discussion so far it is apparent that the extent to which the 
individual is able to engage in absenteeism depends on the nature of the 
employment contract and the measures taken by the employer to enforce it. 
Absenteeism in the context of the simple labour supply analysis depicted in Figures 
2.1 to 2.3 arises due to the imposition of an hours constraint. If contractual hours 
were not defined then the concept of absenteeism would not exist. But the hours 
constraint represents only one characteristic of the employment contract. This 
relationship is subject to further complications since the setting of contractual hours 
is not generally independent of the determination of the offered wage rate. In order 
to present a more integrated theory of absenteeism some explanation for the 
determination of any constraint on hours is required. 
In addition, to attract individuals to a firm which constrains hours, wages 
may have to be set to compensate for the constraint. Again this assumes that wages 
adjust to accommodate hours constraints which may be of a technological nature - 
the production technology, for example, may be such that wages are easier to alter 
than hours. Compensating wage differentials represent one mechanism whereby 
wages alter to accommodate an hours constraint imposed in certain sectors of the 
economy. 
Abowd and Ashenfelter (1981) present a theoretical model of compensating 
wage differentials which serve to compensate for hours constraints. In contrast to 
the conventional model of absence behaviour, the constraints in this model serve to 
under-employ rather than over-employ the individual. The analysis below 
reinterprets that of Abowd and Ashenfelter to introduce the relationship between 
absenteeism arising from over-employment constraints and the wage differentials 
serving to compensate for these constraints. 
Identical individuals may accept a job in either one of two sectors. In sector 
one there are no hours constraints; given the wage rate, w, the individual in this 
sector can choose his/her optimal amount of labour supply. Hence, the concept of 
absenteeism does not exist in sector one. In sector two, on the other hand, the 
employment contract specifies a fixed wage and a constraint on the amount of 
labour to be supplied. 
In sector one the individual chooses his/her optimal labour supply given 
wages and non labour income, mo, where the optimal labour supply decision is 
defined as follows: 
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(2.10) 
The individual's indirect utility function can then be derived which is denoted by the 
following: 
V* = V(h *. wh* + mo) (2.11) 
Since the analysis is concerned with the case where the individual is over- 
employed, the hours constraint in sector two, h', is assumed to be as follows: 
h' > h* (w, mo) (2.12) 
where h' denotes the number of hours specified in sector two as in the labour 
supply model depicted in Figure 2.1. The corresponding indirect utility function 
associated with employment in sector two is denoted by: 
Vc = V(hc, whc + mo) (2.13) 
Assuming the same levels of w and mo prevail in the two sectors, then the 
following inequality must hold: 
V(h c, whc + mo) < V(h*, wh* + mo) (2.14) 
In this situation the individual will always choose a job in sector one since the utility 
derived in the absence of the hours constraint exceeds that from employment in the 
constrained sector. For labour market equilibrium to prevail the following must 
hold: 
V(hc, whc + mo) = V(h * wh *+ mo) (2.15) 
where w" represents the compensating variation solution which satisfies the above 
condition. When the employment contract stipulates contractual hours at h', the 
equilibrium wage prevailing in sector two is w" where w" > w. The compensating 
wage differential, (wcv - w), is such that it eliminates the difference between 
C V(h , wh* + ino) and 
V(h , whc + m,, 
). Hence, in order to attract workers to sector 
two, the firms in this sector must offer a higher wage rate to compensate for the 
imposition of the hours constraint. 
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In the situation described so far h' is known with certainty and the utility 
derived from employment in each sector is weighed up on the assumption that the 
individual will supply this amount of labour, i. e. the individual does not expect to 
absent himself/herself from work if employed in sectors one or two. It may be more 
realistic to assume that h' is a random variable such that the individual is unsure of 
the degree to which the hours constraint will be effective. 15The extent to which 
he/she may be able to engage in absenteeism to reach his/her optimal labour supply 
is, therefore, subject to risk. Hence, h' is assumed to be a random variable with a 
probability density function, g(h'). The individual is assumed to have full 
information regarding the probability density function of h' and is, therefore, able 
to determine the expected value of h', which is denoted by h. 
The individual has to decide between employment in sector one with w and 
h* and employment in sector two with WC'r, the wage which compensates for the 
riskiness of changes in hours worked in sector two, and h'. Thus, the wage rate, 
W"r, satisfies the foHowing condition: 
E[V(h C, Wlr h' + mo)] = V(h * wh* + mo) (2.16) 
That is, WCVr equates the level of the indirect utility functions across the two sectors 
of the economy. 
Figure 2.6 below illustrates how W"r compensates the individual for the 
risk faced in sector two. In this diagram the indirect utility function maximised with 
respect to h', the hours constraint, is graphed where the highest point on the curve, 
o, corresponds to the individual's utility maximising labour supply decision. The 
maximised indirect utility function, V= V(h';. ), is assumed, for simplicity, to be 
concave. 
For simplicity, h' is assumed to be a discrete random variable, hence 9(h') 
is assumed to take the Mowing form: 
pr(hc = h*) = 77 
pr(h' =h 
max )= 1- 77 
where O< 77<1 
(2.17) 
Thus, h"' is assumed to be the upper bound on hc, the hours constraint such that 
hc equals h" with probability (I - 17) and hc equals h* with probability 17. 
15 In a similar vein, Georgellis (1994) presents a matching framework in which workers acquire 
information regarding actual hours of work with experience on the job. 
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Figure 2.6: Absenteeism and Wage Compensating Differentials 
Hence, due to the assumed specification of the probability density function of h', 
the expected value of h' can be expressed as: 
E[h'] =h= 77 h* + (I - 77)h 
max 
whilst expected indirect utility can be expressed as follows: 
E[V(h';. )] = rIV (h * ;. ) + (I - 71)V 
(h mx ; -) 
(2.19) 
i. e. the expected indirect utility function is defined as a weighted average of 
maximised indirect utility when h' equals h* and maximised indirect utility when 
h' equals h". The positive compensating variation in wages, 
(WCVr 
_ W), serves 
to eliminate the difference between V(h*;. )=V(h*, wh*+mo) and 
C E[V(hc;. )] = E[V(h , whc + m,, 
)]. The compensating differential is positive due to 
the assumed concavity of the indirect utility function which represents risk 
aversion. 
This reinterpretation of the model of Abowd and Ashenfelter illustrates the 
degree of symmetry between the literature which treats under-employment as a 
constraint on individual behaviour and absence behaviour as interpreted in the 
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context of the labour supply model. The characteristics of the employment contracts 
offered in the two sectors have implications for the extent to which absenteeism 
emerges in the economy, hence the mechanism behind this result is of importance in 
the analysis of absenteeism. In the situation where h' is a random variable, for 
example, the compensating wage differential is determined with respect to the 
expected value of the hours constraint. Once an individual has decided to accept the 
contract offered in period two, he/she may discover that h' is greater or less than 
F. In the case where it materialises that h' > jý the individual may have an incentive 
to engage in absenteeism. 
The discussion above highlights the parallels which exist between under- 
employment and over-employment. It is clear that whilst much attention has been 
paid to the implications of the fon-ner for worker behaviour, the implications of the 
latter have attracted considerably less attention. It is apparent that not only does the 
presence of an hours constraint define absenteeism, but the effectiveness of the 
imposed hours constraint is itself a major determinant of absence. 
Such considerations suggest that the introduction of a degree of flexibility 
into employment contracts may enable the firm to exercise some control over the 
level of absence. 16Enhanced flexibility may serve to reduce an employee's demand 
for absence since workers may engage in absenteeism as a means of counteracting 
inflexible work schedules. It is in this vein that overtime systems have been 
proposed as a way of counteracting absenteeism. Leslie (1982), for example, 
argues that high overtime working should imply low rates of absenteeism. An 
employer may offer overtime premia for hours worked in excess of contractual 
hours in order to induce individuals to supply more labour. Such measures lead to 
non-convexity in the budget constraint which may cause workers to obtain 
increased utility by working overtime. In order to incorporate overtime into their 
labour supply-based model, Kenyon and Dawkins (1987) specify leisure as: 
1= T-(h'-h a )-hol (2.20) 
where hs represents standard hours, h' represents absence hours and h` 
represents overtime hours. The implications of the amended labour supply analysis 
are depicted in Figure 2.7 below. 
16 The idea that workers may engage in absenteeism as a means of counteracting inflexible work 
schedules has been suggested by Allen (1981a) who points out that the opportunity cost of 
working varies over time as alternatives present themselves, thereby highlighting the individual's 
need for flexibility. 
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Figure 2.7: Absence Behaviour and Overtime Premia 
If there are no contractual constraints and the budget line is given by the line AC, 
then the worker will choose to be at E* where the indifference curve 12 is tangential 
to the budget constraint. If the employer imposes standard hours of h', then the 
individual has an incentive to be absent due to the divergence between E* and E'. 
Suppose the firm ideally wants the worker to supply h' hours of labour. The firm 
could offer a two part wage structure to induce the worker to supply h' hours of 
labour where the wage for standard hours is given by the slope of the line DA and 
the wage for 'overtime' hours is given by the slope of E'D. In the diagram I, 
clearly lies above 12 and is tangential to E'D at point E'. Thus, with the two-part 
wage structure initiated by the payment of overtime premia for hours supplied in 
excess of standard hours, the individual has no incentive to be absent. If contractual 
hours were raised in the absence of an overtime premia, this would clearly increase 
the incentive to be absent [recall Equation (2.7)]. 
On the other hand, Chaudhury and Ng (1992) argue that overtime may be 
associated with increased absence since it may lead to less flexible working 
arrangements and longer working days. In addition, the income effect associated 
with overtime may increase absence. It is apparent, therefore, that there are two 
potential conflicting effects on absence resulting from any changes in overtime 
[Kenyon and Dawkins (1989)]. The income effect coupled with the assumption of 
diminishing marginal utility implies a positive relationship between overtime hours 
and absence. If, however, overtime hours earn a premium, as depicted in Figure 
2.7, then this creates an incentive to reduce absence. 
33 
One rationale for overtime working may, therefore, be framed in terms of 
absence. The basic argument is that the stochastic nature of absence means that 
6 stand-by' workers are not always readily available to firms. If production 
schedules are dependent upon fixed team sizes then it may pay the firm to introduce 
some form of overtime working to enhance the flexibility of the employment input. 
It would follow then that it is the randomness of absence which rationalises the 
presence of overtime working - if absence rates were known with certainty ex ante, 
management would be able to take appropriate remedial action without call to 
additional overtime. 17 
Clearly there is some confusion in the economics literature regarding the 
influence of overtime on absence behaviour. To resolve the theoretical debate one 
must resort to empirical explorations. The paucity of data, however, has limited the 
ability of researchers to analyse the role of overtime. One exception is the study by 
Kenyon and Dawkins (1989) who argue that the availability of overtime should 
have implications for absence rates. As a proxy for the availability of overtime the 
percentage of workers working overtime is included in their time series analysis. 
Since the availability of overtime may be related to the average hours of overtime 
worked by each employee this variable is also included. Thus, a variable 
representing the average number of overtime hours per employee working overtime 
is included. Their results, however, suggest that only the latter variable is 
significant, indicating that an increase in overtime per employee reduces absence. 
Due to data scarcity, Drago and Wooden (1992) include a variable which represents 
hours actually worked each week since they do not have access to data on overtime 
working. This variable is assumed to capture the difference between hours across 
individuals who do work overtime and those who do not. The sign of the estimated 
coefficient suggests a negative association between actual work hours and absence 
behaviour. Chaudhury and Ng (1992) using firm level data include a dummy 
variable which equals one if overtime is common in the work place. The estimated 
coefficient on this variable turns out, however, to be insignificant. 
It is apparent from the above that overtime affects absence partly through the 
alterations to the length of the working day. A related point, therefore, concerns the 
distinction between part-time and full-time workers. One may argue that individuals 
whose specific preferences demand a high proportion of non-work time will opt for 
such a contract since it may minimise the mismatch between contractual hours and 
desired hours. Thus, one would conjecture that part-time workers would absent 
themselves less frequently since they experience enhanced flexibility with respect to 
17 Ehrenberg (1970), however, challenges this conventional view, demonstrating that an optimal 
response by a firm to a certain absence rate is to increase the amount of overtime worked per 
worker (see Section 2.3.1). 
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their work schedule, and, in addition, since they have fewer scheduled hours, they 
are likely to derive less utility from an additional unit of leisure. In addition, 
Chaudhury and Ng (1992) argue that part-time workers may have less job security 
than their full-time counterparts and, thus, may face greater penalties for absence. 
This has been borne out to some degree by empirical work. Chaudhury and Ng 
(1992), for example, in a study using firm level data, find evidence which suggests 
that firms with more part-time workers experience a lower level of absence. This is 
consistent with the results of Drago and Wooden (1992) which indicate that part- 
time employees exhibit low absence and accords with the empirical analysis of 
Barmby and Treble (1991a) which, using micro data, indicates that contract type 
has an important effect on absence. Early evidence from Flanagan et al (1974) 
suggests that absence rates are higher in industries where the weekly hours of work 
are relatively high. 
All this stresses the crucial role played by flexibility in the determination of 
absence decisions. This area is problematic, however, in the respect that flexibility 
is a difficult concept to define and measure. Allen (1981a) incorporates dummy 
variables into his regression equation to represent flexibility. There is a dummy 
variable, for example, which equals one if the same hours are worked each day. 
The estimated coefficient is significant and indicates that the group of workers 
which works the same hours each day are characterised by a higher level of 
absence. Balchin and Wooden (1992) attempt to deal with the problem by including 
a dummy variable in their empirical analysis which indicates whether or not the 
largest occupational group within the work place was able to exercise some 
discretion over start and finish times. The results indicate that flexibility exerts an 
insignificant effect on absence behaviour. Further problems may arise as fin-n level, 
as opposed to micro-data, is used. Since absenteeism is essentially the outcome of 
an individual's decision-making process, it may be argued that micro-data is more 
appropriate. 
Leigh (1991) includes an 'inflexible hours' dummy variable in his model 
equalling one if the individual works the same hours each week. The results 
suggest that individuals with inflexible working hours are more prone to absence 
than those with flexible hours. Chaudhury and Ng (1992) include a dummy 
variable which represents whether shift work is common. They argue that the 
availability of shift work can be regarded as a proxy for work schedule flexibility 
since it may allow workers to change between shifts in order to correspond with 
non-work activities. Hence, if shift work is common the authors conjecture that 
absence rates should be lower. The estimated coefficient on the dummy variable 
turns out to be insignificant, yet an additional potential proxy for flexibility has been 
identified. 
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A related point explored in the literature concerns the difference between the 
absence behaviour of white and blue collar workers. Kenyon and Dawkins (1989) 
found that white collar workers are less prone to absence. This theme is also taken 
up by Leigh (1984,1986). White collar workers may encounter a more flexible 
work schedule since they will not, for example, be tied to an assembly line. 
Evidence supporting this hypothesis is documented by the CBI (1994) which found 
that full-time manual workers in the manufacturing sector lost over twice as much 
working time than their non manual counterparts. The average number of days of 
sickness absence per full-time manual worker in 1993 (1992) was estimated at 9.8 
(10.0) days whilst the average number of days absent per full-time non-manual 
worker in 1993 (1992) was estimated at 4.8 (4.6) days. 
The significance of flexible work schedules for absenteeism has been 
recognised in the management science literature. Dalton and Mesch (1990), for 
example, analyse absenteeism in a large US company which decided to introduce 
flexible scheduling in one of its divisions. The flexible scheduling system did not 
affect the number of hours worked per day, but allowed workers more discretion 
regarding when hours were worked. The results indicated that the introduction of 
flexible scheduling led to reductions in absenteeism. Moreover, when flexible 
scheduling was abandoned after the experiment, absenteeism returned to its former 
level. 18 The applied psychology literature has also recognised the significance of 
flexibility for absenteeism [see, for example, Hall (1987) who argues that the 
importance attached to flexibility may rise in the future with the increase in single 
parent and dual-career families]. 
These results highlight the significance of contract type for absence 
decisions. As mentioned above, only a few theoretical models of absence behaviour 
have explicitly incorporated demand side analysis. In the light of the empirical 
considerations discussed above, Barmby and Treble (1991b) argue that measures 
taken to control absence should be considered in the context of labour demand 
theory in addition to the response of workers to absence controls. A theoretical 
framework is constructed in which the concept of a worker's marginal contribution 
to profit is used to specify how the employer determines the level of contractual 
hours, which given an exogenous wage rate, maximises profits. The firm, 
therefore, faced with heterogeneous workers has to balance the contributions made 
by over-employed and under-employed workers to set contractual hours. 
Typically in the conventional labour supply model, the individual faces a 
fixed wage and then makes his/her optimal labour supply decision. Some empirical 
evidence, however, suggests that the wage rate offered is related to hours worked 
18 The popularity of flexible scheduling, however, is not widespread throughout the management 
science literature. Pierce et al (1989), for example, regard its support as 'unsubstantiated folklore'. 
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[Lundberg (1984)]. In the model of Barmby and Treble (1991b), the firm faces a 
continuum of optimal labour supply decisions for a given wage rate. From the 
opposite point of view a continuum of hours may be offered by the firms in the 
economy and the individual may then choose the job which specifies desired hours. 
The existence of tied wage-hours packages may lead to a situation where the 
individual faces a trade-off between hours and wages with the individual choosing a 
job which specifies undesirable hours if the offered wage rate is sufficiently 
attractive [see, for example, Altonji and Paxson (1988) and Lundberg (1984)]. The 
prospect of such endogenous wages adds a further dimension to the implications of 
contract design for absenteeism. 
Indeed, to address the question of contract design the determination of all 
the characteristics of the employment contract such as wages, sick pay and hours 
has to be considered. In such a setting, the possibility of one firm offering 
employees different contracts may arise. Barmby and Treble (1991b) consider the 
hours setting problem faced by the employer in the context of a heterogeneous work 
force and a fixed wage rate. This contrasts with the theoretical analysis of Coles and 
Treble (1993) who, in a model of homogenous risk averse workers, examine the 
relationship between wagelsick pay policy, production technology and the resulting 
equilibria. Their findings suggest that the existence of different wage/sick pay rates 
among firms should be attributed to technological factors. Similarly, Weiss (1985) 
remarks that, '... in evaluating the cost of absenteeism to firms, the nature of the 
production process is critical'. 
Coles and Treble (1993) analyse the moral hazard problem which is related 
to imperfectly monitored absence behaviour, i. e. the problem is concerned with 
determining whether a worker chooses not to work or is actually unable to work. 
They are concerned with the notion of contract design, i. e. the question as to what 
type of contract might alleviate this moral hazard problem. They analyse the extreme 
case of an assembly line where a fixed number of workers must attend in order to 
produce a positive level of output. The firm faces three possible alternatives; (i) to 
employ too many workers and hold 'reserves"; (ii) to manipulate contract structure 
in order to induce workers to attend; and (iii) to implement an alternative production 
process. Coles and Treble analyse the first two options. Their theoretical analysis 
suggests that firms characterised by constant returns to scale are more likely to pay 
relatively generous levels of sick pay, leading to relatively high levels of absence, 
whilst firms characterised by assembly lines might find it beneficial to pay a 
relatively high average wage but low sick pay provisions which, therefore, makes it 
more risky to work for such a firm. The paper emphases how both the costs of 
absence to the firm and the type of absence control are fundamentally related to the 
nature of the firm's production process. 
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2.3.3.3 Absenteeism and Shirking 
If absence behaviour is costly for the firm, one would expect it to penalise any 
voluntary absence on the part of its work force, thereby limiting any costs over and 
above those implied by legitimate and, therefore, unavoidable absence. Interpreting 
voluntary absence as a form of shirking on the part of the worker implies that the 
firm may have an incentive to monitor absentees and punish any it detects as 
shirking. 19 Typically, imperfect monitoring of employees is assumed - this seems 
to be particularly applicable to absenteeism since employers face a hard task of 
distinguishing between involuntary and voluntary absence without appropriate 
medical certification. Punishment, if detected shirking, might take the form of fines 
or dismissals. Any penalties of this nature will serve to increase the expected costs 
of absence faced by the employee. As such, the effect of absence behaviour on the 
probability of being dismissed may act as a discipline device, an approach which is 
consistent with the efficiency wage hypothesis whereby the prospect of 
unemployment serves to curb shirking on the part of workers [see for example 
Akerlof and Yellen (1984) and Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)]. 20 Krueger and 
Summers (1988) assess the empirical support of efficiency wage theories and 
discover that lower absenteeism is one of the benefits of paying higher wages. 
Similarly, Doherty (1979) remarks that one would expect job security to vary over 
time with an inverse relationship between sickness absence and unemployment. The 
results of this time series analysis confirms these a priori expectations. 21 
Weiss (1985) postulates an efficiency wage type relationship for workers 
employed along a production line and demonstrates that the optimal wage for firms 
operating an assembly-line production process is a sharply decreasing function of 
the probability of worker absence. Weiss argues that any evaluation of the cost of 
absenteeism to the firm depends crucially on the nature of the production process, 
as stressed in the recent contribution of Coles and Treble (1993). Standard 
production theory would assume that the marginal product of a worker is well 
defined and, as under perfect competition, is equal to his/her wage. In such models 
the cost to the firm of absenteeism is simply the wage (sick pay) if the worker is 
fully (partially) compensated when absent, or alternatively zero should the 
19 There is some evidence which suggests that in some sectors of the economy rigorous measures 
are taken to monitor absence, '... it is not unusual for someone who has been off for two weeks to 
have an interview with the occupational health nurse. Even if the absence is certified by a doctor, 
they send someone out for a second opinion. ' [Public Service, May (1993)]. 
20 The implications of an efficiency wage type relationship for absenteeism was pre-figured by 
Allen (1983) who discusses the relationship between wages and employee behaviour. 
21 Applied psychologists such as Steers and Rhodes (1984) acknowledge the importance of the 
state of the economy for absence decisions, '... in times of high unemployment, there may be 
increased pressure to maintain a good attendance record for fear of losing one's job. ' [Steers and 
Rhodes (1984), p. 2401. 
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employment contract prohibit compensation for non-attendance. A worker's 
absence history, therefore, should not affect his/her value to the firm except in so 
far as they were remunerated whilst absent '... but this observation seems at odds 
with the conventional wisdom that one of the most highly valued attributes of a 
work force is a low rate of absenteeism. ' [Weiss (1985), p. 277]. 
Weiss rationalises the conventional wisdom by modelling an assembly line 
production process which requires a critical number of workers to operate - 
workers in excess of this critical number are redundant whilst output falls to zero if 
less than the critical number of workers attend. In such a situation a worker's 
propensity to be absent will have a significant effect on his/her value to the firm, 
even if workers are not paid when they are absent. 
Barmby et al (1994) explore the relationship between absenteeism and 
efficiency wages explicitly. Their model incorporates a health based utility function 
in which increased levels of sickness alter the marginal rate of substitution in favour 
of leisure. A reservation sickness level is calculated which offers a temptation for 
individuals to 'shirk' and take illegitimate absence. The theoretical results suggest a 
negative relationship between the wage and the probability of absence. 
Although the empirical work in this area is still somewhat underdeveloped, 
some limited progress has been made. As discussed in Section 2.3.3.1, Allen 
(198 1 a) extends the basic labour supply model of Section 2.2 by assuming that the 
absentee suffers a lump sum penalty reflected in a decreased chance of promotion or 
an increased probability of being fired. Similarly Leigh (1985) includes a variable 
which captures the expected duration of a spell of unemployment if dismissed and 
finds a negative effect on absence rates. 22 Balchin and Wooden (1992) extend this 
line of analysis and define a penalty function which is a function of the opportunity 
cost of being dismissed and the level of the dismissal threat chosen by the firm. The 
empirical evidence suggests that absence is affected by both of these factors. 23 
It should be noted that some studies have yielded conflicting results. 
Chaudhury and Ng (1992) include a lay-off variable representing the proportion of 
employees laid off as a proxy for the penalty associated with absence. The 
argument behind the inclusion of this proxy is that lay-offs imply less job security 
which in turn leads to less absence. The insignificant estimated coefficient on the 
lay-off variable is, however, inconsistent with the evidence cited above. The 
proportion of lay-offs may, however, be regarded as a rather crude proxy for the 
22 Kenyon and Dawkins (1989) and Drago and Wooden (1992) find similar evidence. 
23 These results should be treated with some caution, however, since problems were encountered 
finding suitable proxies for some of the variables specified in the theoretical model. The threat of 
mi t dismissal variable, for example, is proxied by the actual total dis ssal rate. If the dismissal threa 
is credible, then one would surely expect a negative correlation between the threat and actual 
dismissals. 
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penalty associated with absence and if employees fear that redundancies are 
imminent then they may absent themselves in order to seek alternative 
employment. 24Leigh (1991) assesses the effect of the individual's perception of 
the prospect of unemployment on absence decisions using survey techniques which 
yield information on the worker's subjective evaluation of the rate of unemployment 
in his/her region of residence. Leigh also finds that the unemployment rate is an 
insignificant predictor of absence. 25 
Furthermore, the effectiveness of a penalty system based on efficiency 
wages may be influenced by additional factors such as unionisation. A union 
member, for example, may feel that he/she faces more protection against dismissal. 
Employers may find it relatively expensive to fire a worker if a set of formal 
procedures must be adhered to. Drago (1993) uses Australian data in order to 
determine whether efficiency wages explain dismissals. Their results indicate that 
unions reduce the probability that the firm will dismiss any employees. One reason 
for this may be that union members are less inclined to engage in 'unacceptable 
behaviour' such as voluntary absenteeism on account of the threat of losing the 
benefits of unionisation, for example, higher wages and more attractive work 
schedules [Freeman (1981)]. 26 Metcalf (1993), for example, states that semi-skilled 
employees in workplaces where a union is recognised for collective bargaining 
received earnings, on average, in 1984 which were approximately 8% more than 
their non union counterparts. Metcalf points out, however, that the union/non-union 
differential is the outcome of factors such as union density, closed shop practices 
and the nature of the product market. Furthermore, contradictory evidence has been 
discovered by studies incorporating such additional factors which indicate that less 
importance should be attached to the existence and the extent of the union/non- 
24 Similarly, Steers and Rhodes (1984) remark that once an employee is aware of the fact that 
lie/she will be laid off, then absenteeism may rise as the individual tries to locate alternative 
employment. Evidence from Owens (1966) indicates that employees who had been given notice of 
layoff were characterised by significantly higher rates of absence than a group of comparable 
employees who were not going to be laid-off. 'Me relationship between absence, job search and 
quits is explored at length in Chapter 6. 
25 It should be pointed out, however, that the relationship between absence behaviour and 
unemployment is not as clear-cut as the efficiency wage hypothesis might indicate: Northern 
Ireland, for example, is the region in Great Britain characterised by both the highest absence rate in 
1991 and 1993,6% and 5.7%, respectively, and the highest unemployment rate in 1991 and 1993, 
13.7% and 14.0%, respectively [Employment Gazette, April, (1994) ]. One should recognise, 
therefore, that the influence of additional socio-political factors may complicate the association 
between unemployment and absence rates. 
26 On the other hand, however, non-unionised firms may be more likely to offer fringe benefits 
such as extra statutory sick pay in order to lower the likelihood of unionisation [Beaumont 
(1987)]. 
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union differential. Hence, the alleged benefits of unionisation have been 
questioned. 27 
Leigh (1981b, 1985) and Allen (1984) find evidence which indicates that 
union members are more likely to be absent than non-union members. Similarly, 
Chaudhury and Ng (1992) find that unionisation increases total days lost due to 
absenteeism. The positive correlation between absenteeism and unionisation may be 
the result of higher sick pay allowances negotiated by trade unions as mentioned 
above. Allen (1984), Freeman (1978) and BorJas (1979) find that job 
dissatisfaction is higher among union members. Such evidence suggests that the 
union is not altogether effective in improving working arrangements. Absenteeism, 
therefore, may be considered a temporary escape from the working environment, 
i. e. it may be regarded as a short-term method of dealing with job dissatisfaction. 
Action through unions, on the other hand, may be regarded as a long-term and 
more permanent process [Reza (1975) and Kenyon and Dawkins (1989)]. It is 
interesting to note that several empirical studies have found that unions do appear to 
exert some influence on hours of work. Perloff and Sickles (1987), Earle and 
Pencavel (1990) and DiNardo (1991), for example, find evidence which suggests 
that unionisation in the US exerts a moderating influence on the length of the 
working week. Thus, despite the fact that union members may enjoy shorter 
working hours, and whilst shorter working hours are generally associated with 
lower absence, unionisation appears to increase absence behaviour, ceteris paribus. 
2.3.3.4 Absenteeism and Health 
The discussion so far has assumed that absenteeism on behalf of the individual is to 
some extent voluntary in that he/she knows the level of utility obtained from the 
employment contract and can compare it to that derived from the utility maximising 
labour supply decision. Absenteeism arises as the individual attempts to move 
towards this utility maximising level of labour supply. Absenteeism, therefore, 
arises not because the individual is unable to work but because he/she chooses not 
to. Empirical studies of absence behaviour have been hindered, however, by the 
problem of distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary absence. 
Workers typically cite illness as an explanation for absence, even if this is not 
the case, since illness is considered to be an acceptable excuse for not working. 
Evidence from Dunn and Youngblood (1986) supports the view that illness is used 
as an excuse by workers to move to their optimum. Similarly, Nicholson (1976) 
27 Casey (1994), however, finds evidence which supports the hypothesis that the presence of 
recognised blue collar unions increases the probability of the provision of extra-statutory sick pay 
for all employees. 
41 
discovers that when control is exerted over non-sickness absence the level of 
reported sickness absence tends to rise. There is, however, an additional dimension 
to the problem which is concerned with the fact that the degree to which individuals 
believe themselves to be incapacitated due to a given level of sickness varies across 
individuals. In the case of a heterogeneous work force the level of sickness at 
which one worker believes himself/herself to be unable to attend work may differ 
from that of another. Johns and Nicholson (1982) emphasise the fact that individual 
differences in the interpretation of causes of absence are of extreme importance 
when analysing absence behaviour: 
... how is it that one worker with a mild head cold manages to come to 
work whereas another finds this an adequate reason to remain at home. 
[Johns and Nicholson (1982), p. 142]. 
Furthermore, the criteria used to judge whether one is fit enough to attend work 
may change over time. In addition, different firms may harbour different opinions 
regarding what constitutes an 'acceptable' level of sickness. This leads to the 
question as to what is the level of sickness beyond which the fin-n believes that it is 
reasonable to be absent [see Ban-nby et al (1994)]. 28 
In the context of the labour supply model, absence is voluntary in the respect 
that it arises due to over-employment. A weakness of the economic literature on 
absenteeism, and in sharp contrast to the medical statistics literature - see Footnote 
II- has been the tendency of theoretical models to ignore the state of an 
individual's health. 29 It seems unrealistic, however, to ignore such influences when 
modelling absence decisions and indeed labour supply decisions. Empirical studies, 
on the other hand, have attempted to analyse the influence of health on absence 
behaviour. Allen (198 1 a), for example, includes a health evaluation variable which 
proved to be significant, reports of ill health being correlated with higher 
absenteeism. Leigh (1991) also includes variables reflecting health status and 
hazardous working conditions and, indeed, was surprised at the strength of these 
variables as predictors of absence. Health variables which proved to be significant 
predictors included being overweight and suffering from insomnia. The results of 
Paringer (1983) are a further endorsement of the importance of health status for 
observed absence behaviour. 30 The empirical importance of the health variables 
28 In the medical statistics literature emphasis has been placed on measurements of morbidity, 
such as how much sickness exists in the population and grouping sickness in terms of severity. 
One of the major problems of these statistics is that sickness is hard to define due to the 
substantial differences in severity. Additional problems arise with analysing such data as one is 
observing absence as opposed to sickness behaviour. 
29 Exceptions include Barmby et al (1994) and Kahana and Weiss (1992). 
30 Similarly, Allen (1981b) discovers that absence rates are higher in plants where there appears to 
be high rates of occupational illness and injury. 
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reinforces the argument that health status should be explicitly incorporated into the 
theory. 
To make the labour supply model more realistic one can explicitly incorporate 
sickness into the decision-making framework and, thereby, allow the possibility of 
distinguishing between voluntary and involuntary absence. The importance of 
recognising the distinction between voluntary and involuntary absence has been 
discussed in other disciplines. In the applied psychology literature, for instance, a 
distinction is made between 'unavoidable' ('Type A') absence due to illness where 
the individual is unable to attend and avoidable ('Type B') absenteeism where the 
individual lacks the motivation to attend [Chadwick-Jones et al (1973)]. Dalton and 
Mesch (1991) emphasise that organisational control can only be effectively exerted 
over the latter. 
It is apparent that the severity of any spell of illness has implications not only 
for workers' absence decisions but also for the actions taken by employers. If an 
individual becomes seriously ill then the firm can take measures to allow for such 
anticipated absences. In the long term the firm can replace a seriously injured or 
sick worker by making temporary recruitments or rescheduling existing employees. 
Obviously the firm may still incur some expenses by adjusting the work force, the 
extent of which will depend on the nature of the job. If an individual is seriously ill, 
changing the penalties to absenteeism will not encourage the individual to return to 
work and absence control in such cases becomes ineffective. 
Bartel and Taubman (1979) examine the effects of particular diseases on 
labour supply and earnings, concentrating on major diseases such as arthritis and 
bronchitis which may lead to long-term absence and may be of concern to 
employers as employees age. Dunn and Youngblood's results also show that 
absence declines with age except in the case of the oldest workers. Similar evidence 
is presented by Allen (1984,1981a). Table 2.1 below presents the absence rates 
across regions of Great Britain for two age categories - 44 years of age and under 
and over 45 years of age [Regional Trends (1987,1989)]. It is apparent from the 
figures set out in Table 2.1 that the national statistics reported suggest that absence 
rates appear to rise with age which implies that age is an important indicator of 
absence behaviour. Indeed, Allen (1981a) concludes that age is the only personal 
characteristic found to influence absence. 
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FTable 
2.1: Absence Rates in Great Britain by Age3l 
1985 1987 
Regions 16- 45 and over 16- 45 and over 
UK 4.2 4.9 4.0 4.8 
England 1 4.2 4.9 4.1 4.7 
Scotland 
L 
3.5 4.8 3.4 4.1 
Wales 1 4.2 6.3 1 4.1 6.9 
In order to analyse. the unexpected absence behaviour of workers, however, 
attention should be drawn away from events which cause severe adverse health 
effects which may lead to long term or even permanent absence from work and 
towards the effects of day-to-day sicknesS. 32 The results of Chaudhury and Ng 
(1992) indicate that total days lost and long term absences, defined as those 
exceeding five days, are influenced by different factors with long term absences 
primarily determined by personal characteristics. 
The health of individuals has been explicitly included in individuals' utility 
functions in some areas of economic literature. Viscusi and Evans (1990), for 
example, analyse the empirical and economic implications of utility functions which 
depend on health status. Their empirical analysis indicates that job injuries reduce 
both the total and the marginal utility of income. The state dependent utility 
approach has been used to deal with situations characterised by variations in health 
status [Zeckhauser (1970,1973) and Arrow (1974)]. This approach specifies 
discrete states of the world, each of which is associated with a specific health level 
and income level. Expected utility is expressed as the sum of utilities in each state 
weighted by the probability of each state occurring [Arrow (1974) and Phelps 
(1973)]. 
Following Barmby et al (1994) an index of sickness, or, may be 
incorporated into the utility function. This index is assumed to be a random variable 
with a probability density function f (a) with higher values of a representing 
31 The data is taken from Regional Trends (1994) and represents the proportion of employees 
reporting at least one day absent from work during the week prior to the interview. 
3'ý Leigh (1989) analyses the contribution of 36 specific illnesses to absenteeism. Those which 
appear to have the most influence are day-to-day illnesses such as colds and flus. 
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higher levels of sickness. 33 Utility is expressed as a function of consumption, 
leisure and the individual's level of sickness or health: 
u= U(X, 1,9) (2.21) 
where U represents the individual's utility, x represents the individual's 
consumption of goods and services and I represents the individual's leisure time. It 
is assumed that utility is increasing in consumption and leisure and decreasing in 
sickness. Moreover, the marginal utility of leisure (consumption) is assumed to 
increase (decrease) at higher levels of sickness, the rationale for this being that as 
individuals become sicker more leisure time is required for the purpose of 
recuperation and/or because the supply of labour becomes more onerous. Thus, the 
following assumptions are adopted; dUldx>O, dUldl>O, dUldc<O, 
dU'ld 1da >0 and dU'ld cdx < 0. 
A convenient expositional device is obtained by defining the index of 
sickness over the range [0,11 and specifying Cobb-Douglas preferences: 
U=x (1-a)la (2.22) 
As a tends to one the individual places relatively more value on leisure time or 
recuperation time as opposed to consumption. As or approaches one, the individual 
would invest his/her entire endowment of time in consuming leisure. The opposite 
applies when or approaches zero. As the individual experiences a lower level of 
sickness he/she attaches a relatively higher weight to consumption as opposed to 
leisure. 34 
Different methodological approaches to research into health and illness have 
discussed the question of treating health as a continuum. 35 An early advocate in 
favour of treating health as a continuum is Cochrane (1972) whose arguments 
stressed the need to get away from the simple medical model which dichotomised 
health as either 'good' or 'bad'. Similarly, the model of absence specified by 
Kahana and Weiss (1992), specifies discrete outcomes in the respect that an 
individual is either healthy or sick. If the individual is sick then he/she is unable to 
work. Hence only a healthy individual faces the decision between absence and 
33 In the context of the discussion above, one would expect the nature of the distribution of 
sickness to change over time, becoming increasingly skewed toward higher levels as age rises. 
34 Leisure is essentially being interpreted as recuperation time. One may argue, however, that as 
an individual becomes sicker, he/she may prefer to go to work since leisure cannot be enjoyed 
when ill (recall Footnote 6). 
35 See Long (1984) for a survey of methodological issues concerning research into health and 
illness. 
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work. This approach is clearly unrealistic in the sense that an entire spectrum of 
states of health exist which leads to a complex interaction between the absence 
decision and health status. The inclusion of a continuous index of sickness directly 
into the utility function seems to conform to the idea of treating health as a 
continuous as opposed to a discrete phenomenon. 
As illustrated in Figure 2.1, absenteeism becomes possible when there are 
discontinuities in the budget line. As a consequence of such discontinuities utility 
maximisation may not occur at a tangency point. Consider an extremely rigid 
budget line which consists of two points E' and E': 
"4 x 
x----------------------- 
r ------------------------------ XS ------------------ I 
IC(CT 
Figure 2.8: Health Status and Absenteeism 
If the individual attends work then he/she is at point E' = fxc, lcl,, with 
1c =T- hc, where hc represents the hours of work specified in the employment 
contract. Absence is described by point E' = jx' , T1. The individual's utility 
maximising problem is as follows: 
max U=x 
(I- a), CT 
I 
S. t. 
x=xC = w4=->1= T-hc 
01» 
x= xs =s <=ý 1= 
(2.23) 
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The realisation of a determines whether the individual's utility is maximised at 
point Ec or E'. It is apparent that different realisations of a serve to pivot the 
indifference curve - higher values of cy lead to a relatively steeper indifference 
curve and vice versa. Intuitively, an increase in or increases the marginal rate of 
substitution between consumption and leisure such that the individual places a 
greater value on leisure. 
The assumption of Cobb-Douglas preferences implies well-behaved, convex 
indifference curves, the properties of which can be shown formally by the 
following differentials: 
dx Grx 0, d'x crx dl (1 - er)i 
d12 (1 
_ or)12 
(2.24) 
The attendance decision will depend upon the 'reservation' level of sickness, or*, 
which is defined implicitly by the realisation of sickness at which the individual is 
indifferent between attendance and absence. Formally, this is defined as follows: 
W(I-a* 
)(T 
- h') = s(l-a*)(T) a* (2.25) 
such that: 
In - s 
(, V) 
(2.26) 
In(-w)+In( Tc 
s T-h 
In the context of Figure 2.8, the indifference curve IC(c*) represents the case 
where the level of sickness is such that the individual is indifferent between absence 
and attendance. The slope of the indifference curve is determined by the value of (T 
which determines whether an individual attends or not. If or ý! or*, then the 
individual maximises utility by absenting himself/herself from work. In this case 
the slope of the indifference curve is steeper than that of IC(C*), for example 
IC(q2). Conversely, if a< a*, then the individual maximises utility by attending 
work. In this case the slope of the indifference curve is flatter than that of IC(c*) 9 
such as IC(c. )- 
If the individual faces some risk regarding the level of sickness then his/her 
objective is to maximise expected utility. Expected utility can be expressed as a 
weighted average of the expected utility of an attender and the expected utility of an 
absentee where the weights are the probability that (T < a* and the probability that 
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a ý! cr* respectively. The probability that a< a* is expressed as the integral of the 
probability density function between 0 and a* and the probability that cT ý! U* is 
expressed as the integral of the probability density function between a* and one. 
The individual is assumed to evaluate the expected value of consumption and leisure 
in the case of attendance and absence using the conditional probability distributions 
to determine the expected value of (T. In the case of an absentee the expected value 
of or, conditional on (T being between (T* and one, is substituted into the utility 
function. Conversely, to determine the expected utility of attending work the 
expected value of cy, conditional on a being between 0 and a, is used. For 
simplicity, consider a logarithmic transformation of Expression (2.22), i. e. 
U= (1 - a) ln(x) +a ln(l). Hence, the expected utility function can be expressed 
as: 
a. 
E[U]= f f(a)dcTj[l-E[cl a< c*]]In(w)+E[cl a< a*]In(T-h')I+ 
0 
I 
f 
a. 
where: 
f E[alc< a*]= fc. da 
0ff ((T)dcy 
ý0 
E[al a ý! a*]= a- da CF 
ff (a)da 
0 
(2.27) 
(2.28) 
(2.29) 
The value of cy* which maximises the above expected utility function is equal to 
Condition (2.26) regardless of the distribution of the probability density function of 
(T. The first order condition for maximisation is derived by differentiating under the 
integral sign which yields the following expression [see Henderson and Quandt 
(1971)]: 
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dE[U] 
_f (c*)[(l - or*) In (w) + a* In (T - h')] + da* (2.30) 
1) In(s) - a* In(T)] =0 
which can be rearranged to yield: 36 
In - 
07* = 
(ws )T 
(2.31) 
ln(-w + In( c s T-h 
Maximising the expected utility function with respect to a* may be regarded as a 
mechanism whereby the individual determines the best absence decision rule to be 
employed. The decision rule which maximises Equation (2.27) is invariant to the 
distribution. Changes in the probability function change the expected utility 
function, but not the utility maximising decision rule. This is surprising as one 
would expect behaviour to change if the distribution of sickness changes. 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970,1971) model increases in risk as a change in the 
distribution of the random variable which shifts weight from the centre to the tails 
of the distribution with the mean kept constant. In the context of the model of 
absence behaviour described above, changes in the amount of risk affect the 
probability of a being greater or less than a* and consequently the expected values 
of the payoffs from being absent or not. The decision rule employed, however, 
when making absence decisions will not change as the amount of risk represented 
by the distribution function changes. 
It is apparent that the introduction of risk and uncertainty into a one period 
model is somewhat arbitrary. Hence it is important to consider the dynamic 
implications of the theoretical and empirical analysis of absence behaviour. 
A key point here concerns the relationship between health and past absence 
records. Prior to recruitment, screening of potential employees can be undertaken in 
36 Simplifying the first order condition yields: 
dE[U] 
=(I-u*)In(w)+a*In T-h')+--I)In(s)-a*In(T)=O da* 
In order to check for a maximum, the first order condition is partially differentiated with respect to 
d2 E[U] T-h C 
= In( 
S)+(3 In <0 
du *2 WT 
The second order condition is negative since w>s and T> h' > 0, hence the condition for a 
maximum is satisfied. 
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order to predict future sickness from past records of illness or absence, i. e. to 
determine the characteristics of f (a). Keller (1983) and Breaugh (1981), for 
example, argue that an individual's past absence record is a good predictor of future 
absenteeism. This argument is supported by the findings of the CBI (1994) which 
suggest that some eighty-nine per cent of firms take some measures to avoid the 
recruitment of potential absentees. Moreover, employers may be able to exert some 
control over the future health of employees - Steers and Rhodes (1984), for 
example, remark that firms can promote sound physical health. Bertera (1990) 
analyses the effects of a workplace health promotion program on absenteeism 
which involves the dissemination of information on nutrition, smoking cessation, 
fitness etc. The results indicate that the associated benefits, such as reduced 
absenteeism, outweighed the costs of implementing the scheme. This is related to 
the empirical evidence which suggests that education is inversely related to absence 
since education is considered to be positively related to good health [Drago and 
Wooden (1992)]. 
Borofsky and Smith (1993) analyse the rates of turnover, work accidents 
and unauthorised absence among two groups of employees. One group was hired 
prior to the inclusion of a pre-employment screening inventory in the selection 
process whilst the other group was hired subsequently. The pre-employment 
screening inventory comprised of a set of self-administered questions designed to 
gather information on individuals' behaviour. The questions ranged from subjects 
as diverse as one's life-style and job commitment. The results showed that the rates 
of turnover, accidents and absence were lower in the group hired after the inclusion 
of the pre-employment inventory. Despite the fact that self- administration 
procedures may induce applicants to be less critical of themselves, the results 
suggest that potential benefits of comprehensive screening procedures may well 
exist. 
The importance of screening is emphasised by the adverse selection process 
which operates in the labour market, i. e. a firm which finds absenteeism relatively 
expensive tends to offer high wages with a relatively inflexible work schedule and 
vice versa for a firm which finds absenteeism relatively inexpensive. Allen (1981b, 
1983) has expressed this selection mechanism using hedonic wage equations which 
capture the idea that there is a trade-off between wages and expected absence faced 
by potential employees creating 'compensating differentials' for absenteeism. 
According to this approach absence is viewed as a job characteristic. Allen (1984) 
remarks that: 
The ability to miss work repeatedly while keeping one's job is a job 
characteristic desirable to many workers, regardless of whether that time 
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is spent recovering from short-term illnesses or enjoying three-day 
weekends. [Allen (1984), p. 332]. 
Allen's model, however, operates on the principle that only the wage adjusts as 
absence changes, the implicit assumption being that the other arguments in the 
individual's utility function are fixed. Consequently, many aspects of the labour 
supply decision are ignored. 
Turnbull and Sapsford (1992) cite evidence which supports the claim that 
historicaHy some groups of workers view absenteeism as ajob characteristic: 
... for the docker absenteeism was regarded as an entitlement, and as 
such it was not considered to be a legitimate disciplinary offence. 
[Turnbull and Sapsford (1992), p. 2981. 
Another aspect of this selection mechanism is examined by Waldron et al (1991). 
One of the questions addressed in this analysis is whether health affects labour 
force participation. If empirical evidence suggests that people who expect bad 
health in the future (i. e. who expect high values of cy) do not join the labour force, 
then this suggests that emphasis should be placed on episodes of unexpected and 
relatively minor illness. Indeed, Taylor-Gooby and Dean (1990) argue that, during 
periods of economic recession, the unhealthy or disabled workers are usually 
amongst the first groups to leave the labour market. Their analysis of the General 
Household Survey indicates that in 1984 less workers than in 1981 reported 
chronic ill health. Nevertheless, as unemployment was rising over this period, 
workers who were prone to ill health may have left the labour market, which could 
create the impression that the health of the work force was rising. 
2.3.3.5 Absenteeism and Dynamics 
The possibility of screening through the analysis of past absence records introduces 
a dynamic aspect to the analysis of absence. A major criticism of virtually all 
theoretical models of absence to date concerns their ignorance of such 
considerations. Kenyon and Dawkins (1987) recognise this: 
The existence ... of paid sick leave entitlements could 
introduce a 
dynamic structure to the model in that a heavy usage of sick leave 
entitlements through labour absence in one period could lead to a more 
parsimonious use of entitlements in the subsequent period (or periods), 
and conversely. Secondly, expectations about the future path of real 
wages or over time or the state of industrial relations could also affect 
dynamic adjustment. Thirdly, habit persistence may play a part in 
determining labour absence. Thus the accurate specification of a model 
of labour absence may well require the inclusion of lagged dependent 
and/or independent variables. However, it is difficult a priori, to be 
precise about dynamic structure in that theory, in this case, appears to 
provide no obvious guide to dynamic relationships. Our modelling 
strategy, then, will be to search empirically for appropriate structure 
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estimation and appropriate econometric specification diagnostics. 
[Kenyon and Dawkins (1987), p4l. 
It would seem more appropriate, however, to develop a dynamic theoretical 
framework in order to channel empirical work through a more structured 
environment. Some theoretical analyses have considered shirking in a dynamic 
context. Carlin (1989), for example, emphasises that the detection of shirking does 
not always lead to immediate dismissal and that the interaction between workers and 
employers should ideally be modelled as a repeated game. 
The first claim that an adequate model of absence behaviour should address 
dynamic considerations was put forward by Johns and Nicholson (1982). In this 
paper the authors proposed six 'counter propositions' to challenge the then existing 
theories of absence. 'Counter Proposition Four' (CP-4) stated that: 
Absence is temporal behaviour and continually subject to dynamic 
change. By definition, absence relocates the distribution of time from 
work to non-work. Thus, the meaning of absence events to both 
absentees and others in their social framework, may be distinguished by 
duration as well as by perceived causes ... This compels us to view 
absence causation as a recursive learning process, and ... to expect 'lawful changes' in absence behaviour over time and from episode to 
episode. [Johns and Nicholson (1982), p. 1361.37 
Once the need for dynamics is accepted, the next issue regards the particular 
dynamic estimation approach to be adopted. This has proved somewhat problematic 
with the paucity of theoretical foundations resulting in rather ad hoc empirical 
specifications. Moreover, the empirical results that have been obtained are rather 
difficult to interpret given the lack of theoretical underpinningS. 38 But despite the 
slow pace of theoretical contributions in this area, empirical advances have been 
made. 
The empirical literature since the mid-1980s has taken on board many of the 
suggestions regarding dynamics outlined in the papers collected by Goodman and 
Atkin (1984). Fichman (1988,1989), for example, constructs a dynamic model 
which places emphasis on the motivational aspects of absence decisions. Ban-nby et 
al (1991a, 1991b)', on the other hand, allow for demand side considerations by 
incorporating the attempts of the employer to control for worker absence through 
the use of an experience rated sick pay scheme, which incorporates bonuses for 
37 This dichotomy between incidence and duration was picked up by Drago and Wooden (1992). 
Acknowledging Johns and Nicholson (1982), Drago and Wooden argue that the appropriate 
empirical specification may require separating predictions of 'absence events' (i. e. incidence) and 
'absence rates' (i. e. duration). The authors point out that '... although absence events and absence 
rates may have different determinants, they are related by the fact that an event is required for any 
positive rate. ' [Drago and Wooden (1992), p. 774]. 
38 Some theoretical progress has been made in this respect by Brown (1993,1994) who explores 
the implications of absence decisions within a two period context and Kahana and Weiss (1992), 
who analyse absence behaviour as a repeated game. 
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6 good' attendance and alterations in the level of sick pay according to absence 
histories. If the level of sick pay is dependent on past absence behaviour then a 
temporal aspect to absence decisions emerges - today's attendance decision will 
affect tomorrow's sick pay entitlement. 
These papers, along with Harrison and Hulin (1989), have a common theme 
in terms of the statistical methods employed to model absence and attendance as 
dynamic phenomena. Over time, an individual switches from one state to another 
and the analyst's task is to model the determinants of these switches by analysing 
the time spent in each state. Models representing the duration of events i. e. time 
spent in the state of absence are generally specified in terms of a hazard function 
which represents the rate of transition and which is modelled as a transformation of 
the probability density function of the random variable, duration [see Lancaster 
(1990) for an exposition of these statistical techniques]. The methods used by the 
various researchers are similar. Fichman uses a Weibull hazard function to model 
the probability of transition from attendance to absence and finds significant 
differences in the hazard function associated with the start of an absence spell 
depending upon whether the spell is paid or unpaid. 39 Harrison and Hulin (1989) 
apply a similar hazard rate model to the daily attendance records of 2,130 white- 
collar employees. Their analysis, which includes no quantitative measure of 
financial variables, demonstrated that temporal variables such as the month in which 
the attendance spell took place and historical variables such as the number of spells 
of absence in the previous year have a significant effect on the hazard rate of 
voluntary absence. 40 Demographic variables that were significantly correlated with 
aggregated absences were not, however, found to improve the prediction of the 
hazard rate. 
Barmby et al (1991a) incorporate both financial considerations representing 
sick pay eligibility and personal characteristics into a Weibull hazard model of 
absence duration in order to model the transition from non-absence to absence. Sex 
and marital status appear to be important determinants of duration, with female 
workers and married workers tending to take more prolonged absence spells than 
their male and single counterparts. Furthermore, 'acceptable' absence spells (i. e. 
39 This approach entails assuming that the nature of the hazard function is determined by the 
Weibull probability density function which takes the following form: 
b -, ax f (x; a, b) = abx e 
-b 
where parameters a and b are assumed to be positive. Although, to a certain extent the choice of 
density function is somewhat arbitrary, Cox and Oakes (1984) attempt to weigh up the relative 
inerits of the numerous distributions on offer. One main advantage of the Weibull distribution 
concerns the ease of computation. 
40 In January, for example, the hazard rate for absence was found to be particularly low. 
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medically certified spells attracting minimal, if any, penalties) were found to be of 
longer duration than 'unacceptable' spells. 
Despite their achievement in introducing dynamics into the empirical analysis 
of absence modelling, all these models are nevertheless lacking in several respects 
[see Treble (1990)]. First, both Fichman and Harrison and Hulin classify absence 
spells, somewhat synthetically, as either voluntary or involuntary. Harrison and 
Hulin, for example, define three categories of absence; short-term voluntary 
absence, short-term semi-voluntary absence and long-term involuntary absence. 
The distinction between the three rests on rather subjective criteria. Barmby et al 
(1991a) avoid this and classify absence as either acceptable absence, if medically 
certified, or unacceptable, if not medically certified, and find significant effects of 
sick pay variables on the duration of both types of absence. 
Second, implicit in each of the above models is an inefficiency resulting from 
the separate modelling of the two transitions involved. Harrison and Hulin include 
in their specification a large number of variables intended to capture the absence and 
holiday history of individual workers, both before and during the absence spell 
under examination. Barmby et al include in their specification measures of absence 
histories using a sequential logit model for the commencement of a spell. Many of 
these variables are found to have a relatively large, significant effect on the 
probability of starting an absence spell, suggesting that a fruitful way forward may 
be to attempt the simultaneous modelling of both transitions i. e. the transition from 
absence to attendance and the transition from attendance to absence. The relevant 
statistical methods for this type of modelling are outlined by Lancaster (1990) and 
Lancaster and Imbens (1990). 
Finally, and most importantly, none of these papers offers a clearly 
specified, fully integrated model of the absence decision. Barmby et al (1991a) 
develop a model in the tradition of the economics of labour supply which is 
applicable only to their data, which is itself derived from a firm operating a 
somewhat especial sick pay scheme. 
In conclusion, the statistical methods based on models of this kind are 
developing rapidly and there is little doubt that their use in future studies win yield 
dividends [see Rust (1987) and Hotz and Miller (1989)]. The main advantage of the 
approach is that it permits the incorporation into the model of highly complex 
constraints, thereby permitting the explicit modelling of wage, tax, overtime and 
other absence control influences. 
54 
2.4 Concluding Remarks 
Clearly some progress has been made in both the theoretical and empirical analysis 
of worker absenteeism. The area is stilL however, somewhat underdeveloped 
relative to other areas of labour economics. This is unfortunate given that 
absenteeism constitutes a significant loss of work-time and, therefore, has 
important implications for both household income and firm productivity. Clearly the 
existence of such "costs' warrants further research into the determinants of absence 
behaviour. 
In general, economists have modelled absenteeism in terms of an optimal 
labour supply response on the part of workers to the contractual obligations dictated 
by the employer. Consequently, demand side aspects have attracted limited 
attention. Such an approach is clearly at odds with general economic behaviour in 
which the interaction of demand and supply plays a central role in determining 
market allocations. This exclusion is all the more surprising given the emphasis that 
has recently been placed on contract design in other areas of labour economics such 
as implicit contract theory. Hopefully the present survey, by encouraging 
economists to address demand side (and dynamic) considerations, will help to 
promote the development of a more general theory of absence and, thereby, provide 
a more solid foundation on which to base empirical research. 
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Chapter 3: A Profile of the Over-Employed 
3.1 Introduction 
The huge literature exploring the supply of labour by individuals is dominated by 
research into the decision problem facing an individual over the amount of hours 
worked and is, therefore, concerned primarily with the modelling of desired rather 
than actual work hours [Ilmakunnas and Pudney (1990)]. Due to the paucity of 
data, however, the majority of empirical studies seeking to estimate labour supply 
equations have been based on data pertaining to actual rather than desired hours of 
work [see comprehensive surveys by Ashenfelter and Layard (1986) and 
Heckman et al (198 1)]. Such an assumption is clearly unrealistic: 
For both institutional and technical reasons, many jobs are associated 
with a fixed length for the working week and there is little scope for 
individuals to control their hours of work, except by changing job. But 
changing job is a costly operation, and there are also very few job 
opportunities available in large sectors of the spectrum of weekly hours. 
Consequently many individuals are likely to be observed out of 
equilibrium with respect to their labour supply at any given time. 
[Ilmakunnas and Pudney (1990), p1831. 
Altonji and Paxson (1992) find evidence which is consistent with the hypothesis 
that constraints on the choice of hours within individual firms limit the extent to 
which workers experiencing a change in their marginal rate of substitution 
between income and leisure are able to change hours of work within a job. 
Similarly, Kahn and Lang (1991) obtain results which suggest that using actual 
hours of work causes bias in labour supply estimates. Further evidence supporting 
the existence of hours constraints and the resulting bias in estimates is 
documented by Dickens and Lundberg (1993). 1 
As highlighted in the previous Chapter, emphasis throughout this Thesis is 
placed on the extent to which the constraints imposed on an individual's choice of 
work hours by the employer affect worker behaviour. It is apparent that a given 
constraint may lead to either over-employment or under-employment depending 
on whether the constraint implies an upper or lower bound on hours worked. If the 
upper limit lies below the utility maximising level of labour supply, the constraint 
leads to a position of under-employment - the individual would ideally like to 
supply more hours of labour. Conversely, if the utility maximising level of labour 
supply lies below the hours constraint, then this lower limit serves to over-employ 
the individual. Consequently, the relationship between contractual hours and 
I The implications of assuming a coincidence of actual and desired hours of work for labour 
supply estimates are explored in Appendix A3. 
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utility maximising hours, and the extent to which any constraints that do exist are 
binding, has important implications for worker behaviour [see Brown et al 
(1986)]. 
Consider the simple budget constraint depicted in Figure 3.1 below. 
Income 
C 
Icl 
B 
Ic2 
Ic3 
H* Hc H* A Leisure 
Figure 3.1: Over-Employment, Under-Employment and (Un)Constrained 
Employment 
If we assume the employer specifies that Hc hours of labour must be supplied, 
then, ignoring corner solutions, we can identify three possible situations which 
may arise. First, the individual's indifference curve (such as Ic3) may be 
tangential to the line segment AB. Hence, such 'over-employment' describes a 
situation where the individual's marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption and leisure at contractual hours exceeds the individual's economic 
rate of substitution between income and leisure at contractual hours. Recalling the 
analysis of Section 2.2, Chapter 2, with u= u(x, l) defining the individual's utility 
in terms of consumption (x) and leisure (1), then over-employment may be 
defined formally by the following condition: 
du(x, l)1dl 
> du(x, l)ld. x 
(3.1) 
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Furthermore, the extent to which the constraint is binding depends on whether the 
individual can absent himself/herself in order to supply less labour. As long as 
contractual hours exceed the individual's preferred or utility maximising hours, a 
potential utility gain from absence behaviour may exist. 
Alternatively, the individual's indifference curve may be tangential to the 
line segment CB (such as Ic 1), implying that the individual is under-employed. In 
this case, the individual's marginal rate of substitution between consumption and 
leisure at contractual hours is less than the individual's economic rate of 
substitution between income and leisure at contractual hours: 
du (x, l)/ dl 
<W (3.2) 
du(x, l)ldx 
i. e. the amount of leisure that an individual is willing to sacrifice for additional 
income exceeds the amount he/she is obliged to sacrifice through the labour 
market. The extent to which this type of constraint is binding depends upon 
whether the individual can increase his/her labour supply through overtime 
working and/or 'moonlighting'. 
The final, and theoretically least likely, situation is where the individual is 
neither over-employed nor under-employed and which occurs when the worker's 
indifference curve (such as Ic2) is tangential to AC at point B. Hence, under such 
circumstances the individual's marginal rate of substitution at contractual hours 
and the slope of the budget constraint at contractual hours are in accord: 
du(x, l)ldl 
=w (3.3) du(x, l)ldx 
In such a situation, the worker is simultaneously constrained and supplying 
his/her utility maximising amount of labour. 
It is apparent that any given employment contract can lead to either over- 
employment (OE), under-employment (UE) or 'utility-maximising' employment 
(UME). Despite the possibility of three outcomes, labour economists have tended 
to focus on one outcome in isolation. Tegle (1985), for example, derives hours of 
labour supply equations for a household model consisting of two household 
members where one of the household members is over-employed. Despite the 
analysis of the interesting interaction between the two household members, Hart 
(1987) criticises Tegle's assumption of over-employment since no justification for 
this assumption is given. As emphasised above, an employment contract can lead 
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to three possible outcomes and, as such, a more general specification may be 
preferable. 
Given the focus of this Thesis, the aim of this Chapter is primarily to 
ascertain the characteristics of an over-employed individual in order to determine 
the characteristics of 'potential absentees'. For completeness, however, the 
profiles of an under-employed individual and an individual whose contractual 
hours are in accord with utility maximising hours are also explored, since such 
individuals can be regarded as 'potential non- absentees". 
The Chapter is set out as follows: Section 3.2 outlines the data and 
methodology; Section 3.3 presents the results of the empirical analysis and final 
comments are collected in Section 3.4. 
3.2 Data and Methodology 
The data set analysed in this Chapter is derived from the British Social Attitudes 
(BSA) Survey. The BSA Survey is a series of surveys started by the Social and 
Community Planning Research in 1983 and core funded by the Monument Trust. 
Surveys were conducted annually over the period 1983-1991, excluding 1988. 
Additional contributions are also made by the Department of the Environment, 
the Countryside Commission, the Nuffield Foundation, the ESRC, Marks and 
Spencer Plc and Shell UK Ltd. The data are derived from a cross-sectional sample 
of adults aged 18 and over living in private households whose addresses were 
included in the electoral registrar. The sampling was facilitated by selecting 114 
Parliamentary constituencies from among all those in Great Britain on the basis of 
the Registrar General's Standard Regions. 
From each parliamentary constituency a polling district was randomly 
identified and selected. Addresses were chosen from these polling districts by 
treating the listed electors as circular with a fixed interval and marking the name 
of the individual on which the sampling interval landed. This method ensured a 
probability proportionate to the number of listed electors. Where possible these 
electors were chosen for the survey. Where there was a difference between the 
register entry and the current members of the household, the interviewer selected 
one respondent by means of a random selection grid. 
The data from the BSA Survey was used to construct the set of profiles 
described above. The BSA survey is ideally suited to address such issues, since, 
although largely unexplored by economists, this data set contains a wealth of 
information on individual characteristics which yields an informative list of 
potential explanatory variables. 
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The BSA surveys for 1985,1989 and 1990 contain a question which asks 
individual employees if (a) they would like to work fewer hours than they are 
currently working, (b) if they would like to work more hours than they are 
currently working and (c) if they are happy with their current hours of work and, 
hence, would not like to change these contractual hours. An individual who agrees 
with (a) can be regarded as a 'potential absentee', since his/her contractual hours 
and utility maximising hours are clearly in discord. By the same criterion, 
individuals who agree with part (b) can be regarded as potential 'moon-lighters' 
and individuals who agree with part (c) can be regarded as being neither over- nor 
under-employed. 
A sub-sample of 3614 employees who were asked the above question was 
isolated from the BSA survey, 2494 (69%) of whom reported that they were 
satisfied with contractual hours, 964 (27%) of whom reported that they would like 
to work fewer hours and the remaining 156 (4%) employees reported that they 
would like to work more hours. Hence, almost one-third of the sub-sample 
reported that they faced hours of work constraints of some kind, implying that the 
assumption that individuals are able to choose work hours within a job (or are 
able to costly switch to another employer offering contractual hours equal to 
preferred hours) is clearly inappropriate. 
In order to determine the effect of various personal, demographic and job 
characteristics on the probability of being in one of the three states, the logit 
model is specified. The logit model is based on the cumulative logistic probability 
density function and is specified for observation i as: 
p(di = 1) =1 a-flixi (I + e- 
(3.4) 
where p(di = 1) represents the probability that the individual i is situated in the 
specified state of interest given knowledge of xi, a set of explanatory variables, 
where e denotes the base of natural logarithms. Three logit regressions were 
estimated separately for each possible state, i. e. over-employment, under- 
employment and satisfaction with contractual hours. 2 
Thus, the general methodology is to estimate the three logit regressions in 
order to determine the relationship between the probability of being OE, UE or 
UME and a specified set of regressors. The BSA survey is a rich source of 
2A similar bivariate analysis was undertaken by Hain (1982) in order to explore the determinants 
of the probability of under-employment using US data. The results suggest that years in education 
reduce the probability of under-employment whilst union membership and increases in the rate of 
unemployment raise the probability of under-employment. In addition, the probability of under- 
employment appears to differ across geographic regions. 
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information on an individual's personal and job characteristics and, as such, 
permits an interesting insight into the extent to which specific types of workers 
are satisfied or dissatisfied with their contractual hours. The regression results 
obtained offer a compact method of cross- tabulating OE, UE and UME incidence 
against a set of specified regressors. Given that the objective of this Chapter is to 
identify the three types of employees, such an approach is appropriate. 3 
3.3 Results 
The effects of a number of characteristics are explored which can be broadly split 
into three groups: personal characteristics, job characteristics and residential 
influences. Tables 3.3 to 3.5 present the sub-sample rates and the results of the 
three logit regressions for OE, UE and UME respectively whilst some variable 
definitions pertaining to the expectations and job satisfaction explanatory 
variables are set out in Table 3.6.4 
Prior to discussing the specific implications of each variable, it is 
interesting to consider some general diagnostics pertaining to the empirical 
specification in its entirety. The likelihood ratio test statistics reported in Tables 
3.3 to 3.5, test the hypothesis that the explanatory variables (excluding the 
constant) have no influence on the choice probabilities in the logit analysis, i. e. 
that 02 = 03 = ... = 
Pk= 0 
where k equals the number of explanatory variables 
andArepresents the constant. The likelihood ratio test statistic is defined as: 
-2 In A. = 2[In ý(Q) - In ý(co)] (3.5) 
A 
where f (Q) is the value of the likelihood function evaluated at the maximum 
likelihood estimates and f(a)) is the maximum value of the likelihood function 
under the hypothesis that 
02 = 03 = ... = 
Pk= 0. It is reassuring to note that the 
magnitude of the estimated test statistics for each of the three regressions is such 
that the hypothesis thatP2 =01 = ... = 
0, =0 is not accepted. 
In order to explore implications of desired vis a vis actual work hours, a selection of labour 
supply schedules were estimated, the results of which are presented in Appendix A3. Since the 
BSA Surveys enable identification of those employees who express satisfaction with their current 
work hours, we can derive a sample of desired work hours for this sub-group of individuals. 
Labour supply equations are also estimated for the entire sample of employees in order to provide 
a benchmark for comparison. In addition, the sub-sample of over-employed individuals is isolated 
in order to explore the nature of the labour supply schedule for an individual who faces constraints 
regarding labour supply. The results suggest that the nature of labour supply schedules are highly 
sensitive to the definition of work hours. 
4 The sub-sample rates are defined as the percentage of survey respondents with a given 
characteristic reporting themselves as either OE, UE or UME. 
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In addition, Table 3.1 below presents a selection of measures of goodness 
of fit in order to assess the predictive capacity of the three regressions equations. 
There have been numerous measures proposed in the literature - the three 
measures presented below are amongst the most frequently used in the analysis of 
limited dependent variables [see Maddala (1983) for a survey of the measures of 
goodness of fit]. 
Table 3.1: Measures of Goodness of Fit5 
Potential Measures: OE UE UME 
Maddala R2 0.1835 0.0778 0.1260 
Cragg-Uhler R2 
(, )](2 
In) 
)](2 
In) 
ý(co t))](2/n) 
-P I 
0.2674 0.2300 0.1774 
Chow R2 
n_ý )2/jn 
i)2 1-jjj=1(dj di 
. di=, 
(di -J, 
1 
0.1946 
1 
0.1462 
1 
0.1363 
1j 
The goodness of fit measures not only appear to be relatively small, but there 
appears to be some inconsistencies regarding the ranking of the models. At first 
sight, the levels of the Cragg-Uhler R2 and Chow R2 suggest that the UE model is 
characterised by better predictive capability than the UME specification whilst the 
Maddala R2 measure appears to suggest the opposite. Maddala (1983), however, 
proves that the upper bound on the Maddala R2 measure is less than one. More 
specifically, he derives the following bounds for this measure of goodness of fit: 
[,, (o 0:! ý Maddala R' <- I-f ))](21n) (3.6) 
where n represents the number of observations (i. e. 3614). Table 3.2 below 
presents the upper bounds of the Maddala R2 measure and the goodness of fit 
measure as a percentage of its range. Thus, although the relative ranking of the 
models appears to be restored once allowance is made for the upper bounds of the 
Maddala R2 measure, the analysis suggests that, even after one accounts for the 
upper bound of this goodness of fit measure, these models are characterised by 
5 N. B. d,, d, and j, represent the dependent variable, the predicted value of the dependent 
variable and the mean value of the dependent variable respectively. 
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rather poor predictive capacity. One problem with this specific measure of 
goodness of fit, however, lies in the fact that even if the fit of the model is perfect, 
the Maddala R2 will be significantly less than one which suggests that this 
statistic does not provide a good measure of fit. 
Table 3.2: Upper Bounds of the Maddala R2 Measure 
In f (w) J- ))](2/n) 
I 
Maddala R' /Range 
OE -2096.1 0.6865 0.27 [U 
E0 -642.85 0.2994 0.26 
U UM] ml 
L 
-2237.2 0.7101 0.18 
Cragg and Uhler (1973) propose an alternative measure which does lie on the unit 
interval. The values of the Cragg-Uhler R2 presented in Table 3.1, at first glance 
appear to be relatively low, but Cragg and Uhler (1973) remark that if such a 
measure of goodness fit is estimated at around 0.3, then this should be regarded as 
4... quite a good fit' [Cragg and Uhler (1973), p. 402]. Thus, the goodness of fit 
measure reported for the OE regression may be regarded as an indicator of 
reasonable predictive power. Attention will now be paid to the specific 
implications of each regressor for the probability of being in the state of OE, UE 
or UME. 
3.3.1 Personal Characteristics 
Age, Sex and Marital Status 
As illustrated by Equation 2.9 in Chapter 2, personal characteristics such as age, 
sex and marital status have been specified as explanatory variables in studies 
seeking to ascertain the determinants of the amount of absence observed across 
individuals. 
Subsequently, age in years and age in years squared were entered into the 
three regressions. 6 Age appears to exert a significant positive influence on both 
the probability of being over-employed and the probability of being under- 
employed and a significant negative influence on the probability of being satisfied 
with contractual hours. The situation is reversed in the case of the age squared 
variable. The results accord with those of Kahn and Lang (1991) which also 
6 'Me mean (standard deviation) value of age is 39.12 (11.48), 34.18 (11.34) and 38.68 (12.8) for 
respondents reporting themselves as OE, UE and ME respectively. 
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suggest that OE rises with age. The results, however, are not entirely in 
accordance with those seeking to explore the determinants of observed absence 
behaviour which, in general, suggest that absenteeism is concentrated amongst the 
oldest and the youngest employees [see, for example, Allen (198 1 a, 198 1 b)]. 
The results surveyed in Chapter 2 also suggest that females exhibit more 
absence behaviour than males. It is apparent from Tables 3.3 to 3.5, that the sub- 
sample rate of OE (UE) amongst female respondents is significantly higher 
(lower) than that of their male counterparts, which suggests that female employees 
may desire to work less hours which is consistent with the hypothesis that females 
are more prone to absence behaviour. Moreover, once other individual 
characteristics are controlled for, the dummy variable representing a male 
employee impacts negatively on the probability of being over-employed and 
positively on the probability of being under-employed, which confirms that the 
potential to absent is greater among female employees. 
The sub-sample rate of OE amongst married respondents exceeds that of 
single respondents, whilst the sub-sample rate of UE appears to be somewhat 
lower. The logit analysis suggests, however, that marital status does not exert a 
significant influence, ceteris paribus, in any of the three regressions, which 
suggests that the differential sub-sample rates of OE, UE and UME between 
married and single individuals is largely attributable to other factors. Similarly, 
although differentials are apparent in the sub-sample rates of OE, UE and UME 
between respondents with and without a pre-school child, the logit analysis 
suggests that the existence of such a child does not exert a significant effect on the 
differentials ceteris paribus. 7 
A dummy variable relating to an often ignored dimension of domestic 
arrangements was included in the analysis, taking the value of one if the 
respondent co-habits with his/her parents. It is apparent that two conflicting 
effects may be identified with such an arrangement. On the one hand, the 
respondent's parents may assist in domestic duties, such as child care, which may 
relieve the respondent of the need to absent from the work place in order to attend 
to such domestic matters. On the other hand, the respondent's parents may be 
dependent on the respondent which may lead to more absence from the work 
place in order to care for elderly or sick dependent relatives. Unfortunately, the 
data do not permit discrimination between the two situations. 
7 It is well documented in the literature on absence behaviour that the significance of personal 
characteristics as predictors of absence behaviour has not been universally accepted [see, for 
example, Barmby and Treble (1991a), Allen (1981a) and Kenyon and Dawkins (1989)]. 
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Table 3.3: Over-Emp oyment 
Variable Sub-Sample 
Rates 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
T-Ratio 
Personal Characteristics: 
Female 32-08 - Male 20.59 -0.3800 -3.0749*** Age - 0.1175 4.0111*** Age Squared - -0.0015 -3.9065'*** Single 22.54 - - Married 28.36 -0.0490 -0.3708 Pre-School CiUld 27.25 -0.2300 -1.5884 No Pre-School Child 26.60 - - No Parents in home 28.47 - Parents in home 17.19 -0.5012 -2.7261*** White 26.73 - Asian 16.67 -0.9128 -2.0455** African 33.33 0.1886 0.5575 
CSE 24.39 -0.0280 -0.2086 Apprenticeship 36.43 0.0544 0.3556 
RSA 18.66 - OT. M _2 -2.3989** '0' level 28.62 0.2358 2.2162** 
'A' level 31.19 -0.0388 -0.3417 Technical Qualifications 31.27 -0.1195 -0.7833 Vocational Qualifications 21.69 -0.6200 -2.0182** 
BTech 34.93 0.1099 0.5291 
Degree 30.11 -0.1701 -1.0411 Teacher training qualification 32.97 0.2055 0.9784 
Nursing Qualification 23.93 -0.2052 -0.7990 Expectla 31.93 0.2719 2.6890*** 
Expectlb 25.05 - 
Expect2a 27.97 0.1046 1.1092 
Expect2b 25.00 - - 
Expect3a 31.21 0.1819 0.8375 
Expect3b 26.49 - _ _ _ Expect4a -7T44 -0.1230 4T - 1. I 8 
Expect4b 29.38 - 
Expect5a 24.33 -0.2939 -2.8286*** 
Expect5b 29.67 
- - - Expect6a . 19 
Tq -0.1254 -0.5966 
Expect6b 26.54 - 
Job Characteristics: 
Blue Collar 25.99 -0.1455 -1.2971 
Non Blue Collar - - 
Trade Union Member 29.57 0.1979 1.6458* 
Non Trade Union Member 24.45 - - 
Nominal Earnings - 0.0005 2.2006** 
Nominal earnings Squared - -0.20OOE-7 -2.4686** 
Unearned Income - 0.10OOE-3 1.6500* 
Hours of Work - 0.0822 15.2060*** 7ati _sI a 26.24 0.0348 0.2844 
SatisIb 28.83 - - 
Satis2a 24.38 
_ -0.2688 -2.2672* Satis2b T67 9 - 
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Table 3.3: Over-Employment (continued) 
Variable Sub-Sample 
Rates 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
T-Ratio 
Satis3a 25.49 -0.3722 89*** -3.2489*** 89*** Satis3b 30.57 - Satis4a 28.37 -0.2473 0*** -2.59 80*** Satis4b 31.34 - - Satis5a 36.52 0.4387 1.9233* 
Satis5b 26.3T_ - - Satis6a 31.05 0.3445 3.8138*** 
Satis6b 23.25 - Satis7a 24.03 -0.3 -2.6003*** Satis7b 37.73 - Large Firm 34.73 2.6431*** 
Small Firm 24.92 - Unionised Work Place 27.21 0.0450 O. T579 
Non Unionised Work Place 25.96 - Union well run 23.89 -0.1863 -1.6764* Union not well run 28.16 - - Agriculture 16.67 -0.6437 -0.9694 Energy 22.52 -0.5158 -1.8870* Metal Extraction 35.94 0.4738 2.0199** 
Engineering 37.78 0.4036 2.5906*** 
Construction 29.65 0.1334 0.6351 
Distribution 23.01 O. 1497 1.0123 
Transport & Communications 
- 
31.78 __ 0.0361 -0.1903 ?3 ther Manufacturing 28.45 0.1355 0.8001 
Banking 23.92 - - Other services 22.55 - 
Public Sector 24.17 -0.1102 -0.8847 
Private Sector 28.23 
Residential Influences: 
North East 26.27 -0.2933 -1.5170 
North West 28.09 -0.1551 -0.9871 
Yorkshire and Humberside 26.97 -0.1299 -0.7655 
West Midlands 24.87 -0.3870 -2.3588** 
East Midlands 25.71 -0.3495 -1.8168* 
WaIes 23.78 -0.3425 -1.5043 
Scotland 21.12 -0.3335 -1.7993* 
East Anglia 26.39 -0.5245 -2.2022** 
South West 23.83 -0.4549 -2.4740** 
London 27.94 -0.1124 0.1574 
South East 30.57 - - 
Owner Occupier 28.01 0.2732 2.3242** 
Non Owner-Occupier 21.90 - - - Housing tenure: 0- 1 year 33.21 0.4961 2.3 9 95 
Housing tenure: 1-2 years 31.01 0.3122 1.6462* 
Housing tenure: 2-5 years 30.17 0.2015 1.2506 
Housing tenure: 5-10 years 24.44 -0.0267 -0.1672 
Housing tenure: 10-20 years 24.52 0.1544 
Housing tenure: 26T years 22.11 - 
Constant - -6.2012 -9.12 
Likelihood Ratio Test (69 df. ) 732.83*** 
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Table 3A Under-Em loyment 
Variable Sub-Sample 
Rates 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
T-Ratio 
Pet-sonal Characteristics: 
Female 3.71 - Male 5.57- 0.8329 2.9927*** 
Age - 0.0982 1.755-3* Age Squared - -0-0016 -2.2457** Single 5.73 - - Married 3.74 -0.1224 -0.4392 Pre-School Child 5.86 -0.1614 -05-662 No Pre-School Child . 10 - No Parents in home 3.82 - Parents in home 6.9T_ 0.8746 2.3793** 
White 4.19 - Asian 12.96 1.4488 2.9082*** 
African 3.92 -0.1523 -0.1870 CSE 6.13 _TM -1 0.1 II_T5_ 
Apprenticeship 5.15 0.8003 2.4217** 
RSA 3.11 -0.2978 -0.8794 '0' level 3.82 0.0279 0.1244 
'A' level 3.44 
__ _ 
0.2446 0.9406 
Technical Qualifications 5 F7 -0.0193 -0.0459 Vocational Qualifications 2.41 -0.5269 -0.6666 BTech 2.05 -0.5373 
Degree 1.93 -0.8870 -1.8096* Teacher training qualification 2.75 0.1562 0.2809 
Nursing Qualification 3.42 -0.2109' -0.3647 
Expect Ia 3.63 0.0892 0.3888 
Expectlb 4.53 - - 
Expect2a 3.88 -0.0975 -0.4966 
Expect2b 4.89 - - 
Expect3a 3.55 0.0026 0.0052 
Expect3b 4.35 - - 
Expect4a 3.48 -0.1626 -0.7370 
Expect4b 5.32 - 
Expect5a 4.14 0.2365 1.0737 
Expect5b 4.54 - - 
Expect6a 3.24 -0.9418 -1.9654** 
Expect6b 4.37 
Job Characteristics: 
Blue Collar 6.08 0.5133 2.3524** 
Non Blue Collar 3.07 - 
Trade Union Member 3.44 -0.4952 -2.0231** 
Non Trade Union Member 4.99 - - 
Nominal Earnings - -0.91E-4 -0.1490 
Nominal earnings Squared - -0.64E-7 -0.2669 
Unearned Income - -0.27E-3 -1.6614* 
Hours of Work - 01 OT9_ -8.1878*** 
Satis Ia 3.48 -0.6948 -3.1492*** 
Satislb 8.50 - 
Satis2a 4.13 -0.5134 -2.0166** 
Satis2b 5.18 
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Table 3A Under-Employment (continued) 
Variable Sub-Sample 
Rates 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
T-Ratio 
Satis3a 3.50 -0.6173 -2.8955*** Satis3b 6.99 - - Satis4a 4.52 -0.2657 -1.3408 Satis4b 5.17 - Satis5a 3.48 -0.0523 -0.08-9-4 Satis5b 4.34 _ - Satis6a 4.53 
-"-- 
0.2054 _I__F455 
Satis6b T 1-5 _ - _ - Satis7a 4.53 0.4846 1.7145* 
Satis7b 3.44 - - Large Firm 2.64 -0.2523' -0-877-0 Small Firm 4.68 - - Unionised Work Place 4-5-T- 0.5291 1.9053* 
Non Unionised Work Place 4.02 - - Union well run 5.16 0.5169 2.1096** 
Union not well run 3.87 - Agriculture 4.17 -0.0604 -0.0533 Energy 3.60 U-17-5 0.3117 
Metal Extraction 4.69 0.1242 0.2460 
Engineering 2.27 -0.5400 -1.2688 Construction 3.49 -0.0681 -0.1385 Distribution 7.09 0.2216 0.8239 
Transport & Communications 4.67 0.3327 0.8180 
Other Manufacturing 3.52 -0.4839 -1.2241 
Banking 2.54 - - Other services 4.56 - - 
Public Sector 4.12 -0.2488 -0.9514 
Private Sector 4.41 
Residential Influences: 
North East 6.78 0.1004 0.2676 
North West 3T. 5 -0.5386 -1.4115 
Yorkshire and Humberside 3.94 -0.3196 -0.8564 
West Midlands 3.74 -0.1849 -0.5064 
East Midlands 5.39 -0.0 -0.2318 
Wales 7.32 0.4864 1.2333 
Scotland 4.95 -0.2659 -0.6968 
East Anglia 4.17 -0.0291 -0.0559 
South West 4.33 -0.1775 -0.4572 
London 3.43 -0.3766 -0.9933 
South East 3.74 - - 
Owner Occupier 3.68 -0.2269 -1.0479 
Non Owner-Occupier 6.58 - - 
Housing tenure: 0- 1 year 6.34 1.0569 2.3425 
Housing tenure: 1-2 years 5.17 0.8501 
- - - 
2.0024** 
Housing tenure: 2-5 years 4.75 U 67TI 1.8252* 
Housing tenure: 5-10 years 3.75 0.3395 0.8831 
Housing tenure: 10-20 years 4.77 0.5702 1.6306 
Housing tenure: 20+ years 2.11 - - 
Constant - -0.9161 -2.6739*** 
1 
Likelihood Ratio Test (69 df) 292.876*** 
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Table 3.5: Uti ity Maximising Employment 
Variable Sub-Sample 
Rates 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
T-Ratio 
Personal Characteristics: 
Female 64.21 - 
Male 74.41 0.1747 1.5403 
Age - -0.1197 -4.5178*** Age Squared - 0.0014 4.5859*** Single 71.73 - - Married 67.90 0.0517 0.4318 
Pre-School Child 66.87- 0.1900 1.4448 
No Pre-School Child 69.31 - 
No Parents in home 67.71 - - 
Parents in home 75.87 0.1747 1.5403 
White 69.08 - - 
Asian 70.37 0.1301 0.3823 
African 62.75 -0.0634 -0.1989 CSE 69.48 -0.0255 -0.2093 
Apprenticeship 58.42 -0.1841 -1.2811 
RSA 78.23 0.4295 2.9447*** 
'0' level 67.56 -0.1742 1.748* 'A' level 65.77 -0.0253 -0.2394 
Technical Qualifications 65.98 0.0683 0.4749 
Vocational Qualifications 75.90 0.5937 2.0820** 
BTech 6701. 0.2417 1.5709 
Degree 67.96 -0.7265 -0.1340 
Teacher training qualification 64.29 -0.2725 -1.3881 
Nursing Qualification 72.65 0.2381 0.9972 
Expect Ia 64.44 -0.2286 -2.4339** 
Expectlb 70.42 - - 
Expect2a 68.16 -0.0827 -0.9575 
Expect2b 70.11 - - Expect3a 65.25 -0.1254 -76 768 
Expect3b 69.16 
_ ý Expect4a 72.07 0.19 11 1.9029* 
Expect4b 65.30 - 
Expect5a 71.53 0.1660 1.7428* 
Expect5b 65.78 - 
Expect6a 67.57 0.3503 1.8029* 
Expect6b 69.09 - - 
Job Characteristics: 
Blue Collar 67.94 -0.0257 -0.2540 
Non Blue Collar 69.77 
_ - - Trade Union Member 66.9T -0.0007 -0.0065 
Non Trade Union Member 70.56 - - 
Nominal Earnings - -0.70E-4 -0.3418 
Nominal earnings Squared - 0.39E-7 0.6219 
Unearned Income - -0.81E-4 -1.1527 
Hours of Work - -0.0495 -10.9310*** 
Satisla 70.27 0.1638 1.4835 
Satislb 62.67 - - - - Satis2a 71.49 (771 m 2.8271*** 
Satis2b 57.84 
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Table 3.5: Utility M ximising Em loyment (continued) 
Variable Sub-Sample 
Rates 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
T-Ratio 
Satis3a 71.01 0.5050 4.8522*** 
Satis3b 62.44 - 
Satis4a 67.11 
7 
0.2139 2.4559** 
Satis4b . 48 6 - Satis5a 60. - 0.4 1 TT _-T. M 57 Satis5b 69.31 
__7 - Satis6a 69T: T2 -0.2924 TM7 7 Satis6b 7- 7T-61 - - Satis7a 71.44 0.1780 1.6394 
Satis7b 58.82 - - 
Large Firm 62.64 -0.2038 -1.9250* 
Small Firm 70.39 - - 
Unionised Work Place 68.26 -0.1569 -1.3299 
Non Unionised Work Place 70.02 - - 
Union well run 70.95 0.0440 0.4284 
Union not well run 67.97 - - 
Agriculture 79.17 0.5028 7_8 949 
Energy 73.87 0.4170 1.6769* 
Metal Extraction __5738 -0.4038 -1.8543* 
Engineering 59.95 -0.2675 ' -1.8219 Construction 66.86 -0.0543 -0.2777 
Distribution 69.90 -0.2275 -1.7232* 
Transport & Communications 6755 -0.0419 -0.2397 
Other Manufacturing 68.04 -0.0184 -0.1170 
Banking 73.54 - - 
Other services 72.89 - - 
Public Sector 71.71 0.1191 1.0427 
Private Seci-or -67.36 - - 
Residential Influences: 
North East 66.95 
_ 
0.1338 0.7648 
North West _ 6756 0.2085 1.4194 
Yorkshire and Humberside 69.09 0.1670 1.0651 
West Midlands 71.39 0.3606 2.3783** 
East Midlands 69.29 
- 
0.2508 1.4353 
Wales 68.76 0.1441 0.7079 
Scotland 73.93 0.2925 1.7423* 
East Anglia 69.44 
- 
0.3783 
' 
1.7416* 
-- - South West 71.7 4 0.4250 7 . 5149** London 68.63 0.1540 1.0526 
South East 65.69 
_ - - Owner Uc-cupier 6 RTI -0.1507 -1.4297 
Non Owner-Occupier 71.52 - - 
Housing tenure: 0-1 year 60.45 -0.6583 -3.4225*** 
Housing tenure: 1-2 years 63.82 -0.4644 -2.6601*** 
Housing tenure: 2-5 years 65.08 -0.3496 -2.3517** 
Housing tenure: 5-10 years 71.81 
- -0.0763 -0.5194 Housing tenure: 10-20 years 70.7T -0.2696 -2.0106** 
Housing tenure: 257 years 75.79 - 
Constant - 4.3561 7.1397*** 
Likelihood Ratio Test (df 69) 486.526*** 
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Table 3.6: Variable Definitions: Expectations and Job Satisfaction 
Variables 
Variable Definition 
Expectla Equals one if the individual does not think that there will be less 
employees at his/her workplace next year 
] 
Expectlb Equals one if the individual thinks that there will be less employees at 
his/her workplace next year 
Expect2a Equals one if the individual thinks that the rate of unemployment will 
fall next year 
Expect2b Equals one if the individual thinks that the rate of unemployment will 
rise next year 
Expect3a Equals one if the individual thinks that the rate of inflation will fall 
next year 
Expect3b Equals one if the individual thinks that the rate of inflation will rise 
next year 
Expect4a Equals one if the individual thinks that his/her income has kept up with 
inflation over the past year 
Expect4b Equals one if the individual thinks that his/her income has fallen with 
inflation over the past year 
Expect5a Equals one if the individual thinks his/her real income will increase 
next year 
Expect5b Equals one if the individual thinks his/her real income will decrease 
next year 
Expect6a Equals one if the individual feels that he/she will have to leave the firm 
involuntarily 
Expect6b Equals one if the individual feels that he/she will not have to leave the 
firm involuntarily 
Satisla Equals one if the individual finds life comfortable at his/her present 
level of income 
Satislb Equals one if the individual finds life uncomfortable at his/her present 
level of income 
Satis2a Equals one if the employee thinks that the management-employee 
relations are good at the work place 
Satis2b Equals one if the employee thinks that the management-employee 
relations are poor at the work place 
Satis3a Equals one if the individual thinks that it is unlikely that he/she will 
leave the current job this year 
Satis3b Equals one if the individual thinks that it is likely that he/she will leave 
the current job this year 
Satis4a Equals one if the individual is satisfied with his/her current level of 
wages 
Satis4b Equals one if the individual is unsatisfied with his/her current level of 
wages 
Satis5a Equals one if the individual believes that the pay gap at the work place 
is too small 
Satis5b Equals one if the individual does not believe that the pay gap at the 
work place is too small 
Satis6a Equals one if the individual believes that the pay gap at the work place 
is too large 
Satis6b Equals one if the individual does not believe that the pay gap at the 
I 
work place is too large 
Satis7a Equals one if the individual thinks that the firm is well managed 
Satis7b Equals one if the individual does not think that the firm is well 
managed 
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It is apparent that the sub-sample rate of OE is significantly lower, and the sub- 
sample rates of UE and UME are significantly higher, amongst individuals who 
co-habit with their parents. The logit results suggest that the former effect 
dominates with respondents living in the same residence as their parents 
experiencing significantly more (less) UE (OE). 
A further three dummy variables (Asian, African and White) were 
incorporated into the analysis to represent ethnic origin. Once again there have 
been mixed results reported in the existing literature on absence behaviour 
concerning the implications of ethnic origin. Allen (1981a) and Leigh (1991), for 
example, both include a non-white dummy in their empirical specifications which 
proves to be an insignificant explanatory variable for absence behaviour. In a later 
analysis, Allen (1984), however, obtains results which suggest that absence rates 
are higher among non-whites, contradicting his earlier results. It would appear 
from the current analysis that ideally one should make a distinction between 
Asian and African individuals rather than simply classifying such culturally 
diverse groups as 'non-white'. 
It is clear from the sub-sample rates that the incidence of OE (UE) 
amongst respondents of an African origin is higher (lower) than that of 
respondents of both other ethnic backgrounds. Relative to Whites, however, it is 
only respondents of an Asian origin who are characterised by a significantly 
higher (lower) probability of being UE (OE) ceteris paribus. Thus, being of 
African origin does not appear to influence the differential probability of being in 
any of the three states relative to Whites implying that the differential across the 
sub-sample rates for Africans and Whites can be accounted for by other factors. 
Education 
The implications of education for absence behaviour have attracted some attention 
in the literature with the empirical evidence suggesting an inverse relationship 
between absence and education due to the perceived positive association between 
absence and good health and good health and education [see Section 2.3.3.49 
Chapter 2]. 8 A further dimension to the relationship between absence behaviour 
and education exists, however, if one acknowledges the high degree of correlation 
which exists between educational attainment and occupational status. University 
graduates, for example, are mostly professionals, whilst unskilled manual workers 
usually have few, if any, qualifications. Furthermore, white collar employment is 
associated with a relatively higher degree of flexibility than blue collar 
employment. Section 2.3.3.2, Chapter 2, has discussed the inverse relationship 
which exists between job flexibility and absenteeism in some detail. 
8 Allen (1981a, 1981b) and Leigb (1986,1991), for example, obtain results wbicb suggest that 
education is inversely related to absenteeism. 
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In Tables 3.3 to 3.5, eleven categories of educational attainment are 
specified ranging from CSE to degree level. Although, some of the variables fail 
to reach significance in the logit analysis, there are several results which warrant 
further discussion. The sub-sample rates for both OE and UE are highest amongst 
individuals with an apprenticeship as compared to other educational 
achievements, whilst the sub-sample rate for UME is the lowest amongst this 
group of employees. One might conjecture that the relatively high incidence of 
OE (and UE) may be prevalent amongst such individuals given that this 
qualification is usually associated with inflexible blue collar employment 
contracts. Moreover, the high incidence of UE amongst respondents with an 
apprenticeship may reflect the fall in manual employment following the decline of 
the British manufacturing sector over the 1970s and 1980s where the 
apprenticeship system tends to predominate. 
The logit regressions suggest that, once other factors are taken into 
consideration, apprenticeships appear to exert a large positive effect only on the 
probability of being under-employed. Thus, the implications of the hours 
inflexibility for over-employment, and thus absence behaviour, often associated 
with blue collar employment appear to be out-weighed once one takes account of 
other characteristics. 
The RSA secretarial qualification may be regarded as the clerical 
equivalent to an apprenticeship. It is apparent from Tables 3.3 to 3.5 that the sub- 
sample rate of OE (UME) is lowest (highest) amongst respondents with an RSA 
qualification as compared to other educational qualifications. The RSA dummy 
variable is characterised by a significant negative coefficient in the OE regression 
and a significant positive coefficient in the UME regression, implying that the 
presence of an RSA qualification, ceteris paribus, will lower the potential to 
absent. Such a result is not particularly surprising since secretarial skills are 
generally associated with flexible white collar employment. 
In a similar vein, the sub-sample rate of UE is lowest amongst respondents 
with a degree as compared to other educational qualifications. The dummy 
variable which indicates whether or not the individual has a degree, however, 
only attains significance in the UE regression with the estimated coefficient 
suggesting that the possession of a degree exerts a very large negative impact on 
the probability of being under-employed. This result ties in with the findings of 
Coleman and Pencavel (1993a, 1993b) for the US which suggest that work hours 
have risen over the past two decades in the US for both male and female college 
graduates. 
Similarly, the possession of accountancy and other related vocational 
qualifications appears to lower the probability of UE and to raise the probability 
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of being satisfied with contractual hours, ceteris paribus, in both cases by a 
relatively large amount. Since such qualifications are naturally associated with 
professional and managerial occupations, where contractual hours are relatively 
flexible, the results are in accordance with a priori expectations. 
Expectations 
Following the discussion of Section 2.3.3.5, Chapter 2, which highlights the 
importance of dynamics and, therefore, expectations in analysing absence 
behaviour, a number of variables representing the individual's expectations over 
factors pertaining to future employment opportunities were incorporated into the 
analysis. 
From Tables 3.3 to 3.5, it is apparent that the sub-sample rate of OE (UE) is 
higher (lower) amongst individuals who believe that the number of individuals 
employed at his/her work place will not fall over the coming year than that of 
individuals who are pessimistic about future changes in the number of employees 
employed at the work place. The logit results confirm that the potential to absent 
from the work place is inflated if the individual believes that the number of 
individuals employed at his/her work place will not decline over the coming year. 
Such beliefs may enhance the perceived job security of the individual which may 
in turn encourage absence behaviour. Such behaviour clearly fits in with the 
efficiency wage hypothesis discussed in Section 2.3.3.3, Chapter 2. In addition, if 
the conditions of the economy lead to increases in labour demand, employers have 
tended to rely on the provision of overtime working rather than the employment 
of additional workers [see, for example, Hart and Ruffell (1993)]. Such actions 
would raise the average hours of the existing work force which could further 
intensify the tendency towards OE. 
It is interesting to note that despite the differentials in the sub-sample rates 
of OE, UE and UME between individuals who are optimistic about future rates of 
unemployment and inflation and individuals who are pessimistic about such 
macroeconomic indicators, these expectations variables are not characterised by a 
significant coefficient in any of the logit regressions. Hence, employment 
prospects in an individual's work place appear to influence the potential to absent 
whilst conditions in the general economy appear to be unimportant predictors of 
the potential to absent once one controls for other factors. 
A further set of variables, Expect6a and Expect6b, were incorporated into 
the empirical analysis; Expect6a equals one if the individual believes that he/she 
will have to leave the firm involuntarily in the near future due to, for example, 
lay-offs and redundancies whilst Expect6b equals one if the individual believes 
the opposite. The sub-sample rate of OE is higher amongst those individuals who 
believe that they will be made redundant in the near future, whilst the sub-sample 
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rates of UE and UME are lower amongst this group of individuals. It is apparent 
from the logit results that the prospect of involuntary redundancy appears to exert 
a very large negative effect on the probability of UE and a significant positive 
impact on the probability of being satisfied with contractual hours. It may be the 
case that an individual who perceives that he/she is likely to be involuntarily 
unemployed in the near future will express satisfaction with current employment. 
Differentials in the sub-sample rates of OE, UE and UME exist across 
individuals who believe that their real income has increased over the past year 
(Expect4a) and those who believe that their real income has fallen (Expect4b). 
The sub-sample rates of OE and UE are higher, and that of UME lower, amongst 
those who believe that their real income has fallen. Turning to the logit analysis, if 
an individual believes that his/her real income has increased over the past year 
then such beliefs inflate the probability that an individual is satisfied with his/her 
hours of work. Such results reinforce the proposition that a strong positive 
correlation between job satisfaction and wages exists [see Section 2.3.3, Chapter 
21. 
Furthermore, the sub-sample rates of OE and UE are more pronounced 
amongst individuals who believe that their real income will decline next year 
(Expect5b) as opposed to those who believe that their real income will increase 
over the coming year (Expect5a). It is not surprising that the sub-sample rate of 
UME is lowest amongst those who believe that their real income will fall. 
Moreover, once other influences are taken into account, the logit analysis suggests 
that if an individual believes that his/her real income will rise over the next year 
then the probability of OE is reduced whilst the probability of UME is increased. 
Such results further reinforce the hypothesis that a strong positive correlation 
between the wage rate and job satisfaction exists. 
3.3.2 Job Characteristics 
Occupation, Income and Contractual Hours 
It is apparent from Chapter 2 that contractual arrangements play an important role 
in the theory of absence behaviour. Accordingly, a dummy variable representing 
blue collar employment was included in the empirical analysis. Differentials in 
the sub-sample rates of OE, UE and UME are apparent across blue collar and 
non-blue collar employees, with the sub-sample rate of OE, somewhat 
surprisingly, being higher amongst non-blue as opposed to blue collar employees, 
and the sub-sample rate of UE (UME) being higher (lower) amongst blue collar 
75 
employees. 9 Controlling for other factors via the logit analysis, the blue collar 
dummy variable reaches significance in one regression only. The results suggest 
that blue collar employment raises the probability of being under-employed. 
The implications of trade union membership were explored given the 
potential effects of such membership on the level of satisfaction with contractual 
arrangements. From Tables 3.3 to 3.5 it is apparent that differentials in the sub- 
sample rates of OE, UE and UME exist across trade union and non-trade union 
members. The sub-sample rate of OE is greater amongst union members whilst 
the sub-sample rates of UE and UME appear to be lower across union as opposed 
to non-union members. From Tables 3.3 to 3.5, it is apparent that trade union 
membership exerts a significant positive impact on the probability of OE and a 
significant negative impact on the probability of UE, suggesting that the potential 
to absent from the work place may be inflated amongst trade union members. The 
studies surveyed in Section 2.3.3.3, Chapter 2, confirm that absence behaviour 
appears to be more pronounced among union as opposed to non-union members. 
Clearly, the income of an individual plays a prominent role in any theory 
of labour market behaviour and to ascertain the implications of income for the 
potential to absent, the individual's yearly earnings were included in the 
analysis. 10 Some summary statistics relating to the continuous variables are 
presented in Table 3.7 below. Earnings appear to be positively associated with the 
probability of OE whilst earnings squared impact negatively on OE. It is 
interesting to note the relatively small magnitude of the estimated coefficient of 
the earnings variables. One explanation for this may lie in the extensive set of job 
satisfaction variables which has been included in the analysis. Since job 
satisfaction and earnings are likely to be positively correlated, the inclusion of the 
job satisfaction variables discussed below may have dampened the earnings 
effect. 
In addition, a proxy for unearned income was constructed since changes in 
the level of unearned income will act as a pure income effect thereby, assuming 
the normality of leisure, stimulating absence behaviour. 11 In contrast to Allen 
(1981a), who also includes such a variable, the unearned income variable is 
significant and takes the expected positive sign in the over-employed regression. 
The size of the coefficient is, however, somewhat small. Unearned income, 
9 As reported in the previous Chapter, empirical evidence suggests that blue collar employees are 
more prone to absence behaviour than white collar employees [see, for example, Kenyon and 
Dawkins (1989)]. 
10 Unfortunately, the BSA survey does not contain questions relating to the sick pay arrangements 
prevailing at the work place. 
II The unearned income proxy was constructed by subtracting the individual's earnings from 
household income which is defined in the BSA survey as the summation of income across all 
household members. 
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however, is a difficult concept to measure and the definition incorporated is 
clearly deficient in some areas. Ideally, for example, one would like to have 
information on transfer payments and income from asset holdings. Thus, although 
the variable is characterised by the expected sign the results should be treated 
with some caution. 
Table 3.7: Summary Statistics 
Over-Employed Under-Employed Utility Maximising 
Variable Employment 
mean standard mean standard mean 6801.8 
deviation deviation 
Nominal 11421 6585.7 5762.8 4954.8 9012.4 6801.8 
Earnings 
Unearned 5486.5 6429 5346.2 6488.1 5804.5 6655.4 
Income I I 
Hours of Work 
1 
44.283 1 10.481 1' 28.391 L 12.612 1 35.883 1 11.562 
In order to allow for the length of the working week, contractual hours 
were included in the regression analysis. In accordance with a priori expectations, 
contractual hours exert a positive influence on the probability of OE and a 
negative influence on both the probability of UE and the probability of UME. 12 
Job Satisfaction 
A set of variables pertaining to the satisfaction of the individual towards his/her 
job and workplace was incorporated into the regression analysis in order to 
account for the types of influences on absence behaviour discussed within the 
applied psychology literature (see Section 2.3.2, Chapter 2). 
The sub-sample rates of OE and UE are significantly higher amongst 
individuals who believe that management-employee relations at the workplace are 
poor (see Satis2b) whilst the sub-sample rate of UME is highest amongst those 
who believe that management-employee relations at the workplace are good (see 
Satis2a). These findings are confirmed by the logit analysis with the estimated 
coefficient on Satis2a signifying a significant negative effect on the probability of 
being both over-employed and under-employed and a significant positive effect 
on the probability of being content with contractual hours of work. The results, 
therefore, suggest that the impetus to absent (moon-light) from the work place is 
12 Kahn and Lang (1991) find evidence which suggests that workers who desire to work longer 
hours tend to work longer hours. 
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somewhat curbed if the worker perceives that management-employee relations are 
good at the workplace. 13 
Similarly, the sub-sample rate of OE is much higher and the sub-sample 
rate of UME is much lower amongst individuals who believe that their work place 
is poorly as opposed to well-managed. Confirmation is obtained from the logit 
analysis since the variable Satis7a, which indicates whether the individual 
perceives his/her firm as well managed, is characterised by a negative coefficient 
in the OE regression which suggests that the potential to absent is reduced if an 
individual has confidence in the ability of the management at his/her workplace. 
Differentials in the sub-sample rates of OE, UE and UME are also apparent 
across individuals who are satisfied with the perceived pay gap across employees 
in the firm and those who are dissatisfied with the perceived pay gap. The sub- 
sample rate of OE (UME) amongst individuals who feel the pay gap to be too 
large (small) are higher (lower) than the sub-sample rate for individuals who 
express satisfaction with the pay gap. The sub-sample rate of UE amongst 
individuals who believe that the pay gap is too small is lower than that of 
individuals who are satisfied with the prevailing pay gap whilst the sub-sample 
rate of UE amongst individuals who believe that the pay gap is too large is higher 
than that of individuals who are satisfied with the prevailing pay gap. One 
explanation for this may lie in the fact that individuals who perceive the pay gap 
as too small are likely to be in managerial positions with relatively high levels of 
educational attainment whilst those who perceive it as too large are likely to be 
relatively less-skilled employees in non managerial positions who face the most 
insecurity in time of economic decline. 
The logit results suggest that, ceteris paribus, dissatisfaction with the pay 
gap exerts a (relatively large) positive effect on the probability of being over- 
employed and a (moderate) negative effect on the probability of being satisfied 
with contractual hours. It would thus appear that an employee's satisfaction or 
otherwise with his/her employment conditions may impact significantly on the 
potential to absent. Indeed, in a recent contribution, Rees (1993) emphasises the 
important role played by the perceived 'fairness' in wage comparisons across, for 
example, individuals or unions in observed labour market behaviour which is 
lacking in the standard neo-classical theory of labour contract deten-nination. 
It is apparent from Tables 3.3 to 3.5 that the sub-sample rates of OE and 
UE are lower amongst individuals who are satisfied with their current level of 
wages (Satis4a) whilst that of UME is higher amongst individuals who are 
13 It might be the case that Satis2a (or any variable representing job satisfaction) is correlated with 
the existence of managerial innovations such as flexi-time arrangements which enhance flexibility 
in the work place thereby dampening the effect from hours constraints. 
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satisfied with current wages as compared to the group of individuals who express 
dissatisfaction with the current level of wages (Satis4b). Moreover, once other 
factors are controlled for in the logit analysis, the estimated coefficients for the 
variable Satis4a suggest a significant negative (positive) association between OE 
(UME) and wage satisfaction. 
Differentials in the sub-sample rates of OE, UE and UME are also prevalent 
across individuals who find life comfortable at their present level of income 
(Satisla) and those who find life uncomfortable at their present income level 
(Satis1b). The sub-sample rates of OE and UE are higher amongst individuals 
who find life uncomfortable at their present income level whilst the rate of UME 
is lower amongst such respondents. Moreover, the sub-sample rate of UE amongst 
individuals reporting such uncomfortable arrangements is more than double that 
of individuals who do not report any such problems. The logit analysis confirms 
that individuals who face an uncomfortable life at present income levels are likely 
to be under-employed since the variable Satisla appears to exert a highly 
significant and relatively large negative impact on the probability of being under- 
employed, suggesting that individuals who find life uncomfortable at their current 
income level are highly likely to perceive themselves as under-employed. 
The sub-sample rates of OE and UE are significantly lower, and the sub- 
sample rate of UME significantly higher, amongst individuals who feel that it is 
unlikely that they will voluntarily leave their employer in the near future (see 
Satis3a) as compared to those individuals who feel that it is likely that they will 
quit their current employer (see Satis3b). Once again, confirmation is obtained 
from the logit analysis, since the variable Satis3a is characterised by a highly 
significant negative coefficient in the OE regression which suggests that the 
potential to absent is somewhat reduced if the individual feels that it is unlikely 
that he/she will voluntarily leave the firm. Such predictions tie in with results of 
the Georgellis (1994) who argues that job satisfaction is positively associated with 
job tenure. 
The Work Place 
Leigh (1991) explores the role of employee and job attributes as predictors of 
absenteeism in a national sample of 1308 workers. The category of variables 
reflecting aspects of an individual's job includes a variable which represents the 
size of the organisation i. e. the number of employees at the respondent's work 
place. Leigh argues that there are conflicting hypotheses concerning the effect of 
firm size on absenteeism. 
Employees in a large firm may, on the one hand, believe that they can be 
easily replaced if they go absent, which would be difficult in a small firm. This is 
consistent with the results of the survey undertaken by Ashworth et al (1993) 
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which suggest that small firms experience very low rates of absence since 
employees are aware of the difficulties generated by spells of absence for the both 
the firm and their attending colleagues. Evidence which supports the hypothesis 
that large work places are characterised by higher rates of absence has been found 
by Winkler (1980), Allen (1981b), Leigh (1984) and Peel and Wilson (1991). On 
the other hand, there is some evidence which suggests that more committed 
employees are attracted to large firms and, as a result, large firms experience 
relatively less absenteeism. 14 Leigh's results indicate, however, that the firm size 
variable is on the borderline of significance and as such does not settle the 
ambiguity surrounding the sign of this variable. 
Balchin and Wooden (1992), who analyse a data set containing 1391 work 
place level observations, also include a work place size variable. Their analysis is 
concerned with exploring the implications of the threat of dismissal for poor 
performance on absence behaviour and the authors conjecture that larger work 
places tend to be more X-inefficient and, as such, characterised by lower levels of 
dismissal threat. In addition, as emphasised by applied psychologists such as 
Steers and Rhodes (1978,1984), employees in large work places may feel more 
alienated which in turn leads to lower levels of job satisfaction and ultimately to 
absenteeism or even quit behaviour. The results of Balchin and Wooden (1992) 
suggest that firm size is positively related to absenteeism which is consistent with 
the hypothesis cited above. 
It is clear from Tables 3.3 to 3.5 that the sub-sample rate of OE is 
significantly higher amongst employees of large firms as opposed to those of 
small firms. Conversely, the sub-sample rates of UE and UME appear to be 
significantly higher amongst individuals employed by small rather than large 
firms. One explanation for the UME finding may lie in the fact that contact 
between employers and employees may be more direct in a small fin-n which may 
allow some discussion regarding contractual arrangements. The logit results 
presented in Tables 3.3 to 3.5 are generally in accordance with those of Balchin 
and Wooden (1992), since the estimated coefficient of the large firm variable 
exerts a significant positive effect on the probability of OE and a significant 
negative influence on the probability that contractual hours and utility maximising 
hours are in accord. 
In addition, the sub-sample rate of OE appears to be more prevalent at 
unionised as opposed to non-unionised work places whilst the sub-sample rate of 
UE appears to be only marginally higher at unionised work places. It is surprising 
14 Garen (1985) who adapts a job screening model finds a positive correlation between firm size 
and earnings. The findings also indicate that individuals who choose to acquire more schooling are 
more likely to enter a large firm. 
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that the logit results suggest that the presence of a union at the work place only 
exerts a relatively large positive influence on the probability of being under- 
employed. Furthermore, the sub-sample rate of OE is higher amongst individuals 
who believe that the trade union at his/her work place is poorly managed, whilst 
the sub-sample rates of UE and UME are higher amongst individuals who believe 
that the union is well-run. 15 The logit results suggest that the presence of a 'well- 
run" trade union appears to lower the probability of OE and inflate the probability 
of UE. 
Industry 
Allen (1981a) discusses the role industry dummies play in the determination of 
absenteeism but finds that only one of the sixteen industrial classifications - 
durable manufacturing - appeared to exert a positive and significant effect on the 
rate of absence. 16 
In Tables 3.3 to 3.5, it is apparent that OE appears to be greatest in the 
engineering sector with a sub-sample rate of 37.78 percent, more than double that 
prevailing in the agricultural sector - the sector characterised by the lowest sub- 
sample rate. It is not surprising, therefore, that the engineering sector is 
characterised by the lowest sub-sample rate of UE. The logit analysis confin-ns the 
industrial specificity of OE incidence with the coefficient on the dummy variable 
representing the engineering sector indicating a higher probability of OE in the 
engineering sector relative to that in the service sector. 
One possible explanation for these results could lie in the recent moves 
towards shorter working hours. Over the 1980s, the engineering industry in the 
UK was involved in a dispute between the employers and the engineering unions, 
following the unions' claim for a reduction in the length of the working week [see 
Labour Research (1989,1990) and McKinlay and McNulty (1992)]. One impetus 
behind this movement was the high amount of overtime working prevalent in the 
industry; cuts in the length of the working week were proposed as a stimulus to 
the employment of additional workers rather than utilising the existing work force 
more intensively. 
The metal extraction industry dummy variable is also characterised by a 
positive coefficient in the OE regression and a negative coefficient in the UME 
regression. These results are indicative of dissatisfaction with the level of 
15 One might predict a strong positive correlation between trade union membership and the 
variable indicating that the employee believes the union at his/her work place is well-run i. e. 
individuals who believe that the union is poorly managed are unlikely to subscribe to that 
association. The Spearman's Rank correlation coefficient between these two variables was 
calculated at 0.47 suggestive of a positive but not particularly high degree of correlation. 
Consequently both of these variables were incorporated in the empirical analysis. 
16 One explanation for this might lie in the fact that the durable manufacturing sector in the US is 
characterised by a traditionally unionised work force [Tigges and Tootle (1990)]. 
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contractual hours, and thus potential absence behaviour, in this particular sector. 
The recent survey undertaken by the CBI (1994) confirms the prediction that this 
particular sector of the economy does indeed experience a relatively high degree 
of absenteeism, the findings for 1993 indicating the highest sectoral rate of 
sickness absence (5.1 %) - more than twice that of media and broadcasting sector, 
the sector with the lowest recorded rate(2.0%). 17 Furthermore, in 1992 the metal 
extraction sector recorded the second highest rate of sickness absence. 18 
The results also suggest that such dissatisfaction may prevail in the 
distribution sector since the logit results suggest that the incidence of UME is 
particularly low in this sector. The results from the CBI (1994) are supportive of 
the results from the logit analysis since they indicate that this sector of the 
economy experienced the fourth highest rate of sickness absence (4.3%) in 1993. 
In contrast, the sub-sample rates of Tables 3.3 to 3.5 suggest the incidence 
of OE in the energy industry is relatively low whilst the incidence of UME is 
relatively high. The logit results confirm this with the estimated coefficient on the 
dummy variable representing the energy sector being characterised by a relatively 
large negative (positive) coefficient in the OE (UME) regression, indicating that 
employment in this sector lowers the potential to absence. One explanation for the 
particularly low incidence of OE in the energy sector may lie in the implications 
of the erosion of employment in this sector for labour market behaviour. 19 
Individuals who feel threatened by future job loss may, therefore, be less likely to 
voice job dissatisfaction. 
3.3.3 Residential Influences 
Region 
The majority of studies of absenteeism in Great Britain have used firm specific 
data sets which rules out any role for regional effects. In contrast, some of the 
studies which have utilised US data have used non-firm specific data in which 
regional effects may be prevalent. It is apparent that disparities in absence 
behaviour across regions may exist due to, for example, differences in 
unemployment rates or differences in the industrial mix which may prevail across 
regions. Allen (1984), who includes regional dummy variables in his analysis of 
the American Current Population Survey, finds that individuals located in the 
17 Absence rates are defined here as sickness absence time as a percentage of total working time. 
18 Unfortunately, there are a distinct shortage of data pertaining to absence rates across industries 
(this issue is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7). 
19 The number of individuals employed in the Electricity, Gas and Other Energy and Water 
Supply sector, for example, has fallen from 356,000 in 1981 to 265,000 in 1992 [Employnient 
Ga. zette (1995)]. 
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southern regions of the United States are more prone to absence behaviour than 
those in the north-eastern, north-central and western regions. Leigh (1983,1984), 
who also analyses American data, includes regional dummies but does not devote 
much discussion to these variables. 
It is apparent from the sub-sample rate analysis that the incidence of OE is 
highest in the South East. A set of regional dummy variables was included in the 
logit analysis with the South East dummy variable being omitted from the 
regression. All of the estimated coefficients in the OE regression are negative in 
sign which indicates that non South Eastern residence exerts a negative impact on 
the potential to absent. Since the rate of unemployment in the South East has been 
traditionally the lowest in Great Britain, one would expect, in accordance with 
efficiency wage considerations, residents here to exhibit more absence behaviour. 
Housing Tenure 
The BSA survey contains a set of questions relating to the residential tenure of the 
respondents. A dummy variable representing owner occupancy is incorporated 
into the analysis given the bias in British society towards owner occupancy. It is 
apparent from Tables 3.3 to 3.5 that the sub-sample rate of OE amongst owner 
occupiers exceeds that of non owner occupiers - the opposite holding for the sub- 
sample rates of UE and UME. Furthermore, the results from the logit analysis 
presented in Table 3.3 suggest that owner occupation raises the probability of OE, 
ceteris paribus. 
In addition, a set of dummy variables representing the number of years 
spent in the respondent's current residence was incorporated into the empirical 
specification. The sub-sample rates suggest that the incidence of OE and UE is 
greatest amongst those individuals who have occupied their present home for less 
than one year, whilst that of UME is greatest amongst those who have resided at 
their present home for more than twenty years. From the regression results, it is 
apparent that individuals with the shortest possible tenure at their current 
residence appear to be the most dissatisfied with current contractual hours. The 
magnitudes of the coefficients signalling such dissatisfaction appear to diminish 
as years in the residence lengthen. 20 
3.4 Concluding Remarks 
The aim of this Chapter was to explore how the potential to absent from the work 
place differs across specific demographic, occupational and regional sectors of the 
economy. The approach taken was to compare the characteristics of individuals 
20 These results could reflect an age/job tenure effect whereby older, more tenured workers have 
established themselves in more favourable and flexible employment positions. 
83 
who ideally would prefer to supply fewer hours of labour with those of 
individuals who, according to various empirical studies, are more prone to 
absence behaviour. In general, the results suggest that the potential to absent is 
curbed amongst male employees of a non-African background who co-habit with 
their parents, have relatively pessimistic expectations regarding future changes in 
the work force and their real income and who express satisfaction with their 
working arrangements and environment. To summarise, the results suggest that a 
significant section of the work force face constraints regarding their supply of 
labour and, furthermore, that the type of individuals facing such constraints can, 
in some instances, be determined. The empirical analysis, therefore, suggests that 
labour market constraints are an important labour market concept and provides a 
mandate for further research into observed labour market behaviour, such as 
absenteeism, which can be regarded as a direct consequence of over-employment 
- itself a consequence of imposed hours constraints. 
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A3 The Determinants of Desired Hours of Labour Supply 
A. 3.1 Introduction 
The aim of this Appendix is to investigate the extent to which assuming a 
coincidence of actual and desired hours of labour supply is likely to affect labour 
supply estimates. The general methodology of Kahn and Lang (1991) is adopted 
since this study represents one of the few which explores self-reports of preferred 
hours of work. As emphasised in Section 3.1, data limitations have forced the 
majority of labour supply studies to focus upon actual rather than desired hours of 
work. Since the BSA Surveys enable identification of employees who express 
satisfaction with their current work hours, a sample of desired work hours for this 
sub-group of individuals can be derived. The analysis of Kahn and Lang (1991) is 
replicated in order to determine the nature of the labour supply schedule using 
British data on desired hours of work. Labour supply equations are also estimated 
for the entire sample of employees to provide a benchmark for comparison. In 
addition, the sub-sample of over-employed individuals is isolated in order to 
explore the nature of the labour supply schedule for potential absentees. 1 
A3.2 Empirical Analysis 
Following Kahn and Lang (199 1) a standard cross-section labour supply equation 
may be defined as folloWS: 2 
In (h: ) =, 6Xi +b In (wi) + ei (A3.1) 
where hi* represents desired hours of work, Xi represents a vector of explanatory 
variables, wi denotes the wage rate and ej represents a random error term. In 
general, hi * is not observed and so researchers are consigned to estimating a 
regression equation of the form: 
In(hi )= ßXi +b in(wi) + ei + mi (A3.2) 
IA parallel study for the sub-sample of under-employed individuals was not undertaken since the 
sample of such individuals is somewhat small. 
1) Since the objective of this Appendix is to emphasise the importance of distinguishing between 
actual and desired hours of work rather than explaining the determinants of labour supply per se, a 
simplified labour supply equation is specified which ignores complications such as non-linearities 
due to the taxation system or inter-temporal influences. 
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where hi represents observed hours of work and yj represents the deviation, 
(hi 
- hi*). The estimation of Equation (A3.2) is problematic, since unless /Ii is 
orthogonal to the explanatory variables, then ordinary least squares estimates of 
and b will be biased. 
Three sets of results are presented in this Appendix, the first of which 
relates to the sub-sample of employees who express satisfaction with current 
hours of work. For this set of individuals, actual hours of work coincide with 
desired hours of work, such that a labour supply schedule equivalent to equation 
(A3.1) can be estimated. The second sub-sample of employees comprises the 
entire sample to ascertain the implications of assuming a coincidence between 
desired and actual hours of work for the estimated labour supply schedule. 
Finally, a labour supply schedule was estimated for the 'over-employed 11 sub- 
sample of employees to highlight the implications of assuming a coincidence 
between desired and actual work hours for potential absentees. 
Despite the benefit of obtaining data pertaining to desired hours, there are 
some serious shortcomings of the data set relating to the gathering of information 
on wages and income. 3 The BSA surveys do not ask for specific figures for wages 
or income - instead respondents are asked to indicate into which category their 
income falls. The categorical data, thus, had to be translated into a continuous 
variable. 4 
Furthen-nore, to construct the wage variable, the income variable had to be 
divided by hours worked. If the hours variable is subject to any measurement 
error, then dividing income by hours will induce a spurious negative correlation 
between the wage term and the error term. To counter this problem instrumental 
variable techniques were employed. Kahn and Lang (199 1) use an extensive set of 
occupational dummy variables as instruments for the wage variable. 5 Since the 
BSA surveys do not contain such an extensive set of occupational dummies, 
educational dummy variables were used as an alternative. 6 If educational 
attainment affects labour supply via wages only, then the inconsistency is 
3 The problems encountered are similar to those reported by Kahn and Lang (1991). 
4A similar recoding exercise is undertaken by Blanchflower (1991) who explores income 
determination using data from the BSA Survey. 
5 In most labour supply studies the wage rate is regarded as an endogenous variable and as such 
instrumental variables techniques are often specified. The choice of instruments for the wage is 
problematic since wage endogeneity may be the consequence of two causes. Firstly, as mentioned 
above dividing income by hours worked may induce spurious correlation between hours and 
wages in the presence of measurement error in wages. Secondly, uruneasured characteristics may 
exist which affect both the wages and hours [see Ham (1982) for a concise survey of these issues]. 
6A high degree of correlation exists between educational attainment and occupation - university 
graduates, for example, are mostly professionals whilst unskilled manual workers usually have 
few, if any, qualifications [see, for example, Brown and Sessions (1994) and Pissarides and 
Wadsworth (1990)]. 
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eliminated. Some correlation, however, may exist between educational attainment 
and hours which does not operate through wage differences. For example, more 
highly educated individuals may prefer to work longer (or shorter) hours 
irrespective of wages. Consequently, the bias resulting from the division of 
income by hours will be reduced rather than eliminated entirely. 
One major advantage with the BSA survey over the Survey of Work 
Reduction (SWR) analysed by Kahn and Lang (1991) is that, as mentioned in 
Section 3.3.2, an estimate of unearned income can be obtained by calculating, the 
discrepancy between household and individual income. In contrast, the SWR 
combines both labour and non-labour income in a single question. A further bias, 
not present in the BSA data, may therefore arise as one cannot distinguish 
between the potentially conflicting effects of these two sources of income. 
Figure A3.1 illustrates the distribution of contractual (desired) hours for the 
employees expressing satisfaction with hours of work. The frequency distribution 
is similar to that reported by Kahn and Lang ( 199 1), with a spike at around 40/41 
weekly hours of work. 
140 
120 
100 
80 
(D 
60 
40 LL 
20 
0 
0 LO 0 LO 0 U-) 0 LO 0 U-) 0 LO 0 U-) 0 
NN Cf) CO 't Itt U') LO (0 (D r- r- co 
I Hours I 
Figure A3.1: The Distribution of Contractual Hours for Employees who are 
Satisfied with Current Contractual Hours 
In Table A3.1 below the instrumental variables estimates of the determinants of 
In(/ii*) are presented. 7 The estimated coefficient on In(wi) is characterised by a 
7 The first stage regressors of the instrumental variables estimates include all explanatory 
variables, except the logarithm of the wage. and eleven educational attainment dummy variables C, -- I 
representing the achievement of CSEs, an apprenticeship. RSAs. '0' levels. 'A' Levels. technical ZI 
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relatively small, yet highly significant, positive sign indicative of a dominant 
substitution effect. 
Dependent Variable = In(hi Table A3.1. 
Sub-Sample = Employees satisfied with Contractual Hours 
Variable Estimated 
Coefficient 
T-Ratio 
ln(wi) 0.1606 5.6409*** 
Unearned Income -0.6150E-05 -5.8645*** 
Male 0.2938 15.3620*** 
Age -0.6054E-02 -10.4100*** 
Married -0.0719 -4.3901 *** 
Pre-School Child -0.1291 -5.9968*** 
Owner Occupier -0.0290 -1.6318 
Trade Union Member 0.0274 1.9084* 
Asian 0.0647 1.2455 
African 0.1015 1.7873* 
Agriculture 0.1758 2.3360** 
Energy 0.1206 3.2057*** 
Metal Extraction 0.0435 1.1249 
Engineering 0.0606 2.4582** 
Construction 0.0749 2.3006** 
Distribution -0.0310 -1.4819 
Transport & 
Communications 
0.0858 3.5267*** 
Other Manufacturing 0.0737 2.5044** 
Public Sector -0.0332 -2.0220** 
Large Fin-n -0.8190E-03 -0.4364E-01 
Constant 3.4825 99.2360*** 
R28 IV 
0.3432 
Sargan Test (10 df. )9 40.3512*** 
Number of Observations 2494 
The estimated negative coefficient on the unearned income proxy suggests that 
the amount of non-labour income serves to lower desired hours of work which 
qualifications, vocational qualifications, a BTech, a Degree, teacher training qualifications or 
nursing qualifications. 
8 Since the R2 measure of goodness of fit under instrumental variables estimation, with a lower 
bound of minus infinity, is not well defined, an alternative measure, denoted R2, is presented. IV 
This measure represents the squared correlation coefficient between the observed and predicted 
dependent variable. 
9 The Sargan Test [Sargan (1984)] tests whether the educational attainment dummy variables and 
remaining explanatory variables are invalid first stage regressors. The test indicates whether the 
first stage regressors. are orthogonal to the residual from the structural equation and is calculated 
by regressing the residual from the structural equation on the set of instruments. Sargan (1984) 
proves that the Sargan Test statistic is distributed as a Z2 with degrees of freedom equal to the 
number of additional instruments for the wage minus one. 
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accords with a priori expectations. Ham (1982) reports similar evidence 
suggestive of a small yet significant negative unearned income coefficient. 
In addition to the wage variable, a selection of demographic and additional 
job characteristics was incorporated into the analysis. Given that the number of 
degrees of freedom is lower than in the logit analysis of Section 3.3 and that 
emphasis in this Appendix is primarily concerned with the coefficient of ln(wi), a 
somewhat smaller set of explanatory variables was constructed than in the 
empirical analysis presented earlier in this Chapter. 
The highly significant estimated coefficient on the male dummy variable 
suggests that males desire longer hours of work than females. Desired hours 
appear to decline with age, which is consistent with the hypothesis that over- 
employment rises with age [Kahn and Lang (1991)]. Being married and having a 
pre-school child appear to exert negative influences on desired hours, suggesting 
that family members may have preferences which are biased in favour of leisure 
time. 10 The desired hours amongst respondents of an African origin tend to be 
higher than those of other ethnic backgrounds. 
The results also suggest that membership of a trade union acts to raise 
desired hours of work. One explanation for this may be that trade union members 
receive more favourable working arrangements than their non-union counterparts. 
Industrial affiliation also exerts a significant effect on the desired level of work 
hours, with individuals employed in the manufacturing sector appearing to desire 
more hours of work than those employed in the service sector. 
It should also be noted that the goodness of fit statistic, R1v, is relatively 
high for cross-section data indicating that the model is characterised by reasonable 
predictive power. In addition, the Sargan test statistic rejects the hypothesis that 
the educational dummy and remaining exogenous variables are invalid first stage 
regressors, i. e. instruments for the wage. 
To provide a benchmark for comparison, a second empirical analysis was 
undertaken maintaining the unrealistic assumption that contractual hours coincide 
with desired hours for all employees. Figure A3.2 below presents a histogram of 
contractual hours for this sample of employees. 
10 Ideally one would like to estimate separate regression for males and females to investigate the 
reasonable prior that it is (married) females who prefer shorter hours whilst (married) males prefer 
longer hours. Given the limited number of observations available, however, this option was not 
viable. 
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Figure A3.2: The Distribution of Contractual Hours for All Employees 
Since the proportion of individuals expressing satisfaction with current work 
hours dominates the sample, it is not surprising that the nature of the histogram is 
similar to that presented in Figure A3.1 with the exception that relatively more 
weight is present at the lower end of the distribution in Figure A3.1 
The results presented in Table A3.2 below relate to the labour supply 
schedule estimated for the entire sample. In general, the signs of the estimated 
coefficients appear to be relatively robust to the inclusion of 'constrained' 
individuals. 
The estimated coefficient on ln(i4,,, ) is reduced in size, although the 
substitution effect remains dominant. One would expect the influence of the wage 
variable on work hours to be curbed given that once actual work hours are 
included into the analysis, the observed relationship between hours and wages 
will reflect both labour demand atid labour supply considerations, whereas 
regressing optimal (constrained) hours only would reflect primarily labour supply 
(demand) considerations. Similarly, the estimated coefficient on the uneamed 
income variable is negative, indicative of a moderating influence on desired work 
hours. 
The results set out in Table A3.2 suggest that the nature of the labour 
supply schedule is sensitive to the definition of work hours, with the estimated 
coefficients of the explanatory variables being slightly reduced in magnitude. It 
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should be noted that the predominance of 'utility maximising' individuals in the 
sample may be acting to curb excessive changes in the labour supply estimates. 
Table A3.2: Dependent Variable = ln(hi) 
Sub-Sample All Employees 
Variable Estimated 
Coefficient 
T-Ratio 
ln(wi) 0.15016 6.1064*** 
Unearned Income -0.4900E-05 -5.4040*** Male 0.2952 18.6120*** 
Age -0.4924E-02 -9.7382*** Married -0.0434 -3.1039*** Pre-School Child -0.1085 -5.9768*** Owner Occupier -0.0164 -1.0738 Trade Union Member 0.0255 2.0518** 
Asian 0.0594 1.3211 
African 0.0818 1.7778* 
Agriculture 0.1468 2.1396** 
Energy 0.0671 2.0321 
Metal Extraction 0.0264 0.8438 
Engineenng 0.0653 3.1894*** 
Construction 0.0718 2.5996*** 
Distribution -0.0287 -1.5638 
Transport & 
Communications 
0.0769 3.1594*** 
Other Manufactu 0.0700 3.2665*** 
Public Sector -0.0371 -2.6127*** 
Large Fin-n 0.0155 1.0198 
Constant 3.4523 107.6900*** 
R2 IV 
0.2911 
Sargan Test 44.4522*** 
Number of Observations 3614 
Finally, to highlight the possible implications for potential absentees, a labour 
supply schedule was estimated for individuals who report themselves to be over- 
employed. The histogram for actual hours of work for this sub-sample of 964 
constrained individuals is represented in Figure A3.3 below. 
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Employees 
The estimated labour supply equation estimated for the sub-sarnple of over- 
employed individuals is presented in Table A3.3. The aim is to dernonstrate that 
the general methodology of estimating a labour supply equation is inappropriate 
for analysing actual work hours where a sample is dominated by constrained 
individuals. I It is apparent from Table A3.3 that the significance of the 
demographic variables is, in general, much reduced. This is not particularly 
surprising since for this sub-sample of individuals actual work hours would be 
dominated by labour demand considerations since these individuals have 
expressed dissatisfaction with the current arrangements. 
The estimated coefficient on ln(, K, i) differs greatly from that reported in 
the first two sets of results, being charactensed by a much smaller and highly 
insignificant coefficient. Indeed, most of the explanatory variables in this 
specification are insignificant. This is not particularly surprising. Since the 
dependent variable represents actual hours worked and the set of regressors, in 
general, relates to the personal charactenstics of individuals, one would not expect 
It Could be argued that the 'constrained' sample should include both over-employed and under- C, 
employed individuals. since neither group are supplying their preferred level of hours. Interpreting L_ Z__ C'ý 
such an equation would. however, be somewhat problematic on account of the heterogeneous 
nature of the sample. It would, thus, appear preferable to concentrate on each constrained group 
separately. Given the limited size of the under-employed sample, however, it was decided to 
concentrate eXCIUSIVely upon the over-employed group. 
92 
a particularly good fit between the data given that the level of actual hours may 
predominantly reflect labour demand rather than labour supply considerations. 
Table A3.3: Dependent Variable = ln(hi) 
Sub-Sample = Over-Employed Employees 
Variable Estimated 
Coefficient 
T-Ratio 
ln(wi) 0.9824E-02 0.2883 
Unearned Income -0.7344E-06 -0.6127 
Male 0.2061 10.8320***_ 
Age -0.9418E-03 -1.3985 
Married 0.2723E-02 0.1525 
Pre-School Child 0.4820E-02 0.2115 
Owner Occupier -0.0175 -0.8388 
Trade Union Member -0.0139 -0.8327 
Asian 0.2069 2.8513*** 
African 0.7350E-02 0.1419 
Agriculture 0.0435 0.3965 
Energy -0.0625 -1.4022 
Metal Extraction -0.0489 -1.3614 
Engineering -0.0160 -0.6458 
Construction 0.0178 0.5194 
Distribution 0.0112 0.4222 
Transport & 
Communications 
0.0367 1.2435 
Other Manufactu -0.2419E-02 -0.8284E-01 
Public Sector -0.0354 -1.8805* 
Large Firm -0.8315E-02 -0.4825 
Constant 3.6931 72.3840*** 
R2 I'v 
0.2148 
Sargan Test 12.9176 
Number of Observations 
1 964 
Furthermore, the goodness of fit measure is significantly reduced indicative of a 
lower degree of predictive power. In addition, the Sargan test statistic is 
insignificant which suggests that the use of educational attainment dummy 
variables as instruments for the wage is inappropriate and that the educational 
dummies and other explanatory variables are not legitimate first stage regressors. 
One explanation for this may lie in the fact that, as mentioned above, 
instrumenting the wage with educational attainment will not eliminate the bias 
arising from dividing income by hours of work since some correlation between 
hours and educational attainment may exist which is not due to wage differentials. 
One might argue that the degree of correlation between hours and educational 
attainment in the case of actual hours worked may be higher than in the case of 
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desired hours. Part-time employees, for example, are likely to be less educated 
than full-time employees irrespective of wage differentials. Thus, the assumption 
that the educational dummy variables do not belong in the labour supply function 
explicitly (i. e. they only enter through their influence on the wage variable) may 
be particularly inappropriate once actual hours of work are analysed. 12 
To conclude, it would appear that the results presented in Table A3.3 are 
not particularly informative implying that the general methodology adopted to 
estimate the determinants of desired hours is inappropriate in the case of actual 
hours. Although, Kahn and Lang (1991) obtain evidence which suggests that 
individuals who desire to work longer hours do in fact tend work longer actual 
hours, i. e. there appears to be some degree of correlation between actual and 
desired hours, it would seem that a different approach should be adopted in order 
to ascertain the determinant of actual work hours. In sum, the differences in the 
results presented in Tables A3.1 to A3.3 highlight the differences between actual 
and desired hours of labour supply once one acknowledges the existence of 
constraints on labour supply. 
A3.3 Summary 
The aim of this Appendix was to explore the extent to which the distinction 
between actual and desired hours of work affects the estimates of labour supply 
schedules. The empirical estimation reported in Table A3.1 is concerned with the 
sample of employees who expressed satisfaction with their work hours in the BSA 
survey and, as such, represents the closest approximation to the labour supply 
schedule represented by Equation (A3.1). The other estimations maintained the 
inappropriate assumption that actual hours and desired hours coincide - an 
assumption that has been frequently made in the literature given the distinct lack 
of data pertaining to desired hours of labour supply. In general, the results 
presented in this Appendix are in accordance with those presented by Ham (1982) 
and Kahn and Lang (1991), both of whom report significant differences between 
labour supply functions estimated for individuals reporting that their work hours 
have been constrained and those individuals reporting satisfaction with actual 
hours. 
12 A further regression was undertaken with the educational dummy variables entered as 
explanatory variables in the hours of labour supply equation rather than as instruments in the wage 
equation. In general, the results suggested that vocational qualifications may raise hours of work. 
The magnitude of the Breusch-Pagan statistic, however, was suggestive of the presence of 
heteroskedasticity and one cannot rule out the possibility that measurement error may be adversely 
affecting these estimates. 
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Chapter 4: The Implications of Experience Rated Sick 
Pay for Absence Decisions' 
4.1 Introduction 
It is apparent from the discussion presented in Section 2.2, Chapter 2, that sick pay 
plays a prominent role in the formation of absence decisions. As Figure 2.3 
demonstrates, the provision of sick pay engenders a further impetus to absence. 
Consequently, Allen (1981 a) remarks that in the context of the simple labour supply 
model of absenteeism, ceteris paribus: 
.... an individual will be absent more frequently in plants where sick leave is paid to absent workers. [Allen (1981a), p. 791. 
This is in accordance with the predictions of the extended absence model of Section 
2.3.3.4, Chapter 2, since the reservation sickness level [recall Equation (2.26)] is 
decreasing with respect to sick pay (i. e. dc* / ds < 0); an increase in sick pay, 
therefore, raises the probability of absence. Intuitively, a rise in the level of sick pay 
diminishes the gap between remuneration from attendance and remuneration from 
absence and, hence, makes absence more likely. 
Moreover, as highlighted by Coles and Treble (1993), since sick pay 
represents one aspect of the employment contract, it should also feature prominently 
in labour demand analysis. Firms whose production processes make absence 
particularly costly, for instance, may specify relatively low levels of sick pay and 
compensate low sick pay with relatively high wages in order to induce attendance. 
Thus, it is apparent that sick pay not only influences absence decisions on the part 
of the worker but may also be regarded as a potential mechanism for absence 
control to be exercised the fin-n. 
Doherty (1979) emphasises the parallels that exist between sick pay and 
unemployment benefit. In stark contrast to the plethora of studies investigating the 
implications of the latter for unemployment and job search [see Layard et al (199 1) 
for a comprehensive review of this area], research into the implications of the 
fon-ner for absence behaviour has, however, been sadly lacking. 'Ibis is despite the 
fact that: 
... there 
is an equally strong prima facie case for examining the 
relationshil? between sickness absence and the level and structure of 
national insurance benefits. [Doherty (1979), p50]. 
I Sections 4.2 and 4.3 of this Chapter are published in Brown (1994). 
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Doherty highlights evidence which suggests that variations in sickness absence can 
be explained by economic variables relating to the provision of benefits. Similarly, 
Fenn (1981) finds evidence suggesting that the duration of sickness absence in the 
United Kingdom is influenced by economic factors such as the loss of income 
whilst ill. Despite this, however, the effects of sick pay on the incidence and 
duration of absence spells have attracted relatively little attention in the economics 
literature. 
One exception is the study undertaken by Allen (1981a) who controls for 
the implications of both the availability and variability of sick pay for observed 
absence rates. In accordance with a priori expectations, the results indicate that blue 
collar workers who are not eligible for paid sick leave are characterised by the 
largest negative coefficient on wages - the substitution effect of an increase in 
wages for such workers proving dominant. Balchin and Wooden (1992) and Ng 
(1989) further endorse the significance of sick pay, finding a positive association 
between the provision of sick pay and observed absence behaviour. 
The results of other studies, however, have not supported the proposition 
that paid sick leave encourages absence. Chaudhury and Ng (1992), for example, 
include a variable which indicates whether a loss of income is incurred if absent. 
The inclusion of this variable does not support the prediction that paid sick leave 
dampens the substitution effect of a wage change. The results of Leigh (199 1) are 
also inconsistent with the hypothesis that sick leave raises absence. 2 
Some studies, although acknowledging the importance of sick pay for 
absence, have suffered from a lack of data on sick leave provisions. The quarterly 
data covering the period from 1966 to 1984 used by Kenyon and Dawkins (1989), 
for example, does not allow the authors to distinguish between paid and unpaid sick 
leave. A time trend is, however, included in the regressions in order to account for 
the extension of paid sick leave entitlements over the time period in question. 
Provisions for paid sick leave rose from approximately five to approximately eight 
days per annum over the sample period. Their results indicate an upward trend in 
absence and the authors attribute this trend to the extension of paid sick leave. Allen 
(1981b) also acknowledges the importance of sick leave provisions for the 
attendance decision, but was only able to include a variable which represents short- 
term accident and sickness benefit which turned out to be insignificant. 
Furthermore, it is highly likely that employers are aware of the influence of 
sick pay provisions on absence behaviour. From the viewpoint of the simple 
analysis presented in Chapter 2 it would appear that employers are somewhat 
2 It should be noted that shortcomings of both these both studies can be cited. Chaudhury and Ng 
(1992) attempt to extract information concerning individual decision-making from firm level data 
whilst the analysis of Leigh (1991) suffers from a lack of any firm theoretical basis. 
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irrational in providing sick pay since it raises the likelihood of absence behaviour. 
One explanation for its provision may be concerned with its use as a means of 
absence control. Indeed, this issue is attracting increasing attention given the current 
British Conservative Government's policy to transfer sick responsibilities from the 
state to employers [Taylor-Gooby and Lakeman (1988) and Casey (1994)]. 3 
Taylor-Gooby and Dean (1990) survey employers' attitudes towards the provision 
of employer administered yet Government funded statutory sick pay. It is apparent 
from the survey that many employers regard such a scheme as an additional way to 
enhance absence control. Indeed, Taylor-Gooby and Dean (1990) conclude: 
.... by providing justification for the rigorous absence reporting and 
monitoring procedures adopted by certain larger employers, SSP has 
enhanced their powers to manage. [Taylor-Gooby and Dean (1990), 
p. 661. 
Hence, it appears that employers are aware of the influence of sick pay policies on 
absence and appear to be placing such policies within the ambit of absence control. 
This observation is supported by the CBI's 1994 survey of employers which found 
that seventy seven percent of employers stated that they would consider intensifying 
their sickness absence controls with the removal of the statutory sick pay rebate. 
This finding is re-enforced by evidence from Taylor-Gooby and Lakeman 
(1988) who survey employees' perceptions regarding sick pay. It is interesting to 
note that when asked how employers would determine the level of sick pay, the 
largest group of respondents (45%) believed that the setting of sick pay was most 
strongly influenced by the fin-n's profitability. 
Despite the potential use of sick leave as a means of absence control, 
economists have tended to focus their empirical and theoretical analyses on 
alternative types of absence control, such as the threat of dismissal, thereby 
emphasising the role played by efficiency wage considerations in the formation of 
absence decisions (see Section 2.3.3.3, Chapter 2). Clearly the dismissal threat 
may exert an important influence on curbing excessive absence behaviour, but one 
would not, however, expect the majority of employees to engage in excessive 
absenteeism. One could, therefore, anticipate that the majority of employees would 
be more concerned with the short-term penalties to absence such as loss of income, 
and given that sick pay provisions dictate the extent of this income loss, then one 
would expect sick pay to be a key deten-ninant of absence behaviour. 4 
3 Disney (1987), however, has pointed out that if the Government's aim was to raise the number 
of occupational sick pay schemes, then such an aim has been relatively unsuccessful since 
statutory sick pay arrangements have appeared to exert little impact on existing or, indeed, 
inducing new sick pay schemes. 
4 The interaction between two types of absence control schemes - one related to the provision of 
sick pay scheme and one concerned with the imposition of an dismissal threat is explored from a 
theoretical viewpoint in an Appendix to this Chapter, Section A4.1. 
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In contrast, Balchin and Wooden (1992), who explore the implications of 
the threat of dismissal for absenteeism, argue that sick leave entitlements in 
Australia do not vary to a great extent across work places except in the public sector 
where sick pay schemes are considered to be more generous since entitlements rise 
with tenure. Dummy variables reflecting the private sector and casual employment 
are included in order to capture the effects of differential sick pay arrangements. 5 
The results turn-out, however, to be rather inconclusive with the estimated 
coefficient on the private sector dummy variable proving to be insignificant whilst 
the estimated negative coefficient on the casual employment dummy variable is 
significant. It could be argued, however, that such dummy variables may not 
capture effects which can be solely attributed to sick pay. Furthermore, even if sick 
leave entitlements are uniform across establishments, the extent to which they are 
exhausted across employees is clearly not uniform. Such problems, however, are 
related to the lack of data at a suitable level of dis-aggregation. 
Clearly, there is some debate within the economics literature regarding the 
incentives of employers to make sick pay provisions. Turnbull and Sapsford (1992) 
who explore absenteeism among dock workers from a historical perspective, 
propose an alternative reason for paying sick pay. It is apparent that absence, which 
was regarded as a job characteristic, arose for numerous reasons, for example, the 
avoidance of particular cargoes. Furthermore, Turnbull and Sapsford (1992) 
remark that: 
.... as the dockers were not paid 
for such absence they regarded 'their 
time' as their own, to be allocated and utilised as they saw fit. 
[Turnbull and Sapsford (1992), p301]. 
Hence, the provision of sick pay could be regarded as an extension of managerial 
control beyond the territory of the workplace to curb the perception that absence 
time belongs solely to the individual. 
The aim of this Chapter is to place sick pay entitlement into the forefront of 
the absence decision-making process. In Section 4.2, a dynamic model of 
absenteeism is presented in which the absence behaviour of an individual is 
analysed from a partial equilibrium view point which explores the implications of a 
particular type of absence control scheme for absence behaviour. The type of 
absence control analysed is based upon the level of sick pay entitlements. More 
specifically, absence behaviour is analysed in the context of an employment contract 
which embodies the essence of an experience rated sick pay scheme. The results of 
this model highlight the potential benefits of analysing absenteeism in the context of 
Casual workers are not eligible for sick pay entitlement. 
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a dynamic as opposed to a static framework as has generally been the case in the 
theoretical models of absence behaviour to date. 
It seems particularly appropriate to model absence behaviour within a 
dynamic context since it is the consequence of a time allocation problem. 
Furthermore, individuals usually work for more than one time period and, 
consequently, absence decisions made today are likely to have implications for the 
future nature and duration of the employment contract. Some empirical models of 
absenteeism have recognised the temporal nature of absence decisions but 
theoretical contributions to the literature have been slow to recognise this aspect of 
the decision-making process. 6 
As mentioned in Section 2.3.3.4, Chapter 2, an additional weakness of the 
existing literature concerns the fact that theoretical models of absenteeism have, in 
general, tended to overlook the state of an individual's health. It seems unrealistic, 
however, to ignore such influences in the context of absenteeism and, indeed, 
labour supply decisions. 7 In an attempt to rectify this shortcoming Barmby et al 
(1994) have analysed the importance of health status for absence decisions in a 
static framework. The general approach adopted by Barmby et al (1994) which 
was outlined in Section 2.3.3.4, Chapter 2, is extended in Section 4.2 into a multi- 
period framework which encompasses the influence of both present and future 
sickness states on absence decisions. 
Moreover, as mentioned in Chapter 1, once absenteeism is set in a dynamic 
context, risk and uncertainty are likely to be of considerable importance when 
analysing absence decisions since whether or not an individual becomes sick is 
predominantly a stochastic event. This oversight is rectified in the two period 
framework developed in this Chapter with the individual facing risk in period one 
regarding health status in period two. In the context of the model of Section 4.2 risk 
regarding sickness leads to stochastic changes in the slope of the individual's 
indifference curve - hence the analysis incorporates the concept of state-dependent 
preferences. Section 4.3 presents some empirical results which examine the 
determinants of the observed absence rates of a sample of workers who are 
employed under a contract which embodies an experience rated sick pay scheme. 
Section 4.4 concludes Chapter Four by highlighting some possible avenues for 
further research. 
6 Empirical research which recognises the temporal aspect of absence decisions incudes the studies 
undertaken by Barmby et al (1991), Fichman (1988) and Harrison and Huhn (1989). 
7 Especially since empirical studies such as Allen (1981a), Leigh (1991) and Paringer (1983) 
indicate a significant relationship between absenteeism and health variables as surveyed in Section 
2.3.3.5, Chapter 2. 
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4.2 A Two-Period Model Of Absence Behaviour 
In the context of absenteeism it seems particularly appropriate to assume that an 
individual's current behaviour has implications for future opportunities. 8 In the case 
of an experience rated sick pay scheme, for instance, if an individual goes absent in 
the current time period then this may make him/her eligible for a lower level of sick 
pay in the future. The essence of such a sick pay scheme is incorporated into the 
model presented in this Section for workers employed under a two period 
employment contract. 
A convenient expositional device is to assume that individuals have a log- 
linear utility function of the following fon-n: 
Uj = (I - ai) in(ci) + cri In(li) where i=1,2 (4.1) 
where i represents the time subscript, ci represents consumption in period i, 1i 
represents leisure in period i and ori represents an index of sickness in period i. 
Utility is assumed to be increasing with respect to consumption and leisure and 
decreasing with respect to sickness. 
It is assumed that the individual has committed himself/herself to a two 
period contract to be enforced in periods one and two. This contract is a conditional 
contract which specifies the same wage, w, and level of contractual hours, h, in 
both periods and two levels of sick pay. Sick pay entitlement in the first period is 
set at a relatively high rate and sick pay in the second period is conditional on 
absence behaviour in the first period. If an individual goes absent in period one, 
sick pay is SH. If the individual also goes absent in period two then sick pay in 
period two is SL where SH ý:, SL . 
Rationality ensures that when the individual 
deten-nines the period one work attendance decision rule he/she takes account of the 
fact that his/her decision to attend in period one has consequences for sick pay 
entitlement in period two. 
The analysis of this Section focuses on the derivation of the individual's 
period one absence decision-making rule. Once period one starts the individual 
knows the value of or, the realisation of sickness in period one, and the nature of 
the probability density function of q2, the realisation of sickness in the second 
8 Barmby and Treble (1993) present the results of a preliminary multi-period theoretical analysis of 
an experience rated sick pay scheme in a discrete time period model where time is divided into years 
and days. The theoretical results obtained indicate the potential effects of expanding the time 
horizon. 
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period, f ((T2). For simplicity, it is assumed that the realisation of sickness in both 
periods is deten-nined by f (cri) which represents the uniform distribution: 9 
10 o< ai 
otherwise 
where i=1,2 (4.2) 
As soon as period two begins, the individual knows the value of c72. Hence as 
soon as period two starts, the individual faces the same decision-making process as 
in the static model of Section 2.3.3.4, Chapter 2. 
If the individual goes absent in period one, the reservation sickness level in 
period two, q2 IAI , will be greater than the reservation sickness level in period two if 
the individual attends in period one, U2 . If the individual goes absent in period 
; 1W, 
one, sick pay in period two is set at the relatively low level, SL whilst if the 
individual attends in period one, sick pay in period two will be set at the relatively 
high level, SH . Recalling the analysis of Section 2.3.3.4, Chapter 2, it follows that 
and are defined as: arý 
IW 
2. 
IAI 
(72 
1 
In(w) 
SL (4.3) U2 A, 
ln(w)+In( 
T 
sL T-h 
In - sH 
(72 
W, -() (4.4) 
ln(w)+In( T 
sH T-h 
9 The sickness indices, a, and a2 , are modelled as random variables with separate probability 
distributions. It may be more realistic however to assume that a, and a2 are jointly distributed, 
with the realisation of sickness in period one implying a particular form for the probability 
distribution in period two. If a, takes a high value, then one may expect a2 to be skewed towards 
higher realisations of sickness, given that recovering from a state of ill health may take some 
time. Let f (a,, aj be the joint probability density function of a, and a,. Hence the conditional 
probability density function of cr, given a particular value of a, &,, is as follows: 
f(cy 
I' 
a 
2) 
f, (&, 
) 
where f, (&, ) is the marginal probability density function. The conditional density function above 
can then be incorporated into the expected utility function. 
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Since the reservation sickness level is decreasing with respect to sick pay, *1 is (T2 A 
greater than (72 . This can be confirmed by examining the sign of the partial W 
derivative of Expression (2.26) with respect to s: 10 
da* In( TT h) 
ds -s 
In 
(T )+ln(w)]'j <0 
(4.5) 1 
T-h s 
Therefore, we can conclude that > *1,,, since SH > SL . This is clearly in 
U2* 
IAI 
G2 
accordance with a priori expectations, i. e. the higher the level of sick pay the 
greater the probability of absence since the disparity between income from 
attendance and income from absence is diminished. The following analysis explores 
how the reservation sickness level in period one is affected once the individual 
allows for the effect of his/her decision to attend or absent in period one on future 
sick pay entitlement. 
The reservation level of sickness in period one, a, *, is defined as the value 
of (T, which equates the lifetime utility conditional on attendance in period one with 
the lifetime utility conditional on absence in period one. Hence ' is defined 1 (71 
implicitly by the foUowing condition: 
(I- 
j)ln(w)+ iln(T a, -h)+( E[U21 W, 1+p 
(4.6) 
(I- i*)In(sH)+ lln(T)+( E[U21 
Ul a, 
I+p A, 
In Equation (4.6), E[Ulw, ] represents expected utility in period two conditional on 
attendance in period one, which implies that sick pay in period two will be at the 
relatively high level, SH , and E[U, 
IA, ] represents expected utility in period two 
conditional on absence in period one, which implies that sick pay in period two will 
be set at the relatively low level, SL. Expected utility in period two is assumed to be 
discounted at the individual's subjective rate of time preference, p. 
10 The second derivative, d 
2ar* IdS2' 
was examined in order to ascertain whether the relationship 
between (y* and s is concave or convex. 'Me sign of the second derivative, however, turned out to 
be ambiguous in the absence of further assumptions relating to the relative magnitude of the 
parameters of the model. For instance, if 
[ln(T 
- 
hIT)]2 > 21n(T-hlT), then d 
2Cr*/ds 2>0. 
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Expected utility in period two is expressed as a weighted average of the 
expected utility of an attender and the expected utility of an absentee where the 
weights are the probability that the realisation of sickness is less than the reservation 
sickness level and the probability that the realisation of sickness is greater than the 
reservation sickness level respectively. The individual is assumed to evaluate the 
expected value of consumption and leisure in the case of attendance and absence 
using the conditional probability distributions to determine the expected value of 
(72. In the case of an absentee the expected value of a2, conditional on c72 being 
between the reservation sickness level and one, is substituted into the utility 
function. Conversely to determine the expected utility of attending work the 
expected value of a2, conditional on q2 being between zero and the reservation 
sickness level, is used. Hence, E[U2 
IAI ] 
and E[U21w, 
]are 
expressed as follows: 
2 
1A, 
*1A, In (w) + 
C2 
1A, 
In(T - h) + E[U21 U2 22 
(4.7) 
I+ I+ C72 
A, In(s L)+ 
CT2 
1A, 
In(T) C2 
22 
*Iwl E[U21w *lw 2 In(w) + 
U2 
JW 
1 In(T - h) + CF2 2-2 
(4.8) 
( I+ I+ 
a ; 
lw, 
U21W, 
In(s H) + 
ar2 
W 
In (T) 222 
Ji J 
Substituting Equations (4.7) and (4.8) into Condition (4.6) and rearranging yields 
the following value of the reservation sickness level in period one: 
(4.9) 
(I+p)[In(w)+In( T 
s T-h) 
where the second term of Equation (4.9) reflects the effect on the period one 
reservation sickness level of recognising the future implications of current absence 
decisions and is defined by: 
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o5 = E[Ulw, 
]- E[U21 A, 
]= 
2 In SL +ln(T-h 
)][In( w+ In( 
T )] I (W 
TsH) T-h 
>0 
(4.10) 
Since 8 is positive, the effect of future opportunities on current decisions in the 
context of this model serves to raise the reservation sickness level in period one, 
a, , and, hence, decreases the probability of absence in the first period. This is in 
accordance with what one would expect since E[U, IAI 
] is increasing with respect to 
SL: 
dE[U21 A] 
ds L 
In( 
TTh 
s L[ln(w)+In( 
T) 
sL T-h 
In SL 
)][In( T-h 
-(S 
HT 
>0 (4.11) 
i. e. raising the level of sick unambiguously raises the level of expected utility. " 
To summarise, if the analysis were set in a static context representing period 
one only, the reservation sickness level would equal *1 . Extending the analysis 
U2 
W, 
into a two period context serves to increase the reservation sickness level, due to the 
fact that the individual takes account of the influence of current decisions on future 
sick pay entitlement, absence becomes less likely. Since an experience rated sick 
pay scheme represents one form of absence control, intuitively one would expect 
such a scheme to raise the reservation sickness level as demonstrated above. It is 
interesting to note that the numerator of 8 represents an interaction between a term 
which reflects the difference between the two levels of sick pay and a term which 
reflects the difference between non-work time when attending work and non-work 
time when absent. 
An important point emerges when considering the comparative statics of the 
reservation sickness level specified by Equation (4.9) which is concerned with the 
question as to why firms have an incentive to pay sick pay above the statutory 
minimum. In the context of the conventional labour supply model, an increase in 
II The second derivative was also examined in order to ascertain whether the relationship between 
E[U21 
A, 
I 
and sick pay is concave or convex. The sign of the second derivative, however, turned 
out to be ambiguous in the absence of further assumptions relating to the relative magnitude of the 
parameters of the model. For instance, if 
[ln(TIT 
- h) + In(w / s)] > 2, then the second derivative 
is negative. 
104 
sick pay is associated with a higher level of absence. Sick pay serves to decrease 
the loss in earnings incurred when absent from work and, hence, reduces the costs 
of absence incurred by the employee. Despite the fact that the theory predicts that 
higher sick pay leads to a higher degree of absenteeism, empirical evidence 
indicates that many firms instigate sick pay schemes which specify company sick 
pay in excess of the statutory minimum. 
The Department of Social Security (1988) reported, for example, the results 
of a survey of 1125 private and public sector employers, 803 of which offered 
company sick pay schemes as opposed to relying on the statutory sick pay scheme. 
The CBl (1994) found supporting evidence in its survey of 500 employers which 
indicated that 92% of respondents operated an occupational sick pay scheme. 
Similar evidence is cited by Casey (1994) who explores the 1990 Workplace 
Industrial Relations Survey and finds that 79% of establishments surveyed 
provided extra statutory sick pay for all employees. 
In the context of the model presented in this Chapter some justification can 
be found for specifying sick pay in excess of the statutory minimum. Equation 
(4.12) below represents the partial derivative of the period one reservation sickness 
level of this two period model with respect to the level of period one sick pay: 
d8 
d(yj, 
d(721w, 
+ ds 
H+ 
45 
dsHdsH 
-/ 
(T )] HT )]2 
v (I+p) In( w 
)+In 
(I+p)s [ln(sw +In 
I 
sH T-h 
H T-h 
(4.12) 
The first term of Expression (4.12) represents the effect of increasing sick pay in 
the context of a single period model which is reflected in the partial differential 
specified in Equation (4.5). This captures the extent to which an increase in SH 
reduces the difference between income received from absence and income received 
from attendance in period one. Clearly as this gap is diminished this influence 
serves to reduce the reservation sickness level and increases the probability of 
absence. The following term, however, implies that as SH is increased the future 
penalty to absence in the current period is increased. This is reflected in the fact that 
an increase in SH, ceteris paribus , widens the gap between the two levels of sick 
pay. This effect is illustrated by the partial differential below which is 
unambiguously positive: 
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dö 
[In( 
T 
h)]' 
(4.13) dsH 
2sH In( w) +In( 
T )12 1s 
T-h 
It becomes apparent that in order to sign the differential specified in Equation (4.12) 
further assumptions must be adopted, since a priori one cannot determine which of 
the two effects outlined above dominates. The differential represented by Equation 
(4.12) can be re-arranged as follows: 
d In( 
TT h) 
ds H 
2(l + O)SH ln(w)+In( 
T )]'[In sH )+In(T h)][ 
sH T-h 
(W 
T 
where: 
(T SH T-h)] 
p=2(1+p) ln(ýV)+In 
)][In( 
+ In( 
T 
Is 
T-h w) 
SL T-h (T-h) SL )ln(T-h)SH [In( 
w+ 
In( 
T 
)] 
In 
T+ 
In 
sHT 
(4.14) 
(4.15) 
Clearly the sign of da, / dSH depends on the sign of y. In order to sign y, some 
conditions need to be imposed. If, for example, p ýý 0 and (1 + p) ý! sH, then 
daj Id SH is negative. The former condition is reasonable to assume. It is difficult, 
however, to give any intuition for the latter condition. If these two conditions are 
satisfied, then an increase in period one sick pay is associated with an increase in 
the probability of absence in period one. In general, however, the sign of 
dI Id SH is ambiguous which does not rule out the possibility that an increase in (71 
sick pay may reduce absence. Hence, this may give some justification for the 
existence of many firms in Great Britain endorsing company sick pay schemes 
which stipulate levels of sick pay in excess of statutory sick pay. 
The theoretical results from this Section indicate that if an individual faces a 
sick pay scheme whereby a particular level of absence in the current period implies 
a lower level of sick pay in the future, this will lower the probability of absence in 
the current period. The empirical analysis presented in Section 4.3 below explores 
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the determinants of the absence rates observed from a set of workers who face a 
type of absence control in accordance with that described in this Section. 
4.3 Empirical Analysis 
The data for this study has been collected from four factories belonging to a 
manufacturing firm which operates on the basis of a production line. These 
factories are situated in different parts of Great Britain with work forces consisting 
mainly of production workers. The data set consists of the firm's payroll for the 
period September 1987 to 1989, daily absence records and personnel records. The 
payroll provides weekly information on basic, overtime and premium pay. The 
absence records contain information concerning reasons for absence on a daily 
basis whilst the personnel records contain data pertaining to the personal 
characteristics of employees such as sex and marital status. 
In 1983 the firm introduced an experienced rated sick pay scheme in these 
four factories which was actually put into action in 1985 once the necessary 
information had been gathered. This scheme was introduced as the firm felt that the 
costs of the former sick pay scheme were high with respect to actual levels of 
sickness absence. Under the new scheme, sick pay is available at three different 
rates, SA, SB and sc where SA ý> SB > sc. The rate of sick pay of grade A workers 
is equal to average earnings up to a maximum of basic pay plus one third. 12The 
sick pay of grade B workers is equal to basic pay. Finally, grade C workers are not 
eligible for company sick pay, hence their sick pay entitlement is equal to statutory 
sick pay, sc. Workers are graded according to their absence record over the 
previous two years. 
Each day of absence is awarded a certain number of points which are 
accumulated over the specified time period. 13The number of points accumulated 
over the given period of time determines the sick pay grade of the worker. Grades 
are assigned as follows: 
12 Earnings include overtime and bonus payments. 
13 A similar points-system absence control mechanism is analysed by Kuzmits (1981). Under this 
system each occurrence of absence attracts one point regardless of duration. Further points are 
given for tardiness and partial absence. In addition, employees who fail to report their absence by a 
specified time receive a further two points. Perfect attendance over a month leads to the removal of 
one point. Disciplinary action is taken according to the number of points accumulated over one 
year. Data was collected before and after the instigation of the system and the results indicate that 
there was a significant reduction in the mean level of absence occurrence. Absence duration, 
however, did not change significantly. 
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A 
sick pay grade B 
C 
if points !! ý 21 
if 21 < points: 5 41 
if points > 41 
(4.16) 
The daily accumulation of points is registered in each employee's absence record. A 
day's absence is automatically awarded one point if it is self or medically certified. 
If taken on a 'non-benefit day 9, the absence spell attracts two points where 'non- 
benefit days' are defined as days when statutory sick pay is not due. In general, 
'non-benefit days' are the first three days of an absence spell except in the case 
where there has been a separate spell of absence within the previous eight weeks. 
For grade A and B workers, sick pay exceeds the statutory level. Hence, if 
statutory sick pay is not due, the cost to the firm is SA and SB respectively. If, 
however, statutory sick pay is due, then the firm essentially 'tops-up' the statutory 
payments, which are financed by national insurance contributions, and the cost to 
the firm of a day's absence effectively becomes (s 
A_ 
sc) and 
(S B 
-sc). Thus, the 
cost to the firm is clearly increased on non-benefit days since the finn does not gain 
from the provision of statutory sick pay. 141f an individual does not accumulate any 
points during the period, then he/she will be awarded a bonus of minus ten points 
which will be added to the points total of the following period. 
The sick pay scheme allows the personnel managers to exercise some 
degree of discretion over the awarding of points in specific circumstances. Certain 
absences attract zero points. These are termed 'acceptable' absences where 
acceptability usually implies hospitalisation or serious medically certified sickness. 
Self-certification is not usually deemed acceptable. The inclusion of such a clause in 
the sick pay scheme allows the firm to exercise some discretion in cases where a 
worker is, for example, hospitalised or suffering from serious illness. 
Furthermore, it is apparent that serious illness is capable of verification, hence the 
monitoring role of the firm can be concentrated on such cases, whilst 
4 unacceptable' absences attract the automatic punishment determined by the 
accumulation of points. 
Consider, for simplicity, the extreme case faced by a grade A worker where 
absence in the current period leads to being re-graded as B in the following time 
period. In the context of the theoretical model presented in Section 4.2, this implies 
that the reservation sickness level of the grade A worker in the current time period, 
C7A*, I can be derived as follows: 
14 The cost to the firm is only increased in the case of grade A and B workers since grade C 
workers do not receive company sick pay. 
ins 
CA* 
In w 
(S 
A 
where: 
V= 
In w 5A 
- 
(S 
AT+I(T 
+ In (1 + p)[In( w+ In T-h) sA T-h 
2 In sB 
)+In(T-h )][In( w+ In( T 
)] IwTsA) 
T-h 
>0 
(4.17) 
(4.18) 
where SB = SL , i. e. sick pay if down-graded equals the level of sick pay paid to a 
grade B worker and SA = SH , i. e. current sick pay is deten-nined by the A grading. 
The situation faced by a worker graded B is slightly more complicated since 
a poor attendance record could lead to a lower sick pay grade whilst a good 
attendance record, on the other hand, could lead to a higher sick pay grade in the 
following time period. 
Once again consider, for simplicity, the extreme case faced by a grade B 
worker where absence in the current period leads to being re-graded C in the 
following time period whereas attendance in the current time period leads to being 
re-graded A in the next time period. In the context of the theoretical model presented 
in Section 4.2, this implies that the reservation sickness level of the grade B worker 
in the current time period, alB* , can be derived as 
follows: 
w In 
( 
B 
S 
8B = 
In w 
(S 
B 
+ In(T 
Th 
In sB 
][In(T-h)]9 (S 
AT 
In 
sA 
05B 
+1(1+p)[In(w)+In T )] 
sB 
(T-h 
In(T 
Th 
2[ln(sc +ln(T-h) In( 
w+ In( 
T )] 
wT 
][ 
sA T-h 
>0 
(4.19) 
(4.20) 
It is apparent that 45B > 45A since by definition SA 
> SB > sc. Although the model 
embodies a simplified version of the experience rated sick pay scheme introduced 
by the firm it is clear that, once the individual takes account of the implications of 
current absence decisions for future levels of sick pay, both current and future 
109 
levels of sick pay play a prominent role in the formation of current absence 
decisions. 
The aim of the experience rated sick pay scheme is to reward employees 
whose absence history exhibit relatively little absence behaviour and to provide an 
incentive for employees who have a history of high absenteeism to absent 
themselves less frequently. Under this scheme the individual's absence decision 
affects eligibility for sick pay in the future. Since an individual's behaviour 
determines the rate of sick pay, the price of a day's absence differs across 
employees. 
Barmby et al (1991a) undertake an empirical analysis of the implications of 
such a sick pay scheme for absence behaviour, exploring both the incidence and 
duration of absence. The incidence of absence is investigated using a discrete panel 
data model similar to Heckman (198 1) and estimates are presented of the parameters 
of a Weibull hazard model of duration. 15 The incentive properties of the threat of a 
lower grade of sick pay are analysed by including a parameter representing the 
closeness to the points boundaries, i. e. the boundaries between re-grading. The 
results of the study indicate that sex and marital status are important determinants of 
absence duration. In general, married and female employees appear to take longer 
absences, whilst acceptable absences (i. e. those which do not attract any points 
and, therefore, do not contribute to re-grading at a lower sick pay grade) tend to be 
longer than unacceptable absences. The accumulation of points is also found to be a 
significant determinant of absence. In general, the boundary between the B and C 
grades exerts a stronger effect on absence behaviour than the boundary between 
grades A and B. In addition, sick pay provisions are not found to explain incidence. 
As the authors point out some of their results are somewhat difficult to interpret. 
One weakness of this study concerns the fact that payroll data was not available 
hence factors such as wages and actual levels of sick pay, which play a prominent 
part in absenteeism, were not incorporated into the analysis. 
Parallels exist between the provision of experience rated sick pay within this 
firm and the theoretical model of Section 4.2. The individuals who are graded B 
face the situation described in the theoretical model of Section 4.2, i. e. absence in 
the current period can lead to a lower level of sick pay in the future. Grade B 
workers in the current period are eligible for a level of sick pay which is equal to the 
individual's basic pay. A high level of absence in the present period, however, may 
lead to the individual being re-graded as C in the future period which would imply 
the lowest level of sick pay equal to statutory sick pay. Grade A workers whose 
15 More detailed information regarding the nature of such a model is specified in Footnote 39, 
Chapter 2. 
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weekly earnings exceed the basic rate of pay which include, for example, Nvorkers 
who work overtime or workers who receive shift premia, also face the problem 
anal sod in Section 4.2. Grade A workers in the current period are eligible for a y Cý 
level ot'sick pay which is equal to the individual's earnings. A high level of absence 
in the present period, however, may lead to the individual being re-graded as B in 
the future period which would imply the lower level of sick pay which equals the 
individual's basic pay. Grade A workers whose weekly basic earnings are not 
SUPPIerricnted in any way would not be affected by being re-graded from A to B. 
Grade C workers are already in the lowest category, hence unacceptable absence 
i-nay attract different sanctions such as the threat of dismissal as the level of sick pay 
cannot be lowered any further. 
Tables 4.1,4.2,4.3 and 4.4 below present results of some empirical 
investigations into the factors which influence the absence rates of grade A workers 
whose earnings exceed basic pay, grade B workers and grade C workers. 16 
Frequency 
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Employees' Absence Rates 
Figure 4.1: Histogram of the Absence Rates of All Workers 
The total sample consists of 2) 157 Nvorkers who were continuously ernploý, Icd by the 
1,11111 till'OLI(TI10LIt 1988 and whose working vveek starts on Monday and ends on 
Friday. From this sample 1137 Nvorkers were graded A \, vith earnings exceeding, 
basic pay, 126 ývorkcrs were oraded A with earnings equal to basic pay, 645 
workers Nvere oradcd B and 249 workers were graded C. 17 Figure 4.1 above 
Absence rate,,, are clefined is the percentage of chys absent in 1988 excludin2 holidavs. 
17 ks njell, -oncd al d1c start of tlj-ý is Section, the data set analysed is obtained by merging die data 
1'1'0111 f'OUr filCtOrICS Ol)CI-atCd bY the firm. The first factory, which is referred to as site one , 
has a 
work force of 5'1'L) ciliployces. 60"; of' which is graded A, 37/1ý( of which is graded B and 317( of 
\\ hich is graded C. The second factory. which will be referred to as , site two. 
ha. s the "ImflIest work 
illustrates the nature of the distribution of absence rates across the workers 
employed by the firm. It is apparent that, as one would expect, the absence rates of 
individual workers are skewed towards relatively low levels, the mean rate being 
0.037 with a standard deviation of 0.067. 
Following Balchin and Wooden (1992), Allen (1981a, 1981b) and Kenyon 
and Dawkins (1989), the relationship between an employee's absent rate and the 
chosen regressors is specified in log-odds form since the absence rate lies on the 
unit interval. Perfect attenders, i. e. individuals with an absence rate of zero over the 
period were included in the sample, the absence rate in such cases was set to a 
arbitrarily chosen small number. 18 The log-odds form is a transformation of the 
logit model which is based on the cumulative logistic probability density function. 
The logistic model is specified as: 
p(di = 1) =1 flixi (1 + e-'- 
(4.21) 
where p(di = 1) represents the probability that a certain choice will be made (i. e. 
di =I corresponds to the event of absence and di =0 corresponds to the event of 
attendance) given knowledge of xi, a set of explanatory variables where e 
represents the base of natural logarithms. 
Re-arranging Equation (4.21) yields the following: 
-a-flixi _I-1= 
1- (di=l) 
(4.22) 
p(di = 1) p(di = 1) 
Since e-'-flixi = Ile 
a+Pixi 
, Equation (4.22) can be re-written as follows: 
p(di = 1) 
=e 
a+Pixi (4.23) 
1- p(di = 1) 
Taking the natural logarithm of both sides: 
force consisting of 323 employees, 60% of which is graded A, 31% of which is graded B and 9% 
of which is graded C. At site three there is a work force of 647 employees - 62% of which is 
graded A, 28% of which is graded B and 10% of which is graded C. The fourth site has the largest 
work force of 648 workers - 68% of which is graded A, 25% of which is graded B and 7% of which 
graded C. 
18 Such an approach is taken by Balchin and Wooden (1992), Allen (1981a, 1984) and Drago and 
Wooden (1992). 
112 
In p(di = 
1) 
a+ flix, 
_I 
- p(di = 1)_ 
(4.24) 
where p(di = 1)[1 - p(di = 1)]-' is the ratio of the odds of di =1 against di = 0. The 
proportion of successes in the sample, Pi, i. e. in this case the proportion of days 
absent, is used as an estimate for p(di = 1). In addition, the following definition is 
made, ci = pi - p(di = 1). 
Hence, the following ('observed' logit can be expressed as: 
In Pi 
- 
=In 
p(di = 1) + ei (4.25) 
11-pi- 
_l 
- p(di = 1) - ei 
which can be expanded as follows: 
In P' 
- 
=In 
p(di = [I-pj_ 
_I. 
- p(di 
1) 
+In I+ Ei - In I- 
ei 
= J)- p(di = 1) 1- p(di = 1) 
(4.26) 
Zellner and Lee (1965) use a Taylor expansion in order to re-write Equation (4.26) 
as follows: 
In P' = In 
p(di = 1) Ei-+ ei (4.27) 
11-pi- 
_l-p(di=1)_+_p(di=1)_ _l-p(dil---1)_ 
Recalling Equation (4.24): 
In A =a+pxi+ - 
ci (4.28) 
[I-pjl 
p(di = 1)(1 - p(di = 1))_ 
which forms the basis of the specified regression equation. It is apparent from the 
final term in equation (4.28) that the nature of the transformation required to specify 
the log-odds form leads to estimates which are subject to heteroskedasticity. Thus, 
the approach introduced by White (1980) is adopted below in order to produce t- 
ratios which are heteroskedastic consistent. 
The regressors include daily average earnings over the period, a term which 
reflects the difference between average daily sick pay during the present period and 
expected average daily sick pay in the future period if the individual faces a lower 
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grade in the next time period, contractual hours and personal characteristics such as 
sex, marital status and age. Variable definitions and some summary statistics are 
presented in Table 4.1 below. 
Table 4.1(a): Variable Derinitions 
Variable Definition 
ar an individual's absence rate in 1988 
wage average daily basic wage in 1988 
chrs daily contractual hours 
ssp average daily statutory sick pay 
SBSC average daily basic wage - statutory sick pay (i. e. difference between sick pay at aB grade and at aC 
grade) 
SASB average daily earnings - average daily basic wage (i. e. difference between sick pay at a an A grade and at an B 
grade) 
fd dummy variable which equals I if the individual is 
female 
msd dummy variable which reflects marital status which 
equals 1 if the individual is single 
age average age of the worker in years over 1988 
avd avera, e duration of spells of sickness in days in 1988., 
Table 4.1(b): Summary Statistics F 
Mean 
(Standard Deviation) 
Variabl ie Variabl 
AR Grade A Grade B Grade C 
Workers Workers Workers Workers 
ar 0.037 0.024 0.048 0.076 
(0.067) (0.043) (0.067) (0.120) 
_ 
wage 21.55 22.46- 21.48 21.14 
(5.230) (4.980) (4.935) (4.820) 
chrs 6.98 7.21 7.00 6.95 
(1.538) (1.412) (1.483) (1.504) 
ssp 9.10 9.23 9.15 9.08 
(1.210) (1.110) (1.175) (1.230) 
SB_Sc 12.47 13.23 12.34 
12.132) 
(4.19) (4.04) (3.96) (3.7 65) 
SA_SB 7.49 9.64 
5.99 - 
(8 57) (9.23) (7 - fd . 0.67 0.31 0.74 0.79 
(0.47) (0.46) (0.44) (0.41) 
msd 0.31 0.5ý 0.32 0.35 
(0.46) (0.49) (0.47) (0.48) 
age 42.95 43.82 41.80 39.64 
(11.25) (11.32) (11.26) (11.38) 
avd 2.51 2.04 2.85 3.83 
(3.28) (2.62) (3.12) (5.19) 
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Figure 4.2b: Histogram of (s B-su) for the Grade B Workers 
Figure 4.2a (4.2b) above illustrates the distribution of the difference between 
current sick pay and sick pay in 1989 for grade A (grade B) individuals facing 
down-grading, i. e. s" - s" (s" - s"). It is apparent from Figure 4.2a that this 
difference is skewed towards relatively low levels whilst Figure 4.2b illustrates that 
there is relatively little vanation in the difference between current and future sick 
pay of a grade B worker. The difference between sick pay if graded B and sick pay 
if graded C Is, however, concentrated around relatively higher levels than the 
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difference between current sick pay and sick pay in the next period, if the individual 
faces a lower grade, for grade A workers. 
In Table 4.1 (b) above it is apparent that the mean difference between the 
sick pay of a grade B worker and sick pay if graded C is higher than the mean 
difference between sick pay if graded A and sick pay if graded B. This fits in with 
the evidence of Barmby et al (1991a) which suggests that the boundary between the 
B and C grades exerts a stronger effect on absence behaviour than the boundary 
between grades A and B. 19 
Table 4.2 below presents the results of the empirical analysis of the 
determinants of the observed absence rates of the grade A workers. The estimated 
coefficient on the wage variable is significant at the 5% level and is characterised by 
the expected sign which suggests a negative relationship between the basic daily 
wage and absence rates reflecting a dominant substitution effect associated with an 
increase in wages. The estimated coefficient indicates that a one percent rise in 
wages causes on average a fall in the incidence of absence of 0.02 percentage 
points. 20 
The estimated sign of the coefficient of the wage variable is consistent with 
that from other empirical studies: Allen (1981a), Balchin and Wooden (1992) and 
Chaudhury and Ng (1992), for example, find evidence which supports a negative 
relationship between wages rates and absence. The magnitude of the estimated 
coefficient on wages is, however, relatively high in comparison with that found in 
other studies. The wage effect presented by Balchin and Wooden (1992), for 
example, is particularly small and is argued to be a result of characteristics which 
are specific to the Australian labour market. Differences in the estimated coefficient 
on the wage variable across studies may arise from differences in data sources. 
Balchin and Wooden (1992) and Chaudhury and Ng (1992), for example, use firm 
level data as opposed to micro data. In contrast, Allen (1981a) who uses self- 
reported measures of absence is unable to calculate the wage rate and hence is 
forced to use a proxy. The present study benefits from a micro data set which 
incorporates detailed payroll information and, therefore, may allow a more 
appropriate analysis of the observed behaviour of the individual. 
The term which reflects the difference between sA, current sick pay, and 
S B, sick pay if re-graded at a lower level in the following year, is significant at the 
1% level. The results indicate a negative relationship between absence rates and 
19 Further empirical analysis pertaining to the behaviour of individuals conditioned by the 
boundary between the B and C grades is presented in an Appendix to this Chapter, Section A4.2. 
20 The marginal affect on ar of a regressor, x, equals ar(I - ar)ý where 
ý represents the 
estimated coefficient. The elasticity of ar with respect to x is defined as ar(I - ar)ý(x) / ar 
where ar and x represent their mean values. 
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(S A_S B) 
which is in accordance with the theoretical results of Section 4.2, i. e. as 
the future penalty of absence increases absence behaviour becomes less likely. The 
effect of this regressor, however, is smaller than the wage effect. A one percent rise 
in the difference between the two levels of sick pay leads to, on average, a fall in 
absence of 0.0026 percentage points. Since the wage effect represents the current 
penalty to absence and (s A_SB) represents the future penalty, one might expect the 
current penalty to exert the greatest effect on current absence behaviour. 
Table 4.2: Dependent Variable 
ln[ar / (I - ar)] 
Sample Grade A Employees 
Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
T-Ratio2l 
wage -0.4805 -2.4163** 
SA -S 
B 
-0.1476 -2.5944*** 
chrs 0.3641 2.7944*** 
fd -0.2073 -0.1945 
msd -0.7096 -0.7046 
fd*msd 1.6457 1.2698 
site one 1.2111 1.4260 
site two 5.2144 7.1452*** 
site three -0.1790 -0.2017 
avd 1.4632 7.4823*** 
age -0.5060 -2.4522** 
age2 0.0045 1.7901* 
constant -3.3590 -0.7658 
Breusch-Pagan 
Test (12 df. ) 
134.2360*** 
Adjusted R2 0.1995 
Number of Observations = 1137 
"I ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively for a two tailed 
test. 
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The estimated coefficient on contractual hours is also significant at the I% level and 
is characterised by the expected sign suggesting a positive relationship between 
absence rates and contractual hours with an increase in contractual hours of one 
percent leading to an average increase in the incidence of absence of 0.024 
percentage points. Empirical analysis by Barmby and Treble (1991a) and 
Chaudhury and Ng (1992) also suggests that contract type, as represented by the 
level of contractual hours, has important implications for absence behaviour. 
Chaudhury and Ng (1992), for example, discover that firms with more part-time 
workers experience a lower level of absence. One would conjecture that part-time 
workers would absent themselves less frequently since such employment contracts 
allow enhanced work schedule flexibility. In addition, since part-time workers have 
fewer scheduled hours, economic theory suggests that they would derive less utility 
from an additional unit of leisure. 22 
It is also apparent from Table 4.2, that different sites exert different 
influences on absence rates. The dummy variable representing site two exerts a 
strong positive effect on absence rates which is significant at the 1% level whilst the 
other site dummies appear to be less powerful. Drago and Wooden (1992) argue 
that the significance of plant dummies may reflect plant specific illnesses. 
Alternatively, plant level absence norms may develop which are unique to each 
factory and, hence, differ across the firm as a whole. In the case of grade A 
workers, for example, average absence rates differ significantly across plants 
ranging from 0.025 to 0.037. A further explanation is related to the conditions in 
the local labour markets since each factory is located in a different region of Great 
Britain. Differences in local rates of unemployment may, for example, lead to 
differences in absence rates across plants. 
Moreover, earnings for grade A workers at site two are significantly lower 
than that at the other plants: average daily earnings for grade A workers in the other 
plants are approximately f 35.63 whilst average daily earnings for grade A workers 
at site two are E29.70. This lowers the current penalty of a day's absence as 
derived from the loss in earnings and, in addition, if earnings are low this implies 
that SA tends to SB which indirectly lowers the future penalty of absence. Both of 
these effects may reduce the pressure on an individual to attend and may account 
for the positive relationship between the dummy variable representing site two and 
observed absence rates. The role of site dummies will be discussed further in 
relation to the results of the grade B workers. 
22 Rather than a discrete classification into part time and full time contracts, the data set analysed 
in this Chapter provides information on contractual hours which encompasses the entire range of 
contracts offered by the firm. 
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Somewhat surprisingly, the dummy variables representing female workers 
and marital status turn out to be insignificant. This is consistent, however, with the 
evidence of Barmby and Treble (1991a) which suggests that contractual 
arrangements are more important determinants of absence behaviour than personal 
characteristics. 
The composition of the work force may also have important implications for 
absenteeism with younger workers turning over jobs more frequently and 
undertaking off-the-job search through labour absence. This may be the result of, 
for example, lower commitment to either the firm or the work group. Alternatively, 
younger workers may simply experience a greater opportunity cost for any 
foregone leisure. Thus, average age in years over 1988 was included as a regressor 
and the results appear to be more promising than those pertaining to other personal 
characteristics. Furthermore, the results are consistent with those of Allen (1981a) 
who finds that age is the only personal characteristic to exert a significant influence 
on absence rates. The results in Table 4.2 indicate that younger workers are 
associated with a higher probability of absence. These results are consistent with 
those of Dunn and Youngblood (1986) and Allen (1981a). 
In addition, Dunn and Youngblood (1986) find that absence declines with 
age except in the case of the oldest workers. This result is consistent with the sign 
of the estimated coefficient on age squared. In the context of the index of sickness 
discussed in Section 4.2, one would expect the nature of the distribution of 
sickness to change over time, becoming increasingly skewed towards higher levels 
as age rises. According to Cascio (1986) and Cascio and McEvoy (1989), this is 
consistent with the belief of managers that older workers are likely to absent 
themselves more often due to poor health. Overall, the evidence fits in with that of 
Allen (1981a) which suggests that the relationship between absenteeism and age is 
quadratic rather than linear. 
Finally, the relationship between observed absence rates and the average 
duration of absence spells over 1988 was found to be positive and highly 
significant. It is interesting to note that the size of the estimated coefficient is 
relatively large - this will be discussed in further detail below in relation to the 
results from the analysis of the absence rates of the grade B workers. 
In Table 4.3 the results of the empirical analysis of determinants of absence 
behaviour of the grade B workers are presented. Two specifications of the model 
are included - the only difference between the two models being the 
inclusion and 
exclusion of the regressors representing age. In the first specification where age 
and age squared are included, the overall results are relatively weak. The estimated 
coefficient on the wage is negative and just significant at the 10% level. The only 
other variables to achieve significance are contractual hours, the dummy variable 
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representing site one and the average duration of absence. Figures 4.3a and 4.3b 
illustrate the distribution of age across grade B and grade A workers respectively. 
From Figure 4.3b, it is apparent that there is a more distinctive skew towards high 
age levels which may account for the interpretable relationship between age and 
absence for this group of workers. There appears to be more variation in the 
distribution of age across grade B workers with a much less distinctive skew 
towards high age groups which may, therefore, render the interpretation of the 
relationship between age and absence somewhat difficult. Due to the weak results 
from the first specification, emphasis will be placed on the second specification 
which excludes age and age squared. 
Table 4.3: Dependent Variable =ln[arl(I-ar)] 
Sample = Grade B Workers 
11ndependent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
T-Ratio Estimated 
Coefficient 
T-Ratio 
wage - 1.2238 -1.7597* - 1.4489 -2.0562** 
SA_SB -0.0841 -1.2098 -0.1036 -1.4853 
SC -S 
B 
- 1.0610 -1.5674 - 1.2315 -1.7958* 
chrs 0.2888 1.7150* 0.3684 2.1273** 
fd 0.1659 0.1301 -0.1614 -0.1257 
msd 0.1113 0.0876 0.7275 0.5760 
fd*msd - 0.9813 -0.6597 - 1.2044 -0.7986 
site one -2.1067 -2.9162*** - 1.9568 -2.7285*** 
site two -0.2189 -0.2630 -0.4250 -0.5040 
site three 0.6969 0.9731 0.2087 0.2950 
avd 0.6655 -4.4006*** 0.6342 4.2713*** 
age -0.1437 -0.7727 - 
age2 0.0006 0.2405 - - 
constant 1.3172 0.2828 -3 . 2605 -1.0513 
Breusch- 
Pagan Test 
40.792*** (13 df. ) 32.681*** (11 df. ) 
Adjusted R2 0.1049 0.0894 
Number of Observations = 645 
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Figure 4.3a: Histogram of Age for the Grade B Workers 
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Figure 4.3b: Histogram of Age for the Grade A Workers 
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The situation faced by a grade B worker differs from that faced by a grade A 
worker since a grade B worker can be re-graded at both a lower level (i. e. grade Q 
in 1989 as a penalty for a bad attendance record in 1988 and a higher level (i. e. 
grade A) in 1989 as a reward for a good attendance record in 1988. In order to 
allow for this effect, an additional regressor is included which represents the 
expected difference between SA and SB . Despite the fact that the estimated 
coefficient on this regressor is insignificant, the coefficient does take the expected 
sign which indicates that a greater expected difference between SA and SB is 
associated with lower absence rates. The term which reflects (S B_ SC) is 
characterised by a statistically significant negative coefficient. This is in accordance 
with the theoretical results of Section 4.3, i. e. absence behaviour becomes less 
likely as the future penalty to absence increases. Moreover, it is apparent from a 
comparison between the magnitude of the estimated coefficients of (s B_ sc) and 
(S A_S B) that these results appear to be consistent with those of Barmby et al 
(199 1 a) suggesting that the boundary between the B and C grades exerts a stronger 
effect on absence behaviour than the boundary between grades A and B. 
The estimated coefficient for the grade B workers on the wage variable is 
significant at the 5% level and is characterised by the expected sign, as in the case 
of the grade A workers. It is interesting to note that the size of the estimated 
coefficient is greater than that estimated for the grade A workers with a one percent 
increase in wages on average causing a fall in the incidence of absence of 1.49 
percentage points. One reason for this may be that average earnings for the B grade 
workers are much lower than those for the A grade workers. Grade A workers 
appear to supplement their basic pay to a much greater extent with overtime and 
shift work. Consequently, grade B workers may be influenced more significantly 
by changes in the basic wage than their grade A counterparts. 
The estimated coefficient on contractual hours, which is statistically 
significant at the 5% level, is slightly larger in magnitude for the grade B workers 
than for the grade A workers. As in the previous case the estimated coefficient is 
positive indicating, in accordance with a priori expectations, a positive relationship 
between absence and contractual hours. 
It is clear from Table 4.3 that, as in the case of the grade A workers, 
different sites exert different effects on absence rates. In the case of the grade B 
workers, the dummy variable representing site one exerts a strong negative effect 
on absence rates. In the discussion above some general reasons were cited for the 
observed different influences of the various plants, such as differences in local 
unemployment rates. It is not apparent, however, why a specific dummy should be 
powerful for only one set of workers in a given location. In order to determine why 
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the dummy variable representing site two has a significant negative effect on the 
absence rates of grade B workers, it is necessary to establish whether significant 
differences for these workers exist across sites. For the grade B workers, the 
average earnings at site one were significantly higher than at the other three plants, 
thereby augmenting the loss in earnings associated with a days absence in this 
specific plant which in turn would have a moderating influence on the absence 
rates. 
In the case of both grade A and grade B workers, the results indicate a 
significant positive association between absence rates and average duration of 
absence spells. The relationship for the grade A workers appears to be much more 
pronounced than that for the grade B workers. The mean duration of absence spells 
across grade A workers is significantly lower than that of grade B workers whist 
the average incidence of absence spells across each grade appears to be relatively 
consistent (2.7 for grade A workers and 2.6 for grade B workers). Absence rates 
are clearly determined by both incidence and duration of absence. Average duration 
for the grade A workers is characterised by a lower standard deviation and a 
definite skew exists towards absence spells of short duration i. e. spells of one to 
two days. This implies that a more direct association between the proportion of 
days absent and average duration of absence spells exists. In the case of grade B 
workers, there appears to be more variation in the average length of spells across 
individuals. This implies a less direct association between average duration and 
absence rates and could account for the lower estimated coefficient on this variable. 
As a benchmark for comparison, Table 4.4 presents the results of the 
empirical analysis of the sample of grade C workers. Despite the fact that this group 
of workers does not face the threat of a lower level of sick pay in the future, 
empirical analysis was nevertheless conducted in order to compare the behaviour of 
grade A and B workers with grade C workers. Since grade C workers who exhibit 
very low levels of absence can be re-graded as B in 1989, (s B_ sc) is included as a 
regressor. 
From Table 4.4, however, it is apparent that the daily wage, (S B_ sc) and 
contractual hours do not exert a significant effect on the absence rates of grade C 
workers. Similarly personal characteristics such as marital status and sex do not 
significantly affect absence rates. Average duration of absence spells does exert a 
significant positive effect on absence rates as in the case of grade A and grade B 
workers. Age also tums out to be a significant determinant of absence - exhibiting a 
negative effect in accordance with expectations. 
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FTable 
4.4. - Dependent Variable 
ln[ar / (I - ar)] 
Sample Grade C Workers 
Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
T-Ratio 
wage - 1.0227 -0.7955 
SC-SB 0.5927 0.4827 
chrs 0.4574 1.2661 
fd - 1.2073 -0.6739 
msd 0.0723 0.0429 
fd*msd -0.2075 -0.0988 
site one -3.3044 -3.5019*** 
site two -3.1252 -1.8262* 
site three -0.5938 -0.6077 
avd -0.4306 4.5564*** 
age -0.6452 -1.8681** 
age2 0.0065 1.5011 
constant 8.8634 1.0310 
Breusch-Pagan 
Test (12 df. ) 
23.663 
Adjusted R2 0.1210 
Number of Observations = 243 
It is apparent from Table 4.4 that the dummy variables representing sites one and 
two exert a large negative influence on observed absence rates. One explanation for 
the magnitude of this effect may be that once an employee is graded C any further 
excessive absence is penalised through a warnings system administered by the 
personnel office. Once a grade C employee has accumulated three warnings any 
further unacceptable behaviour is punished by dismissal. The personnel officers 
administer warnings by following subjective rather than objective criteria, i. e. they 
appear to exercise a significant degree of discretion. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that some site dummies, i. e. those representing sites one and two, exhibit a 
significant negative impact on absence rates whilst other site dummies fail to reach 
significance. The site dummies, therefore, could be interpreted as proxies which 
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capture the effects of different personnel management and the leniency or stringency 
of the managers involved. 23 
To summarise, the empirical results presented in this Section provide some 
support for the predictions which arise from the theoretical analysis of Section 4.2. 
It is apparent from the empirical analysis that the determinants of the reservation 
sickness level, e. g. wages, sick pay and contractual hours, appear to have a 
significant and interpretable influence on absence rates. Moreover, those variables 
which characterise the employment contract seem to exert a greater influence on 
absence rates than personal characteristics such as sex and marital status. This is in 
accordance with the results of Allen (1981a) which suggest that: 
... the most easily observable personal characteristics are unrelated to 
work attendance. [Allen (1981a), p781. 
In addition, the implications of the results presented in this Section are in 
accordance with those of Barmby and Treble (1991a) and Chaudhury and Ng 
(1992) which highlight the importance of contract type for absence behaviour. 
These results are also consistent with those of Dalton and Mesch (1991) who 
conclude that an organisation's absence policy is a much stronger predictor of 
avoidable absenteeism than the demographic characteristics of the labour force. 
4.4 Concluding Remarks 
The aim of this Chapter was primarily to extend the current theory of absence 
behaviour by addressing two major weaknesses which characterise the modelling 
of absence, namely the ignorance of labour demand and dynamic considerations. 
Analysing absenteeism from a static perspective is clearly an unrealistic approach 
and this Chapter, building upon the static model of Barmby et al (1994) in which 
contractual considerations play a prominent role, analyses absence within a multi- 
period framework. The theoretical results which emerge indicate that once the 
individual recognises the future implications of his/her current absence decisions 
then his/her current absence behaviour is modified accordingly. In particular, the 
23 Given the relatively weak results presented in Table 2.4, it seemed appropriate to test for model 
mispecification. Ramsey Reset tests were carried out by running three additional regressions of the 
dependent variable on the independent variables and on the powers two, three and four of the 
predicted dependent variable. The estimated test statistics were 19.546 (1,229 df. ), 16.844 (2,228 
df. ) and 11.360 (3,227 df. ) respectively indicating that the equation is mis-specified. This result is 
not surprising given that the grade C employers represent the minority group of employees which 
contains those individuals whose absence behaviour does not appear to be influenced by the 
absence control scheme. Hence, the absence behaviour of this set of employees may be determined 
by factors which are not captured by the available data. 
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results suggest that the provision of experience rated sick pay lowers the probability 
of absence. 
The empirical results of Section 4.3 present some support in favour of the 
predictions which arise from the theoretical results. Moreover, it is apparent from 
the results of Section 4.3 that contractual arrangements play a key role in the 
absence decision making process, a finding which is consistent with the results of 
other empirical studies. Furthermore, differences in the observed absence 
behaviour of the three categories of employees can, in the main, be related to 
factors which determine current and future penalties to absence. 
Finally, it is interesting to note that the firm under investigation has chosen 
to establish the same sick pay scheme across sites. It is clear from the empirical 
results, however, that despite this uniformity the implications of the scheme are 
widely differentiated across sites. One explanation for this may lie in the differential 
availability of overtime, potential earnings, and therefore in the levels of SA and SB 
across sites. Although the nature of the firm's production process may dictate 
differences in the provision of overtime and shift working across plants, the results 
suggest that it may, therefore, be appropriate to operate site-specific methods of 
absence control. 
To summarise, the implications of the analysis suggest that the fin-n is able 
to exert some degree of control over absenteeism by altering characteristics of the 
employment contract. It appears that the sick pay scheme does exert a significant 
degree of control over absenteeism, but it should be noted that the loss of current 
earnings associated with absence has a greater influence on the absence decision 
than the loss of any future sick pay entitlement. 
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A4.1 Appendix One: The Threat of Dismissal 
A4.1.1 Introduction 
The analysis presented in Section 4.2 assumes that absence does not attract any 
punishment over and above that embodied in the experience rated sick pay scheme. 
Consequently, the absentee only suffers a loss of income since sick pay is assumed 
to be less than the wage. As mentioned in Section 2.3.3.3, Chapter 2, some studies 
have analysed the implications of additional penalties for absence behaviour. A. Hen 
(198 1 a), for example, assumes that an absentee, in addition to lost income, faces a 
lump sum penalty reflected in a decreased chance of promotion or an increased 
probability of dismissal to cover the firm's losses. Balchin and Wooden (1992) 
define a similar penalty function which is a function of the opportunity cost of being 
dismissed and the level of dismissal threat chosen by the firm. 1 Their empirical 
results suggest that absence is affected by both the expected cost of dismissal and 
the level of the dismissal threat. 
Penalties of this nature essentially raise the expected cost of absence faced 
by the employee with the probability of being dismissed acting as a discipline 
device. Such an approach is consistent with the efficiency wage hypothesis 
whereby the pro spect of unemployment serves to curb shirking on the part of 
workers [Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)]. Barmby et al (1994), who explore the 
relationship between absenteeism and efficiency wages explicitly, obtain theoretical 
results suggesting a negative relationship between the wage and the probability of 
absence. Weiss (1985) postulates a similar relationship for workers employed by a 
fin-n operating production line technology. Both of these models, however, suffer 
from a major shortcoming in that they are static. 
In many instances the detection of shirking does not lead to immediate 
dismissal [Carlin (1989)]. Hence, the interaction between workers and employers 
should ideally be modelled as a repeated game, i. e. the time horizon should be 
expanded. In this Appendix, the analysis presented in Section 4.2 is extended to 
introduce the notion of 'unacceptable' absence, which attracts a possible threat of 
dismissal, into the two period framework of Section 4.2. Thus, the interaction 
I The authors assume that the dismissal threat level is positively correlated with the actual 
dismissal rate. Such an approach is open to criticism, since if the dismissal threat is credible, one 
might expect an increase in the threat to reduce the level of actual dismissals. The authors justify 
their assumed positive correlation by invoking Drago's (1993) assumption that if the elasticity of 
absence with respect to the dismissal threat is less than one, then an increase in the threat level 
will reduce absence but by a relatively small amount, such that the level of actual dismissals will 
rise. This relationship is, however, somewhat tenuous with a lack of any rigorous theoretical 
structure. 
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between two types of absence control, an experience rated sick pay scheme and the 
threat of dismissal, is analysed. 
Focus is placed on an additional complication which arises when 
interpreting 'unacceptable' absence as shirking, namely the possibility that 
individuals who wish to absent themselves due to poor health may come to work 
under certain circumstances due to the fear of losing their job. An employee who 
turns up to work regardless of poor health may inadvertently impose costs on the 
firm; the productivity of the individual may decline or the condition of the individual 
may be contagious - leading to, for example, a costly epidemic of flu throughout the 
work force. 
A4.1.2 The Imposition of a Dismissal Threat 
The absence decision analysed in Section 4.2 is expressed as a choice between two 
distinct options; attendance and absence. This analysis is unrealistic in the sense that 
the firm's only response to the worker's absence behaviour is to set a lower level of 
sick pay in period two if the worker absents in period one. Absenteeism may, 
however, lead to further measures of absence control. The firm may, for example, 
have some notion of what it deems to be 'acceptable' absence and may be willing to 
dismiss any worker taking 'unacceptable' absence. This leads to the issue of what 
actually constitutes '(un)acceptable' absence. Incorporating sickness into a model of 
absenteeism, therefore, suggests that a distinction could be made between 
'acceptable' absence, whereby an individual is physically and/or psychologically 
unable to work, and 'unacceptable' absence whereby the individual's health is 
deemed adequate for the execution for his/her duties. Such a dichotomy implies the 
existence of some 'critical' level of sickness which marks the threshold of 
'acceptable' absence. Furthermore, one might expect 'unacceptable' absence to 
attract further punishment from the employer. 
Clearly disparities may arise between the level of sickness above which the 
individual prefers absence (the reservation sickness level) and the level of sickness 
beyond which the employer feels that it is acceptable for the employee to absent 
himself/herself from work (the acceptable sickness level). This disparity essentially 
forms the basis of the efficiency wage model of Barmby et al (1994). If the 
acceptable sickness level exceeds the reservation sickness level, then infon-national 
asymmetries play an important role if the firm is unable to determine the 
individual's level of sickness. To be sure, a range of sickness values exist over 
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which individuals may be tempted into taking 'unacceptable' (i. e. shirking) 
absence. 2 
Following the approach adopted by Barmby et al (1994), a minimum level 
of sickness, or', is defined such that for levels of sickness over the closed interval 
[a', I], the individual is deemed to be 'acceptably' sick and thereby entitled to 
company sick pay without threat of dismissal. Values of sickness which lie within 
this range may be, for example, viewed as medically certifiable. For simplicity, the 
Barmby et al (1994) assumption that (, a is exogenously determined and equal to 
the value of or such that the individual is indifferent between attending work and 
being unemployed, er' is adopted. Maintaining the model specifications developed 
in Section 4.2, this implies: 
In(-w 
aa= arz =b(T 
ln(-w + In b T-h 
(A4.1.1) 
where b denotes unemployment benefit. In the static model of Barmby et al (1994), 
given the assumption that sick pay is always greater than unemployment benefit, the 
reservation sickness level will always lie below or'. Once the time horizon is 
increased, however, this may not be the case and situations may arise when the 
reservation sickness level in period one exceeds (T a. such that workers prefer work 
to 'legitimate' absence. 
It would seem appropriate to assume that the individual faces some 
punishment if caught misrepresenting his/her level of sickness. This punishment is 
modelled as dismissal, where q c= [0,1] represents the probability that the firm is 
able to ascertain an absentee's true state of health. It is assumed that any worker 
dismissed by the firm is able to claim unemployment benefit. The reservation level 
of sickness in a static one period framework, e% is defined as the level of 
sickness such that the expected utility from attendance is equal to the expected utility 
from absence. Maintaining the assumption that sick pay is set at the relatively high 
rate, s", implies that as* satisfies the following condition: 
(I 
- er'*) In (w) + a'* In (T - h) = 
(A4.1.2) 
(I - q)[(l - as*) In(s") + a"" ln(T)] + q[(l - as*) In(b) + a`* In(T)] 
2 Firms may encounter problems distinguishing between different types of absence. Absence from 
work is usually justified by sickness, i. e. the individual reports that he/she is too ill to work even 
if this is not the case. Evidence from Dunn and Youngblood (1986) supports the view that illness 
is used as an excuse by workers to move towards their optimum labour supply position (see 
Section 2.3.3.4, Chapter 2). 
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Equation (A4.1.2) can be re-arranged as follows: 
(TS 
*= 
In w+ qIn s) 
( 
SH 
)b 
In w +qln 
(S 
H) 
s H-)+In( T 
b T-h 
(A4.1.3) 
If the realisation of sickness lies between the reservation sickness level and the 
'acceptable' level of sickness, then the individual has an incentive to illegitimately 
absent himself/herself from work since the expected utility from absence exceeds 
that from attending work. 
It is apparent from Equation (A4.1.4) below that any increase in the 
probability of dismissal would raise the reservation sickness level: 
In s 
)In( T 
-) da 
-=-(b 
T-h 
-, >0 
(A4.1.4) dq [ln(w)+qln(su)+ln( T) 
sHb T-h 
The sign of the second derivative indicates that the effect of an increase in the 
probability of detection diminishes as q increases: 
2 s* 
-2[ln(SH 
-2 
In( T) 
T-h 
(A4.1.5) 
dq2 
In w) +qlnln s 
H)+ln( T )-3 
1 (S 
Hb T-h 
Barmby et al (1994) explore the relationship between 'unacceptable' (i. e. shirking) 
absence and wages in this single period framework. The aim of this Appendix is to 
extend the time horizon of the theoretical framework and, in addition, to analyse the 
effects of both experience rated sick pay and the imposition of a dismissal threat. 
Consider how the reservation sickness level is determined in the context of 
the two period model of Section 4.2 once a distinction is made between 'acceptable' 
and 'unacceptable' (i. e. shirking) absence. The reservation sickness level, c-I *, will 
be defined as the value of sickness such that the utility from attendance in period 
one, plus the discounted expected utility in period two conditional on attendance in 
pefiod one, equals the expected utility from absence in period one plus the 
discounted expected utility in period two conditional on absence in period one: 
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(1-c-, *)In(w)+ci*ln(T-h)+ 1 E[U21 
w I+p 
(1 - q)( , 
a)[(l ci (SH) + C-1 a)[(l In (b) + el *In (T) _ '*) In '* In(T)] + q( 
] 
(I 
_ (, 
a )[(l 
_ (7'1*) In 
(SH) + cT, '* In(T)] +1 E[U21A 
(A4.1.6) 
Equation (A4.1.6) implicitly defines the individual's period one decision rule for 
determining the value of the reservation sickness level, a, '*. It is apparent that a 
priori he/she does not know whether the his/her reservation sickness level will be 
greater or less than the minimum 'acceptable' sickness level. Thus, there are three 
potential events which may occur - 'acceptable' absence, 'unacceptable' absence 
which is not detected and 'unacceptable' absence which is detected. The individual 
knows, however, that since sickness is defined over the unit interval and since or a 
represents the minimum 'acceptable' sickness level, that there is a (1 - Ora) 
probability that the reservation sickness level will be greater than or equal to aa 
and, therefore, will enable absence on the part of the individual without fear of 
dismissal, whilst there is aa probability that the reservation sickness level will be 
less than (, a and, therefore, that absence will attract a probability of dismissal. 
Thus, in the two period framework the reservation sickness level in period 
one may lie above or below the minimum acceptable level. Under the former 
situation, workers will attend work despite the fact that their realisation of sickness 
in period one is such that absence does not attract any threat of dismissal. 
'Acceptable' sickness in period one still implies that sick pay entitlement in period 
two is equal to the relatively low level and this wedge between s" and SL may raise 
the reservation sickness level in period one beyond , a. 
Situations may arise when individuals attend work when employers would 
prefer them to stay away. In the theoretical model of Kahana and Weiss (1992), for 
example, daily paid workers employed by a profit maximising firm will, under 
some circumstances, work when it is in the firm's interests that the workers absent. 
In the context of the proposed two worker-model, workers under conditions of 
profit maximisation are only paid on days when they attend work. Thus, the wage 
is only equal to the marginal productivity displayed when in attendance. In addition, 
the marginal productivity of an individual depends on how often his/her colleague 
attends on the same days. Marginal productivity is enhanced when the overlap 
between workers attending is minimised. Since, individuals are only paid for 
attendance and since prior to the fon-nulation of their work attendance decision, they 
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are not aware as to whether their colleague is sick or not, the attendance rates in this 
model are shown to be sub-optimal and exceed the pareto optimal level. 
Similarly, Kenyon and Dawkins (1987) argue that individuals may reduce 
recovery time from illness below socially optimal levels as a response to economic 
incentives. This may result in a reduction of the productivity at the work place by, 
for example, spreading illnesses such as flu throughout the work force. Doherty 
(1979) quotes from Morgan and Martin (1975): 
The most important reason determining how soon a person who has 
been sick returned to work was thought by all samples to be the drop in 
income during illness, followed by the fear of losing one's job and 
boredom at home. [Morgan and Martin (1975), p7]. 
Fenn (198 1) finds similar evidence which supports the claim that the duration of 
sickness in the UK is influenced by economic factors. 
Rearranging Condition (A4.1.6), which allows for the fact that situations 
may arise where an individual may attend the work place despite the fact that his/her 
state of health is such that he/she is entitled to 'acceptable' absence, yields the 
following: 
+q (,, a In sH+I 
JE[U21w ]-E[U21 
A, 
]I 
b I+p 
In -w)+q(7a In 
sH+ In( 
T (S 
Hb) T-h 
(A4.1.7) 
where E[U21w, 
] 
represents expected utility in period two conditional on attendance 
in period one and E[U2 IA, 
] 
represents expected utility in period two conditional on 
absence in period one. 
In w 
(S 
H 
From Equation (A4.1.8) below, it is apparent that E[U, 1w, 
] is a weighted 
average of the expected utility of an attender, the expected utility of an individual 
who is 'acceptably' absent, the expected utility of an individual who is 
unacceptably' absent weighted by the probability of not being detected and the 
expected utility of an individual who is 'unacceptably' absent weighted by the 
probability of being detected: 
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,. a )]In(sH)+('+(7a)ln(T) 
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'S*IWI U2 
In( w 
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In(SH + In(_ 
T 
(A4.1.9) 
sHb T-h 
i. e. the period two reservation sickness level conditional on attendance in period 
one is a function of the relatively high level of sick pay, sH. 
Equations (A4.1.10) and (A4.1.11) below define E[U2 
IA, ] 
which is 
essentially a weighted average of expected utility in period two conditional on 
'unacceptable' absence in period one and not being detected, 
E[U2 INF, ], 
) expected 
utility in period two conditional on 'unacceptable' absence in period one and being 
detected, E[U, IF 
. 
], 
and expected utility in period two conditional on 'acceptable' 
absence in period one, 
ýU2 INF, ]I 
where the weights are (I - q) a 
a, 
qa and 
(I - al respectively: 
E[U21 
A, 
]=(I-q) a E[U21NF. ]+q aa4U 21 Fl 
] 
+(l _aa )E[U2 INF 
I] 
where: 
(A4.1.10) 
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i. e. the period two reservation sickness level conditional on absence in period one is 
a function of the relatively low level of sick pay, SL . 
Thus, expected utility in 
period two if the individual is not dismissed in period one, E[U2 INF, 
]') is a weighted 
average of the expected utility of attendance in period two, 'acceptable' absence in 
period two, undetected 'unacceptable' absence in period two and detected 
'unacceptable' absence in period two. 
The expected utility in period two conditional on detected 'unacceptable' 
absence in period one is defined as foRows: 
E[U21 
)[ln(b) 
+ In(T)] F, 
]2 
(A4.1.13) 
Equation (A4.1.13) implicitly assumes that if the individual is dismissed in period 
one, he/she does not secure employment in period two. 
As in Section 4.2, the reservation sickness level in period two is decreasing 
with respect to sick pay: 
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s 
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Thus, once period two starts the analysis is the same as in the single period model 
which means that the reservation sickness level in period two will always lie below 
the acceptable level of sickness, i. e. u2s 
* IWI < ar; *IA 
I<(, 
a if 0! ýq<l since 2 
sH >SL 
In order to ascertain the future consequences of current work attendance 
decisions, the sign of the additional term of the numerator of Equation (A4.1.7), 
E[U21w, ]- E[U21 
A, 
], 
needs to be determined. The difference between expected 
utility in period two conditional on attendance in period one, E[UIwj and 
expected utility in period two conditional on absence in period one, 
E[UI IAI 
], 
can 
be expressed as follows: 
E[U21w, ]- E[U21 A, 
]= 
E[U21w, ]- (I 
- q(T')E[U2 
INF 
I]- qu'E[U2 
IF, 
] 
(A4.1.15) 
The magnitude of Expression (A4.1.15) is obviously influenced by q, the 
probability of detection, which is the outcome of the firm's choice of monitoring 
intensity. For ease of analytical exposition, it is useful to examine the extreme cases 
of zero monitoring and perfect monitoring. 
When q is equal to zero no distinction is made between 'acceptable' and 
& unacceptable' sickness and Equation (A4.1.15) reduces to 3, the difference 
between expected utility in period two conditional on attendance in period one and 
expected utility in period two conditional on absence in period one [recall Equation 
(4.10), Section 4.21: 
8= L 
2[ln s +ln(T-h) In( 
w+ In( 
T 
wT 
][ 
sH T-h 
In SL 
][In( T-h (S 
HT 
>0 (A4.1.16) 
Thus, when q equals zero, E[U, 1w, 
]> E[U21A, ] which implies that the future 
implications of current actions curb the tendency to absent from the work place. 
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At the opposite extreme of perfect detection, it can also be shown that 
E[U21w, ]> E[U2 IAI ]- As q approaches unity, Equation (A4.1.10) reduces as 
follows: 
E[U21 AI]= ,a E[U21F I]+ 
(1 
-a 
)E[U2INF, ] (A4.1.17) 
i. e. expected utility conditional on absence in period one is a weighted average of 
the expected utility in period two if dismissed in period one and the expected utility 
in period two if the individual is not dismissed in period one where the weights are 
detennined by the probability of 'unacceptable' absence and 'acceptable' absence 
respectively. Thus, the difference between expected utility in period two conditional 
on attendance in period one and expected utility in period two conditional on 
absence in period one is as follows: 
JE[U21 
W 
I]-E[U2 
JAI lllq=l 
= 
JE[U21 
W 
. 
]-E[U2 JNF 
1 
]11 
q=l 
+ or a JE[U21 
NF 
I]-E[U21F I 
]JI 
q=l 
ý Olq=l + , a 
JE[U21 
NF, 
]- E[U21 F, 
]llq=l 
(A4.1.18) 
where: 
01 
q=l = 
JE[U21w, ]- E[U2 JxF 
I 
]I 
q=l 
(A4.1.19) 
Taking the two bracketed terms on the right hand side of Equation (A4.1.18) in 
turn, the first term is positive when the probability of detection is equal to one: 
Olq=l = 
In 
( 
T 
T 
- h)] 
In 
( s 
SL 
2 ln(w)+In( 
T Ib 
T-h 
>0 (A4.1.20) 
Thus, as long as E[U21 NF1 
] is not less than 
E[U2 IF, 
]I 
the effect of the future 
implications of current absence decisions raises the probability of attendance. 3 
Furthermore, since expected utility conditional on absence in period one is a 
weighted average of the expected utility in period two if dismissed in period one 
3 'Ibis is clearly a plausible assumption to make since if were not the case then the individual 
would derive more utility from unemployment than employment. 
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and the expected utility in period two if the individual is not dismissed in period one 
(recall Equation A4.1.17), then it must be the case that E[U2 
IA, ] 
"ýý 
ýU2 INF, ]* 
One should note that situations where the probability of detection equals one 
or zero are somewhat extreme. Clearly the case when 0: 5 q: 5 1 is more realistic, 
i. e. it seems appropriate to assume imperfect monitoring of absence behaviour since 
employers encounter obvious problems in distinguishing between voluntary and 
involuntary absence. It is interesting, therefore, to determine the sign of 
E[U21w, ]- E[U21 A, 
I 
when q lies between zero and one, 
610: 
5 q: 51 ' 
in order to 
determine the implications of an imperfect monitoring technology on the probability 
of absence. 
In order to determine such implications, it is necessary to ascertain the sign 
of 310: 
ýq! ýl * Since E[U, 
1A J>E[U21F, ] 
lit follows from Expression (A4.1.10) that 
E[U2 Jwj ]> E[U2 
IvF 
I]> 
E[U21 A, 
]- 
Equations (A4.1.21) to (A4.1.24) below 
demonstrate that E[U21w, ]- E[U2 
INF, I is positive when 0:! ý q:! ý 1. Since 
E[U2 INF, 
] 
is greater than E[U, 
IA, ], 
then the analysis implies that 
610: 
5q5l is positive: 
(q _ 1)2 In s 
)[In( T )]', 
r3 
sL T-h + 01,1 >0 E[U21 
w 
E[U2 JNF 0=2 
In - +In 
T )-2 
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, r, = In( 
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'r2 : -In SL +qln( 
b )+In( T- h),.: 
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'r3= In( 
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(A4.1.24) 
+ In( 
T )[In( b )+In( b )] 
T-h sHsL 
Since r3< 0, then 0 is unambiguously positive. This algebraic result is confirmed 
by Figure A4.1.1 below which depicts the log-linear expected utility functions 
represented by Equations (4.7), (4.8), (A4.1.8) and (Al. 1.11). 
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Figure A4.1.1: Experience Rated Sick Pay and the Threat of 
Dismissal 
When q equals zero, ln(vt, )Aln(T) represents the utility function specified by 
Equation (4.8) and ln(vv, )Bln(T) represents the utility function specified by 
Equation (4.7). The expected utility function denoted by Equation (4-8) is 
represented by the expected value of the line segment ln(vv, )A evaluated using the 
expected value of (T., conditional on or, being less than (T*)iw, plus the expected 
value of the line segment A In(T) evaluated using the expected value of or, 
conditional on or, being greater than or*) 1w, . 
The expected utility function denoted 
by Equation (4.7) is represented by the expected value of the line segment ln(vt,, )B 
evaluated using the expected value of or, conditional on (T, being less than or, IAI 
plus the expected value of the line segment Bln(T) evaluated using the expected 
value of a, conditional on or, being greater than or*, I. Clearly ln(vt, )Aln(T) lies 
above ln(vt, )Bln(T) which implies that there is a higher level of expected utility 
associated with the higher level of sick pay. Z-- 
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Once 0:! ý q!! ý 1, then the individual has to take into the account the fact that 
there is a probability of being dismissed attached to tunacceptable' absence. In 
order to demonstrate the implications of an imperfect monitoring technology, the 
following definitions are adopted: 
E[yl] = (I - a2)[(l - q) 
In(SH) +q In (b)] (A4.1.25a) 
E -": (1 - q) In(SL) +q in (b)] (A4.1.25b) [ Y2 
I"- C2)[(l 
In the diagram, the value of the reservation sickness represented by Equation 
(A4.1.9), c2'*Iwl, is derived at point A* and the value of the reservation sickness 
represented by Equation (A4.1.12) Cý is derived at point B. It is apparent 
SIAI 
that ln(w)A*CC2 In(T) reflects E[U2 
Jw] 
and ln(w)B*C3 C41n(T) reflects 
E[U2 JvF 
I 
]. There is a discontinuity in the line segments at point or' since if a2 is 
greater than or equal to a' then absence is 'acceptable' and, hence, does not attract 
any threat of dismissal. Clearly, ln(w)A*CIC2 In(T) lies above ln(w)B*C3C, In(T). 
Thus, we can conclude that E[U21W, 
]> E[U21 NFI 
]> 
E[U2 IAI 
]- 
This means that the 
threat of dismissal which is attached to 'unacceptable' absence serves to raise the 
reservation sickness level. Hence, in the context of this model the existence of the 
threat of dismissal reduces the probability of absence. Furthermore, it is apparent 
from Figure A4.1.1, that as q increases, Expressions (A4.1.21 a) and (A4.1.2 I b) 
both tend to In(b). 
Equation (A4.1.4) illustrates that the reservation sickness level in the static 
single period model is increasing with respect to q. It is interesting to consider how 
4510: 
5q: 51 ' which determines the magnitude of the period one reservation sickness 
level, responds to changes in the probability of detection. Due to the intractability of 
the algebra, attention will be paid to simulation experiments. The results of three 
different cases are presented in Tables A4.1.1 to A4.1.3 below: 
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Table A4.1.1: Simulation Results: Case One 
Case One: w=9, s H =6, SL=5, b=4, T=24, h=9 
q 0 4510: 5q: 51 Ora ar, 
*1 
1 0= 0 
(7'* 
1I P=5 (Tls*l p=lo 
d 
0.0 0.02175 0.02175 0.63308 0.62616 0.61105 0.6096 7 
0.1 10.01955 0.03693 0.63308 0.63882 0.61316 0.61082 
0.2 0.01773 0.05247 
_0.63308 
0.65178 0.61532 0.61200 
0.3 0.01625 0.06830 0.63308 0.66499 0.61752 0.61320 
0.4 10.01506 0- 08439 0.63308 0.67840 0.61975 0.61442 
1 
0.5 0.01412 0.10067 0.63308 0.69200 0.62202 0.61566 
0.6 0.01341 0.11712 0.63308 0.70576 0.62431 0.61691 
0.7 1 0.01288 0.13386 0.63308 0.71966 0.62663 0.61817 
0.8 0.01253 0.15069 0.63308 0.73370 0.62897 0.61945 
0.9 0.01234 0.16767 0.63308 0.74785 0.63133 0.62073 
1 1.0 1 0.01227 
1 
0.18478 0.63308 0.76213 1 0.63371 1 0.62203 1 
Table A4.1.2: Simulation Results: Case Two 
Case Two: w=14, s 
H= 11, SL = 8, b = 6, T = 24, h =8 
q 0 1510: 5q: 51 a S 
*l 
p=O 
S *I 
P=5 
*I 
P=10 
0.0 0.04195 0.04195 0.67634 0.68653 0.65639 0.65365 
0.1 10.03519 0.05590 0.67634 0.69856 1 0.65839 0.65474 
0.2 10.03001 0.07141 0.67634 0.71193 0.66062 0.65595 
0.3 1 0.02604 0.08808 0.67634 0.72631 0.66302 0.65726 
0.4 1 
_ 
0.02303 0.10563 0.67634 0.74144 0.66554 0.65864 
0.5 1 0.02077 0.12386 0.67634 0.75717 0.66816 0.66007 
0.6 1 _ 0.01912 0.14264 0.67634 0.77336 0.67086 0.66154 
0.7 0.01796 0.16187 0.67634 0.78994 0.67362 0.66305 
0.8 _ 0.01721 0.18146 0.67634 0.80683 0.67644 0.66458 
0.9 0.01681 0.20136 0.67634 0.82399 0.67930 0.66614 
1.0 0.01668 1 0.22154 1 0.67634 0.84139 1 0.68220 0.66772 
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Table A4.1.3: Simulation Results: Case Three 
Case Three: w=12, s H=8, SL = 7, b = 5, T = 24, h = 10 
q 0 4510: 5q5l (,. a (Ts*l I p=O cr 
S* lp=5 (TS I 
*I 
P=10 
0.0 0.01905 0.01905 0.61894 0.59577 0.58342 0.58230 
0.1 1 0.01681 0.03548 0.61894 0.60854 0.58555 0.58346 
-- 0.2 1 0.01499_ 0.05217 0.61894 0.62152 0.58772 0.58464 
0.3 0.01352 0.06910 0.61894 0.63468 0.58991 0.58584 
0.4 0.01235 0.08624 0.61894 0.64800 0.59213 0.58705 
0.5 10.01145 0.10357 0.61894 0.66148 0.59438 0.58828 
0.6 10.01076 0.12108 
_0.61894 
0.67509 0.59664 0.58951 
0.7 0.01027 0.13875 0.61894 0.68883 0.59893 0.59076 
0.8 0.00994 0.15660 0.61894 0.70270 0.60125 0.59202 
0.9 1 0.00975 0.17461 0.61894 1 0.71671 1 0.60358 1 0.59330 
1.0 1 0.00970. 0.19260 0.61894 1 0.73085 1 0.60594 1 0.59458. j 
The simulation results serve to demonstrate that both 0 andk, 5q, ýI are positive and 
that 0 is decreasing with respect to q whilst 4510,, q,, l 
is increasing with respect to q- 
Figure A4.1.2 below which graphs 0 and (510,, q<, against q 
illustrates the nature of 
these relationships. 
The numerical analysis presented in Tables A4.1.1 to A4.1.3 also suggests 
that in all three cases the reservation sickness level in period one is increasing with 
respect to the probability of detection and, in some cases, actually exceeds or'. 
Figure A4.1.3 below graphs a-, * against q in each of the three cases. The 
horizontal red line included in each figure represents the value of (T'. It is apparent 
from the set of illustrations that the magnitude of the discount factor, p, plays a 
prominent role in determining whether or not cTl'* exceeds a'. 
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Figure A4.1.2: Differences in Expected Utility 
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Figure A4.1.3: The Implications of q for the Reservation Sickness 
Level in Period One 
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In the context of the single period model, it is apparent that the reservation 
sickness level is increasing with respect to the probability of detection. Once the 
time horizon is extended, the results of the simulation experiments demonstrate that 
as q increases, the influence of the future implications of current absence decisions 
rises which, therefore, lowers the probability of current absence behaviour. 
Moreover, under certain circumstances, the individual" s reservation sickness level 
in period one lies above a, hence there is a range of values of sickness, [a a* , orý 
S 
over which the individual is entitled to go absent without fear of dismissal but the 
level of the threat is such that the individual attends work. 
Hence, it becomes apparent that once the time horizon is extended changes 
in the probability of dismissal have two effects on the reservation sickness level. 
These effects are illustrated by Equation (A4.1.26) below: 
d(Tls* 
_ 
dors* d 4510: 9q51 
+- . 
dq dq dq (1 + p) 
(A4.1.26) 
Thus, increases in q serve to increase or*' and, hence, make absence less likely. 
This effect is reinforced since the results from the simulations suggest that 
E[U2 1w, ]- E[U21 
A, 
] is also increasing with respect to q. Thus, both the level of the 
dismissal threat and the provision of experience rated sick pay appear to reduce the 
tendency to absent from the work place. The results accord with a priori predictions 
since both of these influences represent a means of absence control. 
A4.1.3 Concluding Remarks 
In this Appendix the effects of two types of absence control techniques on absence 
decisions have been explored; an experience rated sick pay scheme and the 
imposition of a dismissal threat. The results obtained are in line with empirical 
results such as those from Balchin and Wooden (1992) which indicate that a 
dismissal threat and, indeed, the level of this threat have a significant effect on 
absenteeism. Clearly the theoretical results obtained from the two period model 
presented in this Appendix suggest that the nature of absence decisions is a complex 
result of the interaction between different types of absence control and the 
individual's expectations regarding the future implications of current decisions. 
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A4.2 Appendix Two: The Sickness Distribution: An Empirical 
Analysis 
A4.2.1 The Sickness Distribution 
It is apparent from the empirical results presented in Section 4.3 that, in the case 
of the grade B employees, the estimated coefficients on wages and the difference 
between sick pay if graded B and sick pay if graded C are relatively large in 
comparison with those estimated for the grade A workers. This accords with the 
results of Barmby et al (1991a) who discover that the points boundary between 
grades B and C exerts a stronger influence on absence behaviour than the points 
boundary between the A and B grades. In order to investigate the absence 
behaviour of the individuals who are affected by the B/C boundary more fully, 
maximum likelihood techniques were used to present an alternative empirical 
analysis of the theoretical structure of Section 4.2. This analysis aims to utilise the 
payroll data and the absence histories in order to gather information pertaining to 
the nature of the sickness distribution across individuals, the objective being to 
examine the relationship between the parameters of an individual's sickness 
distribution and his/her personal characteristics. 
The absence histories of the workers continuously employed over 1988 
form a discrete balanced panel of weekly data where at each point in time an 
observation reveals whether an individual was absent or not in a particular week. 
Each observation can be expressed as follows: 
dit =I 
absent 
0 work 
(A4.2.1) 
where: 
i=l and t=1 
where i represents the individual subscript and t denotes the time subscript. In 
terms of the model described in Section 4.2, the probability that di, =0 is equal to 
the probability that > ari, i. e. the probability that the reservation sickness level (Tit 
of individual i in time period t exceeds the realisation of sickness of individual i 
in time period t. This can be expressed formally as: 
1A similar analysis for A grade workers proved problematic. This is not altogether surprising 
given that the ratio of earnings to sick pay of such workers may, under certain circumstances, tend 
to unity. 
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p(dit = 0) = p(ai*, > ai, ) =f f(aJdai, (A4.2.2) 
Likewise, the probability that the realisation of sickness of individual i in time 
period t exceeds the reservation sickness level of individual i in time period t, 
i. e. the probability that (Ti*, < ai, can be expressed as: 
I 
p(dit = 1) = p(ai, >ff ((3-i, )dai, cit 
ail 
(A4.2.3) 
Therefore, the likelihood function for this panel of data takes the following form: 
NT dit 1 d. 
L= rlrlp((Tit> *)' [I-p(uj, > (Tit (Tit (A4.2.4) 
In order to evaluate such a likelihood function the value of the reservation 
sickness level for each individual at each point in time is required. From 
Equations (4.9) and (4.10) it is apparent that qj, is a function of w, h, s" and SL. 
Therefore the reservation sickness level, , can be calculated for each grade B ait 
and grade C worker at each point in time using the data contained in the payroll. 
In addition, a functional form for f (qj must be specified in order to 
calculate the probability of attendance or absence associated with a given level of 
q, t. The 
index of sickness, (Tit, is assumed to be a random variable characterised 
by the beta distribution, B(a, b). The beta distribution describes a family of 
probability density functions of continuous random variables defined over the 
range 0 to I with a density function given by: 
f Ogi, ) =I , i, 
a-I (1 
_ ai, 
)b-l 
B(a, b) 
where: 
I 
B(a, b) f cý-t a-I ai, 
)b-'da (A4.2.5) 
0 
and: 
a >0, b >0 
The following graphs illustrate how the values of the parameters a and b 
determine the nature of the probability density function. 2 
2 If a and b equal to one, the beta distribution reduces to the uniform distribution. 
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Figure A4.2.1(a): Probability Density Functions of the Beta Distribution 
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Figure A4.2.1(b): Cumulative Distribution Functions of the Beta 
Distribuition3 
Figure A4.2. I (a) illustrates examples of beta density functions for specific values 
of the shape parameters a and b and Figure A4.2.1(b) shows the respective 
cumulative distribution functions. It is apparent from the above diagram that use 
of the beta distribution implies a rich range of probability distributions with the 
direction and degree of skewness of the density function determined by the 
relative values of a and b. 
The objective of this Appendix is to maximise the likelihood function with 
respect to a and b for each individual in order to estimate the values of the 
parameters of a and b which maximise each individual's likelihood function 
which is in turn derived from the individual's absence history for 1988 whilst the 
3 The beta density functions and the cumulative distribution functions were plotted using 
Mathematica Version 2.04. 
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reservation sickness level at each point in time is calculated from payroll data. 4 in 
order to maximise the likelihood function it is necessary to evaluate p(q, > :) or Crt 
p(at < a, ) depending on whether the individual absents or attends at each point 
in time. 5 The likelihood function for each individual's event history can be 
reduced to: 
> *)d, P(at > 
)]I-d, Li p (at at at (A4.2.6) 
t=l 
where T is equal to 52, i. e. representing the 52 weeks in 1988. 
A FORTRAN program was constructed and then compiled which 
evaluates the integrals represented by Equations A4.2.2 and A4.2.3 and 
maximises Equation (A4.2.6) with respect to a and b using NAG library 
subroutines. 6 A full listing of the program is presented in Section A4.2.2 below. 
The program invokes a Quasi-Newton algorithm in order to maximise the 
likelihood function described by Equation (A4.2.6). This algorithm approximates 
the Hessian matrix of second order partial derivatives by a matrix which is 
updated at each iteration with information found with respect to the curvature of 
the objective function [see the NAG FORTRAN Manual (1990) for further 
details]. 
Quasi-Newton methods of optimisation can be based on the analysis of 
either first order or second order derivatives. Methods based on first derivatives 
only may be particularly useful in situations where it is difficult or even 
impossible to calculate the second derivatives of a given function. Given the 
complex nature of the likelihood function specified in Equation (A4.2.6), a Quasi- 
Newton method based on first derivatives only was used to maximise the 
likelihood function. The Quasi-Newton methods based on first derivatives 
basically entail approximating the Hessian matrix by analysing finite differences 
of the gradient function. All curvature information is computed at a single point - 
so the selection of the finite difference interval is a much debated area. Quasi- 
Newton methods which are based on first derivatives only basically build up 
information regarding the curvature of the function with iterations of a 'descent 1) 
4 The parameters a and b are assumed to lie in the range [0.5E - 8,50]. The chosen upper limit 
is in accordance with that set by Pearson and Johnson (1968), who calculate tables of probability 
integrals for the incomplete and complete beta function for values of a and b between 1 and 50. 
Pearson and Johnson (1968) remark that, '... as a and b approach 50, the standard deviation of the 
curve of the incomplete beta is about 1/20th of the range and 99.9% of the curve's area falls on 
less than 1/3 of the range. ' 
5 Since the probability of a particular individual's event history occurring is maximised, the 
individual subscript can be omitted. 
6 Specifically, routines E04HBF, E04JBF, E04JBQ and GOIBDF. 
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method in order to accumulate observed information on the function and its 
gradient. Quasi-Newton methods, therefore, approximate the curvature of non- 
linear functions without explicitly constructing the Hessian matrix. 
The gradient function derived from the first derivative is given by g(. ), the 
gradient function at point xk is, therefore, given by: 
9(xk) (A4.2.7) 
Assume that s, represents a small step away from point xk, the gradient function, 
therefore, becomes: 
9(xk + sk) (A4.2.8) 
Thus, the difference between the gradient at the two points weighted by the 
movement away from xk yields information on the curvature of the function 
between the specified interval: 
[g(x" + SJ - g(xJ]s, (A4.2.9) 
Moreover, the above information can be derived using information on first 
derivatives only. Each iteration of the optimisation program yields such 
information. 
At the start of the k" iteration, a matrix Bk which approximates the 
Hessian matrix is constructed which contains the curvature information which has 
been already accumulated from iterations I to k-1. After point xk, j is 
determined, Bk is updated in order to produce Bk, j where: 
Bk+I «-. ': Bk + Uk (A4.2.10) 
where U,, represents the update matrix. Let sk denote a small change in x during 
the V iteration: 
Sk Xk+1 - Xk- 
and let yk denote the change in the gradient function: 
Yk :: - 9(Xk-+I) - 9(Xk) 
(A4.2.1 1) 
(A4.2.12) 
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The updated Hessian approximation matrix should satisfy the condition that: 
Bk+lSk 
" -": Yk (A4.2.13) 
i. e. the approximation to the Hessian matrix weighted by the movement away 
from Xkmust equal the change in the gradient, this is know as the Quasi-Newton 
condition. The iterations continue until the there is global convergence at a 
stationary point [see Gill et al (198 1) for further details of Newton methods of 
optimisation]. 
The Quasi-Newton algorithm which is operationalised by the NAG 
subroutine E04JBF was devised by Gill and Murray (1972). This particular 
routine is also used by Davies (1993) in an analysis of the residential mobility of 
owner occupiers who remarks that: 
... (he) has found it to be robust, and, with no derivatives required, easy 
to operationalise for maximum likelihood calibration of non standard 
models. [Davies (1993), p. 1491. 
which clearly endorses the practical applications of this particular NAG 
subroutine. 
The resulting values of the parameters a and b, therefore, indicate the 
nature of the probability function of the index of sickness, q, which maximises 
the likelihood of the occurrence of the observed absence history of each 
employee. Thus, the implementation of the maximisation program enabled the 
construction of a data set containing the values of a and b which maximise the 
likelihood of each observed absence history occurring. 
It is apparent that the nature of the distribution of sickness is likely to be 
influenced by personal characteristics such as age and sex. As a increases relative 
to the value of b, for example, the distribution of sickness is skewed towards 
higher levels of sickness. One may expect that as age increases the distribution of 
sickness would be skewed towards higher levels. This relation can be expressed 
formally as writing parameters a and b as functions of personal characteristics 
such as age, i. e. a= h[a + fl(age)] and b= h[a + fl(age)]. Figure A4.2.2 below 
plots the probability density function for a distribution with parameter a equal to 
2.9 (the average value of a for employees above the age of 55 years) and 
parameter b equal to 5 (the average value of b for employees above the age of 55 
years). As a benchmark for comparison, the probability density function for a 
distribution with parameter a equal'to 2.23 (the average value of a for employees 
below the age of 21 years) and parameter b equal to 8 (the average value of b for 
employees below the age of 21 years) is also plotted. 
150 
a 2.23 
3b8 
2.5 
2 
a 2.9 
b5 
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 
Figure A4.2.2: Differences in the Probability Density Function of the Beta 
Distribution across Age 
It is apparent from the above plots, that the nature of the density function appears 
to be skewed towards higher levels of the sickness parameters as the age of 
employees rises. Similarly, one can compare the nature of the probability density 
function between male and female employees. Figure A4.2.3 below plots the 
probability density function for a distribution with parameter a equal to 2.1 (the 
average value of a for female employees) and parameter b equal to 7.6 (the 
average value of b for female employees. The probability density function for a 
distribution with parameter a equal to 2.4 (the average value of a for male 
employees) and parameter b equal to 7 (the average value of b for male 
employees) is also plotted. 
Figure A4.2.3: Differences in the Probability Density Function of the Beta 
Distribution across Sex 
151 
Although, the difference between the density function is not as pronounced as the 
differences in the density function across age, the plots suggest that the sickness 
index of females is skewed towards lower levels than that of their male 
counterparts. 
Clearly, considering the nature of average values of a and b suppresses a 
great deal of information pertaining to the values of the parameters across 
individuals. In order to examine such considerations more fully, the values of a 
and b which maximise the likelihood function for each individual were regressed 
on a set of observed personal characteristics of the employees using standard OLS 
techniques since the magnitude of the estimated Breusch-Pagan statistic did not 
suggest the presence of heteroskedasticity. In addition, since a relatively small 
amount of information relating to the personal characteristics is available, Ramsey 
Reset tests to check for model mispecification were carried out by running three 
additional regressions of the dependent variable on the independent variables and 
on the powers two, three and four of the predicted dependent variable, the 
estimated test statistics were 0.09569 (1,888 df. ), 0.70024 (2,887 df. ) and 1.7824 
(3,886 df. ) respectively for the case where the dependent variable is a. The 
estimated test statistics when the dependent variable is b were 0.14189,0.15186 
and 0.12368. Thus, the magnitudes of the test statistics point towards no model 
mis-specification in both of the regression equations presented. 
The results presented in Table A4.2.1 (a) indicate that there is a positive 
relationship between the parameter a and age, i. e. the higher is an employee's 
age, the more skewed is the distribution of sickness towards higher levels which 
conforms with a priori expectations. This evidence is re-enforced by the results 
presented in Table A4.2. I (b) which imply a negative association between age and 
the parameter b. The lower is the magnitude of b relative to that of a, the greater 
is the extent to which the distribution is skewed towards higher levels of or, 
In Table A4.2.1(b), the coefficient on the female dummy variable is 
positive suggesting that female employees are characterised by a distribution of 
sickness which is skewed towards relatively low levels. The results from the 
medical statistics literature [Studies include Pines et al (1985), Ryan (1981), 
Jenkins (1985), Broadhead et al (1990) and Parker et al (1987)], which is mainly 
concerned with the empirical analysis of health statistics as opposed to theoretical 
analysis, are broadly in line with the evidence from the economic literature, i. e. 
that married females with young children exhibit a high degree of sickness 
absence. Such evidence seems to conflict with that presented in Table A4.2. I (b) 
and Figure A4.2.3. 
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Table A4.2.1(a): Dependent Variable =a 
Independent 
Variable 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
T-Ratio 
Age7 0.119199 3.166*** 
Female -0.552158: 
1 
-0.769 
Married 0.574032 0.594 
Female*married -2.564850 -0.813 
Constant 8.222168 4.611*** 
F-Statistic 
(4,889 df. ) 
3.500260*** 
Breusch-Pagan Test 
(4 df. ) 
8.145 
Adjusted R2 0.0184 
Number of Observations = 894 
Table A4.2.1(b): Dependent Variable =b 
Independent 
Variable 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
T-Ratio 
Age -0.027087 -2.502** 
Female 0.536086 2.597*** 
Married 0.504926 1.818* 
Female*married -0.126880 -1.398 
Constant 4.061856 7.922*** 
F-Statistic 
(4,889 df. ) 
5.77160*** 
Breusch-Pagan Test 
(4 df. ) 
9.612 
Adjusted R2 0.0181 
Number of Observations = 894 
7 Average age of employee in 1988. 
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The traditional indices of sickness used in the medical statistics literature, 
however, are the percentage of time lost and average episodes of absence per 
person. Such data is, therefore, analysed at an aggregate level and, as a result, a 
significant amount of information is left unexplored. McKeown (1989) and 
McKeown and Furness (1987) argue that such indices do not provide information 
on the type of absence, i. e. long or short-term absence, and how such absence is 
distributed across employees. McKeown and Furness discover that males take 
fewer episodes of absence than females who in turn exhibit shorter but more 
frequent absence, which is in accordance with the results of Table A4.2.1(b). 
Barmby et al (1991a), on the other hand, discover that married and female 
employees take longer absences. It is apparent, however, that one is observing 
absence behaviour as opposed to sickness behaviour, i. e. observed absence does 
not necessarily imply sickness. 
In Table A4.2.1(b), the coefficient on the married dummy variable is 
positive suggesting a negative association between marriage and the level of 
sickness. Nathenson (1975,1977) who surveys the relationship between illness 
and personal characteristics discovers that, in general, empirical evidence from 
household surveys has shown that married individuals are less prone to illness 
than single individuals. Hence, the results of Table A4.2.1(b) are consistent with 
Nathenson's findings. 
To summarise, maximum likelihood techniques were used to determine 
the characteristics of the distribution of sickness for a sub-sample of the 
individuals whose absence rates were analysed in Section 4.3 using information 
held in the company's payroll and absence records. Moreover, the relationship 
between the nature of the distribution of sickness and personal characteristics 
were broadly in line with the findings of the medical statistics literature. 
A4.2.2 The Maximisation Program 
PROGRAM MAIN 
c Maximum Likelihood program which uses E04JBF in order to determine the 
c values of the parameters of the beta distribution which maximise the 
c likelihood function formed by the weekly absence histories of the employees. 
Integer N, LH, LIW, LW 
parameter (N=2, LH=N*(N-I)/2, LIW=2, LW=9*N) 
Integer NOUT 
Parameter (NOUT=6) 
Real*8 BIG, ETA, F, FEST, SMALL, STEPMX, XTOL, PROB 
Integer IBOUND, IFAIL, INTYPE, IPRINT, J, MAXCAL 
Logical LOCSCH 
Real*8 BL(N), BU(N), DELTA(N), G(N), HESD(N), HESL(LH) 
Real*8 W(LW), X(N) 
Integer ISTATE(N), fW(LW 
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External E04HBF, E04JBF, E04JBQ, FUNCT, MONIT, INTEGRATE 
G01BDF, INTEGRATEA, INTEGRATEW 
write(NOUT, *) 'EO4JBF PROGRAM RESULTS 
PROB=O 
c Call E04HBF at the starting point to find suitable differencing intervals. 
X(l)=6.50d0 
X(2)=6.5OdO 
IFAIL--O 
HESD(l)=0d0 
HESD(2)=OdO 
HESL(l)=0d0 
call E04HBF(N, FUNCT, X, J, DELTA, HESL, LH, HESD, F, G, IW 
LIW, W, LW, IFAIL) 
write(NOUT, *) 
write(NOUT, 99999) J, 'function evaluations were needed by E04HBF 
c check whether the HESD(J) indicate that the problem should be rescaled 
BIG--HESD(l) 
SMALL=HESD(l) 
do 20 J=2, N 
if(BIG. It. HESD(J)) BIG--BESD(J) 
if (SMALL. gt. HESD(J)) SMALL=HESD(J) 
20 continue 
if(BIG. ge. l. Od4*SMALL) then 
write(NOUT, *) 
'Try rescaling the problem. Elements of HESD are' 
write(NOUT, 99998) (HESD(J), J=I, N) 
else 
c continue setting parameters for E04JBF 
c set IPRINT=1 to obtain output from MONIT at each iteration. 
IPRINT= I 
LOCSCH=. TRUE. 
c As well as providing suitable settings for the DELTAQ), E04HBF will have 
c assigned values to F, the G(J) and the HESD(J), and will have set the elements 
c of HESL to zero. 
c So E04JBF can be set with INTYPE set to 1. 
INTYPE--I 
MAXCAL=50000*N*(N+5) 
ETA=0.999DO 
c Set XTOL to zero so that E04JBF will use the default tolerance 
XTOL=O. OOOODO 
STEPMX=1000000. DO 
c zero is a lower bound on the function value 
FEST=O. ODO 
IBOLTND=O 
BL(I)=0.000000050DO 
BU(I)=50. ODO 
BL(2)=0.000000050DO 
BU(2)=50. ODO 
EFAEL=l 
call E04JBF(N, FUNCT, MONIT, IPRIENT, LOCSCH, INTYPE, E04JBQ, 
* MAXCAL, ETA, XTOL, STEPMX, FEST, DELTA, MOUND, BL, BU, X, 
* HESL, LH, HESD, ISTATE, F, G, fW, LIW, W, LW, EFAIL) 
if (IFAIL. ne. 0) then 
write(NOUT, 99997) 'error exit type', EFAEL, '-see routine document' 
end if 
if (IFAIL. ne. 1) then 
write(NOUT, 99996) 'function value on exit is', F 
write(NOUT, 99996) 'at the point', (X(J), J=l, N) 
if (IFAEL. eq. 2) then 
C if it is decided to re-enter E04JBF with EVrYPE--2 then before re-entering, 
c the X(J), F and the G(J) must be set to the values given in the final call of 
c MONIT, and HESL, HESD and ISTATE must be set equal to the values 
c printed here 
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write(NOUT, 99995) 'where ISTATE contains', 
write(NOUT, *) TESL contains' 
write(NOUT, 99994) (HESL(J), J=I, LH) 
write(NOUT, 99993) 'and HESD contains', (HESD(J), J= 1, N) 
end if 
end if 
end if 
stop 
99999 format(x, B, x, a) 
99998 format(x, p, 4el5.4) 
99997 format(x, a, B, a) 
99996 format(x, a, 4f 12.4) 
99995 fonnat(x, a, a) 
99994 fonnat(x, p, 6e2O. 40) 
99993 format(x, a, p, 4e20.4) 
end 
subroutine FUNCT(IFLAG, N, XC, FC, GC, IW, LIW, W, LW) 
c Subroutine to evaluate the objective (likelihood) function 
Real*8 FC 
Integer IFLAG, LIW, LW, N 
Real*8 GQN), W(I-W), XQN) 
Real*8 prod I, prod2, bprod, PROB, EUA, EUW, EXA, EXW 
Real*8 PROBA, PROBW, w(49), s(49), h(49), da(49), dw(49) 
Integer IW(LIW) 
Real*8 A, B, d(49), work, absent 
Integer iabs(49), empno(49), weekno(49) 
c PROB(A, B) corresponds to the evaluation of the following; 
cr, If b-1 a-I 
B(a, b) 0 c 
c where PROB(A, B)=work(A, B). Likewise absent(A, B) corresponds to, 
11 
B(a, b) 
ý (1 _ (71 )b-I (a1 )a -'d(;, 
work(A, B)=PROB 
absent(A, B)=I-PROB 
if (rFLAG. ne. 3) then 
open (2, file='name of data file', status='old' 
do 25 k=l, 49 
read(2, *, end= 100) empno(k), weekno(k), da(k), 
dw(k), w(k), s(k), h(k), iabs(k) 
c N. B. dw equals (YwI and da equals , a, 22 
A=XC(l) 
B=XC(2) 
call INTEGRATEA(A, B, PROB, da, k, GO I BDF) 
PROBA=PROB 
call INTEGRATEW(A, B, PROB, dw, k, G01BDF) 
PROBW=PROB 
A=A+l 
call INTEGRATEAA(A, B, PROB, da, k, GOIBDF) 
EXA=PROB 
call INTEGRATEWW(A, B, PROB, dw, k, GOIBDF) 
EXB=PROB 
A=XCO) 
c EUW equals the expected utility function in period two if the employee 
c attends in period one and EUA equals Che expected utility function if the 
c employee is absent in period one. 
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EUW=PROBW*((I-EXW)*w(k)+EXW*(24-h(k)))+ 
(I-PROBW)*((I-(I-EXW))*s(k)+(I-EXW)*24) 
EUA=PROBA*((l-EXA)*w(k)+EXA*(24-h(k)))+ 
(I-PROBA)*((I-(I-EXA))*s(k)+(I-EXA)*24) 
EU=EUW-EUA 
d=(w(k)-s(k)+EU)/(w(k)-s(k)+h(k)) 
call INTEGRATE(A, B, PROB, d, k, G01BDF) 
if ((iabs(k). eq. 0). and. (k. eq. l)) then 
prodl=work(A, B) 
else if ((iabs(k). eq. 1). and. (k. eq. 1)) then 
prodl=absent(A, B) 
else if ((iabs(k). eq. 2). and. (k. eq. 1)) then 
prodl=1 
end if 
if ((iabs(k). eq. 0). and. (k. gt. 1)) then 
prod2=work(A, B) 
bprod=prod 1 *prod2 
prodl=bprod 
else if ((iabs(k). eq. 1). and. (k. gt. l)) then 
prod2=absent(A, B) 
bprod=prodl*prod2 
prodl=bprod 
end if 
25 continue 
FC=(-I)*bprod 
end if 
rewind(2) 
100 print*, 'end of file' 
return 
end 
subroutine MONIT(N, XC, FC, GC, ISTATE, GPJNRM, COND, 
POSDEF, NITER, NF, IW, LIW, W, LW) 
C monitoring routine 
Integer NOUT 
Parameter (NOUT=6) 
Real*8 COND, FC, GPJNRM 
Integer LIW, LW, N, NF, NITER 
LOGICAL POSDEF 
Real*8 GC(N), W(LW), XQN) 
Integer ISTATE(N), IW(LIW) 
Integer ISJ, J 
write (NOUT, 
*'Itn fn evals fn value norm of proj gradient' 
write (NOUT, 99999) NITER, NF, FC, GPJNR. M 
write (NOUT, *) 
j XQ) G(J) status' 
do 20 J=l, N 
ISJ=ISTATE(J) 
if (ISJ. gt. 0) then 
write (NOUT, 99998) J, XCQ), GCQ), 'Free' 
else if (ISJ. eq. -I) then 
write (NOUT, 99998) J, XCQ), GC(A 'Upper bound' 
else if (ISJ. eq. -2) then 
write(NOUT, 99998) J, XC(J), GC(J), 'Constant' 
end if 
20 continue 
if(COND. ne. O. OeO) then 
if(COND. gt. l. Oe6) then 
write (NOUT, *) 
estimated condition number of projected hessian is more than I. OE+6' 
else 
write (NOUT, 99997) 
estimated condition number of projected hessian=', COND 
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end if 
if (. NOT. POSDEF) then 
c The following statement is included so that this MONIT can be used 
c in conjunction with any of the routines E04JBF, E04KDF, E04LBF 
write (NOUT, *) 
projected hessian matrix is not positive definite' 
end if 
return 
end if 
99999 format(x, B, 6x, i5,2(6x, p, e20.4)) 
99998 format(x, i2, x, p, 2e2O. 4, a) 
99997 format(x, a, p, e10-2) 
end 
subroutine INTEGRATE(A, B, PROB, d, k) 
c This subroutine evaluates the probability p(a I> a) using the beta 
c distribution. 
Real*8 A, B, PROB, X, d(49) 
Integer IFAIIL 
Real*8 GOIBDF 
external GO1BDF 
EFAH, -O 
X=d(k) 
PROB=GOIBDF(X, A, B, IFAU-) 
return 
end 
subroutine INTEGRATEA(A, B, PROB, da, k) 
c This subroutine evaluates the probability p(, a', ' 02) using the beta 
c distribution in order to evaluate the expected utility function if the 
c individual goes absent in period one. 
Real*8 A, B, PROB, X, da(49) 
Integer IFAIL 
Real*8 G01BDF 
external G01BDF 
EFAIL=O 
X=da(k) 
PROB=GOIBDF(X, A, B, EFAU-) 
return 
end 
subroutine INTEGRATEW(A, B, PROB, dw, k) 
c 'Mis subroutine evaluates the probability p awl CF using the beta 
(2 
2) 
c distribution in order to evaluate the expected utility function if the 
c individual attends in period one. 
Real*8 A, B, PROB, X, dw(49) 
Integer IFAIIL 
Real*8 GOIBDF 
external GOIBDF 
IFAIIL=O 
X=dw(k) 
PROB=GOIBDF(X, A, B, IFAEL) 
return 
end 
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Chapter 5: Overtime and Absenteeism 
5.1 Introduction 
In general, studies have employed cross-section data in order to analyse the 
empirical implications of absence decisions within the context of neo-classical 
labour supply theory [see, for example, Allen (1981a), Dunn and Youngblood 
(1986) and Drago and Wooden (1992)]. 1 The aim of this Chapter is to explore the 
determinants of observed absence behaviour within an extended theoretical 
framework. In general, absence decisions have been modelled within a static 
theoretical framework which clearly suppresses any dynamic considerations. The 
extensions introduced in this Chapter modify the static model of absence by 
expanding the time horizon of the decision-making process in order to highlight the 
inter-temporal link which may be relevant as individuals make daily absence 
decisions. Furthermore, empirical analysis is conducted by exploring a panel of 
daily data. Clearly, the analysis of such data is advantageous given the benefits of 
the union of cross-section and time series considerations. 
In addition, emphasis is placed on the implications of a specific absence 
penalty system for the absence decision making process within a multi-time period 
model. This absence penalty system makes the provision of overtime working 
conditional on past absence behaviour. A worker with an 'unacceptable' absence 
history is effectively banned from working any overtime for a specified time period. 
The penalty system, therefore, is similar to that analysed in Chapter 4 where the 
level of sick pay is conditional on past absence behaviour. Thus, both absence 
penalty schemes emphasise the temporal link between past, present and future 
absence decisions. Furthermore, the experience rated sick pay scheme analysed in 
Chapter 4 operates by making sick pay entitlements more generous if an individual 
displays a 'satisfactory' attendance record. As outlined in Chapter 4, it is difficult to 
justify the provision of sick pay which is in excess of the statutory minimum -a 
necessary feature of an effective experience rated sick pay scheme. In contrast, the 
absence control mechanism explored in this Chapter does not rely on such an 
arrangement but focuses, rather, on the income earned from attendance. 
The empirical analysis set out in Sections 5.4 and 5.5 explores a set of 
discrete panel data which consists of work histories derived from daily attendance 
records for a sample of individuals employed by the British manufacturing firm 
1 Two notable exceptions are Kenyon and Dawkins (1989) who analyse time series data and Aflen 
(1984) who analyses a pooled data set. 
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which operates the overtime ban absence control mechanism. 2 Given that 
individuals make attendance decisions on a day-by-day basis it is clear that such a 
micro data set is an appropriate starting point. Moreover, the analysis of such 
absence records explicitly introduces a time dimension into the absence decision- 
making process which has not attracted much attention in the literature. 3 
It is reassuring to discover that the results are in accordance with those of 
other studies. In general, the analysis of this panel of daily data confirms that 
absence behaviour is primarily affected by contractual characteristics such as the 
prevailing wage rate and the penalty system operated by the firm. Moreover, the 
penalty system appears to be effective in exerting a moderating influence on absence 
behaviour and, furthermore, the empirical findings suggest ways in which the 
effectiveness of the system could be further enhanced. 
The remainder of this Chapter is set out as follows: Section 5.2 motivates 
the study by highlighting some background issues pertaining to the economics of 
absence and overtime. Section 5.3 extends the conventional labour supply theory in 
order to place absenteeism into the realm of multi-period analysis. Section 5.4 
describes the data set and methodology which is used to analyse the dynamic nature 
of absence decisions. Section 5.5 discusses the empirical findings and Section 5.6 
concludes the Chapter and highlights avenues for further research. 
5.2 Absenteeism and Overtime 
The analysis of overtime working is central to both labour supply and labour 
demand issues. The provision of overtime leads to alterations in the length of the 
working day and, as such, has implications for the labour supply and, therefore, 
the work attendance decision of the individual. On the other hand, the provision of 
overtime working is clearly a consequence of the firm's demand for labour at a 
given point in time. Despite the central role played by overtime provisions in labour 
demand and labour supply analysis, such considerations do not play a prominent 
part in the economic literature on absence behaviour. 
One issue which has attracted some attention in the economic literature 
centres on the belief that a high level of overtime working raises unemployment 
[see, for example, Leslie and Wise (1980)]. One reason why firrns may be reluctant 
to employ additional workers may concern the implications of human capital 
investment for the degree of worker utilisation [Hart and Ruffell (1993)]. 
2 The results, therefore, unlike those of Allen (1981a), are firm and site specific but are 
advantageous in the respect that they are derived from daily panel data. 
3 This is despite the relatively early contribution made by Johns and Nicholson (1982) who argue 
that an adequate model of absence should address dynamic considerations, '... absence is temporal 
behaviour and continually subject to dynamic change. ' [Johns and Nicholson (1982), p. 1361. 
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Furthermore, Hart (1987) remarks that a situation of high unemployment with some 
sectors of the economy being characterised by high levels of overtime may be 
regarded as politically and socially unacceptable. Hence, it is not surprising that 
attention has been paid to policies which may be introduced to alleviate such 
problems. Calmfors and Hoel (1988), for example, explore the proposal that a 
reduction in standard working time through 'work-sharing' represents one potential 
way of increasing employment. 
Evidence from the New Earnings Surveys shows how average overtime 
hours across individuals have been increasing over the 1980's, this evidence is 
summarised in Table 5.1 below which confirms that overtime working is an 
important phenomenon in the British economy. 
Table 5.1: Average Weekly Overtime Hours 
Production IndustrieS4 
in British 
Year Manual Non Manual 
Male Female Male Female 
1981 4.0 0.7 1.1 0.3 
1984 5.0 1.3 1.6 0.5 
1988 6.1 2.0 1.6 0.7 
Figure 5.1 below, which depicts the amount of overtime hours worked in the 
British manufacturing industry over the period 1972 to 1992, confirms the 
significance of overtime working to the British manufacturing sector. Further 
evidence pertaining to the importance of overtime working is highlighted by Milner 
(1993) who presents evidence suggesting that trade unions have exploited the 
dependence of British firms on overtime working by channelling dissatisfaction 
through a particular form of industrial action, 'the overtime ban' defined as a 
restriction on working time through the collective refusal to work overtime. Milner, 
who analyses the CBI Data Bank for the period 1979 to 1989, demonstrates that in 
every year of this fin-n level survey, the frequency of overtime bans exceeds that of 
strikes. 
4 British production industries are defined as the energy, water supply, manufacturing and 
construction industries. 
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Figure 5.1: Overtime Hours (Thousands) in the British 
Manufacturing Industry 
Since the influence of overtime working on absence behaviour plays a key role in 
the analysis presented in this Chapter, it is useful to re-iterate the hypotheses of 
economists conceming the relationship between overtime hours and absence which 
were discussed in detail in Section 2.3.3.2, Chapter 2. The implications of overtime 
working for absence behaviour have attracted some attention in the literature [see, 
for example, Chaudhury and Ng ( 1992), Kenyon and Dawkins (1989) and Leslie 
(1982)]. 
Absenteeism in the context of labour supply analysis arises due to the 
iinposition of an hours constraint. Such considerations imply that enhanced 
flexibility may reduce an employee's demand for absence since absenteeism 
constitutes a means to counteract inflexible work schedules. In this vein, overtime 
systems have been proposed as a way of counteracting absenteeism Leslie ( 1982), 
for example, argues that high overtime working should imply low rates of 
absenteeism since an employer may offer overtime prernia for hours worked in 
excess of contractual hours in order to induce individuals to supply more labour. 
Such measures lead to non-convexity in the budget constraint which may cause 
workers to obtain increased utility by working overtime (as depicted in Figure 2.7, 
Chapter 2). 
Chaudhury and Ng (1992), on the other hand, argue that overtime may be 
associated with increased absence since it may actually lead to less flexible working 
arrangements and longer working days. In addition, the income effect associated 
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with overtime may inflate the tendency to absent from the work place. It is 
apparent, therefore, that there are two potentially conflicting effects on absence 
behaviour resulting from any changes in overtime provisions [Kenyon and 
Dawkins (1989)]. The income effect coupled with the assumption of diminishing 
marginal utility implies a positive relationship between overtime hours and absence. 
If overtime hours earn a premium, however, then this creates an incentive to reduce 
absence. 
Clearly there is some debate in the economics literature regarding the effect 
of overtime on absence behaviour. Dalton and Mesch (1992) highlight the essence 
of the paradox which exists if a firm provides overtime to attenders in order to 
compensate for absentees: 
Employees working additional overtime hours may be able to 'afford' 
absence. [Dalton and Mesch (1992), p. 292]. 
Such an effect may lead to another group of workers working overtime and so on. 
This tendency has been called the 'snowball effect'. Similarly, Johns and 
Nicholson (1982) cite evidence from Gowler (1969) and Martin (1971) which 
suggests that workers may substitute readily available 'lucrative' overtime work for 
standard work hours and, therefore, exhibit more absence during the standard 
contractual hours. Furthermore, Ehrenberg and Schumann (1982) and Trejo (1991, 
1993) find that union workers in the US are more likely than non-union workers to 
receive premium pay for overtime. Trejo (1993), for example, finds that: 
... after controlling for individual characteristics including industry and 
occupation, unionization raises the probability of receiving premium 
pay for overtime by 8 percentage points. [Trejo (1993), p. 276]. 
Such evidence suggests that the potential 'snowball' effect may be greater in 
unionised fin-ns which may give unions, under some circumstances, an incentive to 
enforce absence control mechanisms. As pointed out in Section 2.3.3.3, Chapter 2, 
empirical evidence has indicated that unionisation is generally associated with 
increased absenteeism. In this vein, Allen (198 1 a) points out that some unions may 
implement their own disciplinary measures to curb persistent absenteeism given that 
the majority of workers attend on a regular basis. Similarly, the historical evidence 
of Tumbull and Sapsford (1992) describes how one set of workers viewed absence 
as a job characteristic [see Section 2.3.3.4, Chapter 2] except in the case where the 
gang itself refused to cover for an absentee if the individual in question had 
exceeded the 'absence norm' of the group. Chaudhury and Ng (1992) acknowledge 
that unions may implement disciplinary measures, but argue that: 
... although 
lower absenteeism may result, such effects are not likely to 
dominate: if union-imposed penalties are greater, workers will have less 
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incentive to become union members. [Chaudhury and Ng (1992), 
p. 619]. 
It is apparent, however, that since the majority of workers do not engage in 
excessively high levels of absenteeism, it is unlikely that the main body of the work 
force will have such an incentive to leave the trade union. 
The penalty system analysed in this Chapter introduces an interesting 
interaction between absenteeism and overtime working. The absence penalty system 
is based upon an actual scheme implemented by the firm which forms the basis of 
the empirical analysis of Sections 5.4 and 5.5. The scheme is particularly 
interesting in that it has emerged as the product of an implicit agreement between the 
personnel managers and the trade union with both parties co-operating in the 
enforcement of the absence control scheme. 
Furthermore, the temporal nature of absence decisions becomes apparent 
when one considers the potential penalties which absence behaviour may attract. 
Allen (198 1 a), for example, extends the income-leisure model by incorporating the 
assumption that, in addition to lost earnings, the absentee suffers a lump sum 
penalty to cover the firm's losses from his/her absence. 5 The penalty is assumed to 
be reflected in a decreased chance of promotion and/or an increased probability of 
being fired. Similarly, Kenyon and Dawkins (1989) include such a penalty function 
in their analysis and proxy the penalty function with a variable which represents the 
percentage change in employment, their hypothesis being that the higher are lay- 
offs the more 'threatened' employees will feel and the greater the perceived penalty 
associated with any absence behaviour. 
It is apparent that these types of penalty functions may have important 
dynamic implications; current absence behaviour, for example, may lead to 
unemployment in a future time period. Researchers have, however, consistently 
incorporated such considerations into static theoretical models by assuming that 
absence exerts a negative influence on current income only. Such an approach does 
not allow for a penalty structure whereby current absence attracts a penalty such that 
costs are carried over to some future time period. 
Moreover, the type of penalties hypothesised by Allen (1981a) and Kenyon 
and Dawkins (1989) are specified in rather vague terms. In contrast, the firm from 
which the data analysed in Sections 5.4 and 5.5 has been collected administers a 
very specific penalty system which is related to the provision of overtime working 
5 Such losses may arise because since the firm has to take costly measures to fill the gap created 
by the absentee, i. e. the output of the firm may be reduced if a replacement worker cannot be found 
or if a replacement is found he/she will in general be less efficient at performing the task. In 
addition, the fixed costs of employment will raise the cost to the firm of employing substitute 
workers. 
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in the firm and, hence, provides an interesting interaction between the absence 
penalty system and the incidence of overtime hours. 
5.3 Theoretical Considerations 
The theoretical framework outlined in this Section is based on Allen (1981a) and 
Kenyon and Dawkins (1989), both of which analyse absence within the framework 
of the static neo-classical labour supply model outlined in Section 2.2, Chapter 2. 
The potential for absenteeism within this theoretical framework emerges when 
individuals are obliged to supply a certain amount of labour within a given time 
period. Such constraints are common since employers are unlikely to be indifferent 
as to how much labour individuals supply. 
If we accept the basic premise that observed absence rates are the outcome 
of the absence decision-making process which is modelled within the income- 
leisure framework, we are faced with the problem that individuals will, in general, 
make their attendance decision on a day-by-day basis. Hence, in order to analyse 
this daily decision, the analysis of daily absence records is preferable to the analysis 
of workers' absence rates over a given time period. This issue is discussed more 
fully in Sections 5.4 and 5.5. 
Once absence is set in a daily context it would seem particularly appropriate 
to analyse absence as an all-or-nothing decision taken by an individual worker, i. e. 
on a given day the individual either attends or absents. The standard model of 
absence behaviour can be modified to incorporate this all-or-nothing choice by 
assuming that the individual's utility function is a function of consumption, x, 
leisure, 1 and sickness, a: 
U= U(X, 1, a) (5.1) 
where (T represents a stochastic parameter which determines the value of the 
individual's marginal rate of substitution between income and leisure. This 
parameter is exogenously determined each period and its inclusion formally allows 
for the observation made by Allen (1981a) that an individual's opportunity cost of 
working may vary over time as alternatives to work arise. Assuming that absence is 
a discrete concept, the individual either attends on a particular day and receives the 
following level of utility: 
it = u(wh', T- h', a) =Uw (a) 
or, altematively, absents and receives: 
(5.2) 
165 
u(S, T, a) = UA 
(a) 
(5.3) 
where w represents the wage rate, T represents the individual's stock of time, h' 
represents contractual hours, and S= sT represents total sick-pay remuneration 
since s denotes the sick pay rate. A pivotal level of a, a*, exists such that: 
uw (a*) = u(wh', T- h', a*) = u(S, T, a*) = UA 
(a*) 
(5.4) 
i. e. a*, the reservation sickness level, ensures that the utility from attendance 
equals the utility from absence. Hence, this pivotal level of the marginal rate of 
substitution between consumption and leisure can be used to derive the following 
daily absence decision-making rule: absent from work if (T> cy* and attend 
otherwise. 6 
Due to the existence of readily available overtime in the firm, where the 
absence histories analysed in Sections 5.4 and 5.5 were collected, problems were 
encountered as employees were aware that overtime would be offered within the 
near future. Hence, they could choose to absent themselves in the knowledge that 
the loss of earnings from absence could be offset in the future by working fewer 
overtime hours at enhanced overtime rates. In order to curb such an incentive, the 
firm introduced an absence penalty system which took the form of a ban on 
overtime working. More specifically, there is an implicit agreement in the firm 
between the personnel managers and the trade union that if an individual takes two 
unauthorised absences (i. e. absences which are not medically certified) within a five 
week period, then the individual will not be given any opportunity to work overtime 
for the next four weeks. The threatened overtime ban is, therefore, assumed to curb 
excessive levels of absence. 
For ease of analytical exposition, this penalty system is scaled down by 
assuming that one day of absence implies a two day overtime ban, thereby making 
the inter-temporal link which exists between absence decisions apparent within a 
simplified theoretical framework. A three period framework is adopted such that in 
time period 1, employees do not work any overtime. The pivotal value of the 
marginal rate of substitution in period 1, which is used to make the period 1 
attendance decision, is defined implicitly by the condition that utility from 
attendance in period I plus expected utility in periods 2 and 3 conditional on 
6 The nature of the decision-making process is analogous to that of Barmby et al (1994) who 
formally analyse the link between absenteeism and efficiency wages in a single period model. 
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attendance in period I equals utility from absence in period I plus expected utility in 
periods 2 and 3 conditional on absence in period 1: 
w( 
, 
*')] + E[U3'Ul = UW( ul )+E[U2 1 Ul = Ul (71 1 (71 
W( 
A( - A( - A( 
i)+E[U2'Ul =U 1)] + 
E[U3'Ui =U 1 
61 ul CT, 
(5.5) 
where: 
uw ul (wh', T- h', 1 (5.6) 
A 
ul ul (S, T, a, *) (5.7) 
i. e. denotes the level of utility in period I at the reservation sickness level 
if the individual attends and UA denotes the level of utility in period 1 at the 1 (71 
reservation sickness level if the individual absents. Similarly, E[U21UI =U1 61 
W( *)] 
represents expected utility in period 2 conditional on attendance in period I and, 
therefore, given the opportunity of overtime in period 2 and E[U 
lu =UA( 
*)] 
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represents expected utility in period 2 conditional on absence in period 1 and, 
therefore, given the imposition of an overtime ban in period 2. Hence, 
W( *)] can be defined as follows: E[U2 1 Uý = Uý (TI 
E[it Iu= Uw p(a2< ýjw, 
)E[u2w ( (T2 )I (T2 < Jw, + 21 ()*1 G2 (Y2ý 
p(c2 
*lw. )E[UA("2)IC2 *IWI 
(5.8) 
ar2 2 C72 
where: 
E[uw(u2 )I a2 < *lw, E[U2(wh' + w'h', T- h' - h' < *jw (5.9) 2 CT2 9 CT2 
)I 
CF2 ar2 
] 
UA( 
)I ýý *IWI E[U2(S, T, q2 )I C2 E[ 2 U2 or 2 *Iwl (5.10) (T2 (T2 
and w' represents the wage paid for overtime hours, 7 ho represents the number of 
*lw,, the reservation sickness level in period two conditional overtime hours and q2 
on attendance in period 1, is defined implicitly by the following condition: 
7 It is assumed that iv' > w, i. e. overtime hours are assumed to attract a premium. 
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U2*IW 
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2 
where: 
W( U2 U2* W, U2(wh'+w'h', T-h'-h' *lw 9 U2 1) (5.12) 
A IWI 
U2(S, T, (T2 U2 (72 2 (5.13) 
-jW. 
Hence, expected utility in period 2 conditional on attendance in period 1 [depicted 
by Equation (5.8)] is a weighted average of the expected utility given attendance in 
period 2 and the expected utility given absence in period 2, where the weights 
which reflect the probability of attendance and absence respectively, are detennined 
*lw,, the critical level of sickness in period 2 given attendance in period 1. To by a2 
*1w, denotes the level of sickness in period 2 at which the individual is be sure, q2 
indifferent between absence and attendance given the opportunity of overtime 
working in period 2. 
The crucial message from the analysis is that the expected utility of 
attendance in period 2, the expected utility of absence in period 2 and * are all C72 
I 
W, 
determined by the non-imposition of the overtime ban in period 2 given the 
attendance decision of period 1. Hence, it is clear that an inter-temporal link exists 
across the absence decisions in periods I and 2. 
Similarly, EuIu=4( *)] can be defined as follows: 
[21 
(71 
E[ =U A( *)]=P( < *IAj)+W(a2)I(T2 < CF2 + U21UI I (Ti C2 (72 2* 
IA, 
(5.14) 
)E[UA((T2)1(y2 
ýý C2 P( a2 ýý or2 2 
*IAI * IA, 
where: 
E[i, 2w 
(c2)1 
a2 < r; 
IA. ] E[U2(whc,, T- hc, 
*IA (5.15) C2 C2 )1(3 2< (72 
E[u2A ( (T2 )I cr2 ý! a2*1 Eu2 (5.16) A, 
I 
2(S, T, 
(72 
)1 q2 ý! (T 
*lAl 
I 
and , the reservation sickness 
level conditional on absence in period 1, is 
defined implicitly by the following condition: 
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*IAI (5.17) a2 a2 
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UW 
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*IA 
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I) 
A( 
U2 (Tl* 
IA, 
U2(S, T, 
*IA, 
(5.19) (71 
Hence, expected utility in period 2 conditional on absence in period I is a weighted 
average of the expected utility given attendance in period 2 and not working any 
overtime and the expected utility given absence in period 2, where the weights 
which reflect the probability of attendance and absence are determined by a2 IAI , the 
critical level of sickness in period 2 conditional on absence in period 1. 
Moreover, it is apparent from Conditions (5.11) and (5.17) that further 
dynamic implications exist between the absence decisions of periods I and 2 and 
the attendance decision of period 3. It is apparent from Condition (5.5) that 
attendance in period I implies two possible levels of expected utility in period 2 
[recall Equation (5.8)] - expected utility from attending work in period 2 conditional 
on attendance in period I and expected utility from absence in period 2 conditional 
on attendance in period 1- which in turn condition the possible outcomes in period 
3. To summarise, attendance in period I implies that overtime working in period 2 
is available which affects the period 2 attendance decision through the expected 
utility of attendance, the expected utility of absence and the value of the reservation 
sickness level. Clearly, despite the provision of overtime working, there is still 
some probability that an individual who attends in period I will be absent in period 
2 and will, therefore, face an overtime ban in period 3. Alternatively, if the 
individual attends in periods 1 and 2, no overtime ban will be imposed in period 3. 
Similarly, it is apparent from Condition (5.5) that absence in period I 
implies two possible levels of expected utility in period 2 [recall Equation (5.14)] - 
expected utility from attendance in period 2 conditional on absence in period I and 
expected utility from absence in period 2 conditional on absence in period 1- which 
in turn conditions the possible outcomes in period I Absence in period I implies 
that the individual will face an overtime ban in periods 2 and I Clearly, absence in 
period 2 does not introduce any further sanctions since the absence decision of 
period 1 implies that the overtime ban holds for the subsequent periods regardless 
of the attendance decision of period 2. 
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The four potential pay-offs in period 3, which reflect the four possible 
absence histories which may arise in this 3 period framework, are defined below. 
The first potential level of expected utility in period 3 assumes attendance in periods 
I and 2: 
E[U31u =uw( *lw, 
)]=p(a3< *lw. 
w, 
)E[uw(a3)la3 
< 22 (72 
*lw 
w 
or3 3 CF3 
12+ (5.20) 
P( C73 ý! (T3* 
I 
w, w, 
) 
E[U A( (T3 )I (T3 (T * 3 31 WIW2 
where: 
*iw, 
w, 
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)I 
(Y3< *Iww'] (5.21) E[uw(c3)IC3 < U3 3 (T3 
1 
E[u A( a )I a ýý 
*IW 
=Eu (S, T, q3 
)I 
(T3 'z-> *lw (5.22) 333 U3 IW2 
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CT3 
IW2 
] 
and where 
*'WIW2 
is defined implicitly by: a3 
3 
or3 ar3*IW. 
W, U3(S, 
TC3 U3 a3 u 
W( *'WIW2) 
= U3(whc + woho, T- hc - holl 9 
*IWIW2) A( *'WIW2) 
(5.23) 
Thus, Equation (5.20) represents expected utility in period 3 conditional on 
attendance in periods 1 and 2. 
Similarly, the level of expected utility in period 3 conditional on attendance 
in period 1 and absence in period 2 can be defined as follows: 
A( *IWI)]=P(( < 
)E[uw (a3)IC3 < *lw + E T3 (T 
*IWIA2 G3 
IA2 
[U3 
1 U2 = U2 (T2 33 
(5.24) 
)E[UA(a3)IC3 IWIA 
p( (73 U3 (T3 
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where: 
Eu E[U3(wh T-h, c3 
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a, U3 c *1111A (5.25) '(a3)IC3 < (73 3 
IA2 2 
Eu= E"3(S, T, 93)la3 ý! *jw (5.26) U3 )I orl ý! or3 3 * 
IIIIA2 
(73 
IA2 
and wheir cT*j is defined implicitly as follows: 3 WIA2 
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Thus, Equation (5-24) represents expected utility in period 3 conditional on 
attendance in period I and absence in period 2. 
The third potential level of expected utility in period 3 conditional on absence 
in period 1 and attendance in period 2 can be defined as foHows: 
Eu lu = uw( *IA, 
)] 
= p((73 < *IA, w, 
)E[uw((73 )I cT3 <+ 322 ar2 (73 3 (T* 
IA 
13 
IW2 
(5.28) 
'Al 
W2 
)E[U A( (T3 )I (T3 *IAIW2 P( (T3 ýý (T3 3 U3 
where: 
E[uw(93)IC3 < *IAw, EU3(wh', T-h, a3)lc, < (5.29) 3 CT3 (73 
1 *IAIW2 
E[U A( (73 )1 (T3 ý! *IA, w, E[U3(S, T, (T3 
)I 
a3 ý! (5.30) (73 U3 3 
*IAIW2 
and where a3 
IA, 
W2 is defined implicitly by: 
W( *IAIW2) 
= U3(wh', T- h', c3 
A( - * 
IA, 
3 (33 (5.31) U3 173 
*IAIW2 
U3(S, T, 173 W2) =U 
*IAIW2 
where Equation (5.28) represents expected utility in period 3 conditional on 
absence in period 1 and attendance in period 2. 
Finally, the fourth potential level of expected utility in period 3 conditional 
on absence in periods I and 2 is set out below: 
A 
(C2 
E[U3 1 U2 = U2 =p 
)E[u3w((3*3)la3 
< *IAIA2] + *IAI 
)] * IAIA2 ar3 (73 < (Y3 
(5.32) 
)E[UA(U3)IU3 
3 (73 P(CT3 
ýý C731AIA2 
*IAIA2 
where: 
E[113 all 
I(T3 
< ar3 (5.33) 3 
*'AIA2 ý113(wh', T-h, cT3) g'( (73 )1 ar3 < ; IAIA2 
E[IIA(CF3)IC3 ý! *IA, 
A, 
] 
=E[U3(S, T, (73 
)1 
(T3 (5.34) 3 ar3 :?! a31A, A2 
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and where or3 is defined implicitly by: 
*IAIA2 
W( * IAI 
A U3(wh', T- h', q3 = UA( U3 (33 
*IAIA 
3(S, T, 
(73 3 ar3 
IAI 
A (5.35) 2)u 
*IAIA2 
2 2)=3 
where Equation (5.32) reflects expected utility in period 3 conditional on absence in 
period I and absence in period 2. 
For clarity, the structure of the individual's decision-making process over 
the three time periods is summarised in the form of a decision tree presented in 
Figure 5.2 below. The associated Table 5.2 presented below sets out the definitions 
of the eight potential period 3 payoffs: 
Table 5.2: Derinitions 
Pay-Off 1= A Eu (U3)lc *IAIA 
133 
C3 
Pay-Off 2= Eu W(U3)IU3 C3 33 
IAIA2 
Pay-Off 3= A( E[U3 U3 or 
IAI 
W2 3 
U3 
Pay-Off 4= E uW(C3)1(T3 < (T3 3* 
IAI 
W2 
Pay-Off 5= A( *IW E[U3 Or 3 CT 3 ar3 
IA2 
Pay-Off 6= E[uw *IW 3 
(or3)jor3 < C73 
IA2 
Pay-Off 7= A( )I ýý *IW E[U3 (T3 U3 a3 
1 W2 
Pay-Off 8= E[U3 W(a3)IC3 < CY31W 
I W2 
Thus, Figure 5.2 and the associated Table 5.2 above illustrate the significance of 
inter-temporal influences for the absence decision-making process within this 
simplified three period frwnework. 
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Since, for ease of theoretical exposition, the assumption has been made that the 
analysis ends at the end of period 3, it is apparent that: 
r3 (T3 C73 a 
*IWIA2 
-": 
* IAIW2 
: -- 
*IAIA2 
(5.36) 
We may for illustrative purposes deviate from the simplifying assumption made in 
this Section and consider what happens if the analysis does not end after period 3. 
If the time horizon is extended, then, irrespective of any attendance decision in 
period 4, in general, it is the case that: 
(1-3 U3 (T3 
IWIA2 *IAIW2 *IAIA2 
(5.37) 
The structure of Condition (5.5) implicitly assumes that the analysis ends after 
period 3. If this is not the case, then it is apparent that the attendance decisions of 
periods 2 and 3 will have further implications for future absence behaviour. The 
possible absence histories which can be formed over periods 1,2 and 3 are 
summarised in Table 5.3 below together with the implications of each potential 
absence history for the imposition or non-imposition of an overtime ban in periods 
4 and 5. 
Table 5.3: 
Future Implications of Absence Histories 
Absence Histories 
Future Imphcations of the Absence 
History for the Overtime Ban 
Period I Period 2 Period 3 
Absent Absent Absent Overtime Ban in Periods 4 and 5 
Absent Absent Work Overtime Ban in Period 4 
Absent Work Absent Overtime Ban in Periods 4 and 5 
Absent Work Work No Overtime Ban in Period 4 
Work Absent Absent Overtime Ban in Periods 4 and 5 
Work Absent Work Overtime Ban in Period 4 
Work Work Absent Overtime Ban in Periods 4 and 5 
Work Work Work No Overtime Ban in Period 4 
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Hence, Table 5.3 highlights the extent to which the penalty system analysed in this 
Section implies the existence of an inter-temporal link between current and future 
absence decisions through the provision of future overtime working. 
So far the mechanics of the overtime ban system have been outlined. As 
mentioned in the introductory Section 5.1, this system has been implemented as a 
means of modifying absence behaviour - more specifically, the system is aimed at 
reducing the probability of absence in the current period by making the provision of 
future overtime working conditional on current absence records. Clearly, for this 
system to be effective, the wage premium paid for overtime working should be 
sufficient to offset the decrease in utility arising from the subsequent loss in leisure 
time. Hence, the wage premium should be of a sufficient magnitude to ensure that 
the following conditions are satisfied: 
w( *)]>E[u lu =u 
A( *)] E[U2 1 Ul = Uý (7ý 211 (71 (5.38) 
and: 
A( *)] E[U3'Ul = Uw (aý*)] > E[U3 1 1ý = Ul (71 (5.39) 
Condition (5.5) can be re-written as follows: 
117 ((T*) + 5=UA( (5.40) 
where: 
8=E[ lu =U W ((T, *)] - Efu Iu=uA( 
*)] 
U2 1211 (Ti 
w E[U3'Ul = 4(aý >0 
(5.41) 
+ E[U3 1 Ul ul (Ti 
Thus, if Conditions (5.38) and (5.39) are satisfied, the inclusion of 3 serves to 
increase the level of expected utility associated with attendance in period 1, i. e. the 
incorporation of the dynamic implications of current absence decisions raises the 
likelihood of attendance in the context of this theoretical structure. This is in 
accordance with a priori expectations - the introduction of the inter-temporal link 
between absence decisions and overtime working has been explicitly devised as an 
absence control mechanism and as such should curb the tendency to absent from the 
work place. 
A further point becomes apparent when considering the conduct of individual 
employees once their absence record dictates that an overtime ban is to be imposed. 
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If an individual goes absent in period 1, this ensures that an overtime ban is to be 
imposed in periods 2 and 3. If the individual then also goes absent in period 2, then 
the existing ban will be extended to cover periods 3 and 4 effectively. Thus, the 
marginal cost of absence in period 2 is an overtime ban in period 4 only, since the 
opportunity to work overtime in period 3 has already been relinquished. Hence, 
once an overtime ban is already in place, absence becomes relatively cheaper due to 
declining marginal cost of future absence. 
To summarise, the aim of this Section is primarily to extend the static model 
of absence decisions into the realm of multi-period analysis by highlighting the 
potential inter-temporal link which may exist across the absence decisions of 
different time periods. In addition, this analysis of worker behaviour across discrete 
time periods incorporates the essence of a specific means of absence control and 
introduces an interesting interaction between absenteeism and overtime working. 
5.4 Data and Estimation 
The approach taken by the majority of researchers has been to explain the amount of 
absence observed (i. e. absence rates across individuals or work places) with a set a 
regressors, such as wages and contractual hours, derived from the income-leisure 
framework. 8 Studies which analyse the amount of absence undertaken by 
individual workers over a specified time period include Allen (198 1 a) and Dunn and 
Youngblood (1986). Allen (1981a), for example, uses survey data where each 
individual reports the number of work days missed in the two weeks before the 
interview. Problems arise since the number of work days scheduled is not reported 
and, furthermore, if workers missed more than one day no information is given 
with respect to whether absence occurred on consecutive days. 9 Alternatively, firm- 
level studies have been conducted which analyse the determinants of the amount of 
absence observed across work places [such as Allen (1981b), Chaudhury and Ng 
(1992) and Balchin and Wooden (1992)]. Such an approach is problematic, 
Typically econometric specifications employed to analyse absence rates have been based on the 
log-odds transformations of the logit model [e. g. Allen (1981a), Drago and Wooden (1992) and 
Kenyon and Dawkins (1989)]. There are problems, however, with such a specification in the case 
of perfect attenders. In general, studies have set the absence rates of perfect attenders to an 
arbitrarily chosen small number [e. g. Drago and Wooden (1992)]. 'Ibis approach was adopted in the 
empirical analysis of Chapter 4. 
9 Clearly such an approach does not allow for the distinction between the duration and incidence 
of absence. The importance of the dichotomy between incidence and duration is emphasised by 
Drago and Wooden (1992). Acknowledging Johns and Nicholson (1982), Drago and Wooden argue 
that the appropriate empirical specification may require separating predictions of 'absence events' 
(i. e. incidence) and 'absence rates' (i. e. duration). The authors point out that '... although absence 
events and absence rates may have different determinants, they are related by the fact that an event 
is required for any positive rate. ' [Drago and Wooden (1992), p. 774]. 
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however, given the attempt to determine aspects of individual behaviour from firm 
level data. 
Once the temporal nature of the individual's absence decision-making 
process is acknowledged, the analysis of panel data seems to be particularly 
appropriate. The aim of the following Section is to analyse a firm-specific set of 
panel data which has been collected from a manufacturing company operating in 
Great Britain. The panel is formed by merging the personnel records of the 
company which contain personal characteristics of employees, daily absence 
records, which contain daily reasons for absence, and the information held in the 
firm's payroll which contains information pertaining to the weekly earnings of 
employees. 
The aim of this Chapter is to analyse absence behaviour within a more 
general setting where both labour supply and labour demand considerations are 
relevant. This data set consists of a discrete panel of daily data formed by 2092 
employees over a maximum of 78 weeks from June 1988 to December 1989. Each 
observation of the panel indicates whether an individual was absent from work or 
not on a given day: 
I if the individual is absent i=N di, =0 if the individual attends t= 11 ... I Ti 
(5.42) 
where i represents the case subscript and t represents the time subscript. Thus, if 
dil = 1, this indicates a spell of absence on a given day where absence is assumed to 
be either self or medically certified absence or absence without permission. 
The estimations were carried out by specifying a logistic model with the 
contnbution to the likelihood by the i 
th 
case and t 
th 
event as follows: 
Lit A=- 
[exp(ß"Xi, )] 
di, 
(5.43) 
1+ exp(ß"Xit)l 
Xit vector of explanatory variables (5.44) 
P vector of parameter estimates 
The results presented in the following Section illustrate the influence of a set of 
explanatory variables on the probability of absence, i. e. on the probability of di, 
being equal to one. 10 The set of independent variables can be broadly split into two 
10 In an Appendix to this Chapter, Appendix A5, the results of some additional estimations based 
on an extended form of the logistic model, the logistic-normal mixture model, are presented. 
177 
groups; those which represent characteristics of the employment contract and those 
which reflect employees' personal characteristics. Table 5.4 contains some 
summary statistics relating to the set of explanatory variables. The information 
conveyed in Table 5.4 is supplemented with the set of histograms presented in 
Figures 5.3 to 5.6 below. 
The conventional labour supply model of absence places the emphasis on 
the influence of contractual arrangements on absence decisions. The wage rate, 
therefore, plays a central role in the theory of absence behaviour with empiricists 
left the task of determining whether the income effect or substitution effect 
dominates. Following this lead, the daily wage rate (wage), a time varying 
parameter, is included in the set of explanatory variables. In general, researchers 
have found a negative relationship between wages and absence behaviour. Dunn 
and Youngblood (1986), for example, analyse the conditions under which an 
individual faced with a situation in which contractual hours exceed desired hours, 
will absent himself/herself Their results show a significant positive relationship 
between absence and the (positive) difference between a worker's marginal rate of 
substitution and the wage rate. Supportive evidence for the result of a negative 
relationship between wage rates and absence is found by Drago and Wooden 
(1992) and Chaudhury and Ng (1992). 
From the discussion of Section 5.2, it is apparent that overtime affects 
absence partly through the alterations to the length of the working day. A related 
point, therefore, concerns the distinction between part-time and full-time workers. 
One may argue that individuals whose specific preferences demand a high 
proportion of non-work time will opt for a part-time contract since such a contract 
may minimise the mismatch between contractual hours and desired hours. Thus, 
one would conjecture that part-time workers would absent themselves less 
frequently since they experience enhanced flexibility with respect to their work 
schedule and, furthermore, since they have fewer scheduled work hours, they are 
likely to derive less utility from additional leisure. In addition, Chaudhury and Ng 
(1992) argue that part-time workers may have less job security than their full-time 
counterparts and, thus, may face greater penalties for absence. This has been borne 
out to some degree by empirical work. 
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Table 5.4: Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
Mean 
(Standard Deviation) 
Variable All Full- Full- Definition 
Workers time time 
Workers Workers 
11 
wage 17.89 25.86 26.11 Daily basic wage 
(5.26) (5.11) (5.07) 
chrs 5.67 7.66 7.68 Daily contractual hours 
(1.21) (1.96) (1.93) 
overtime ban n. a. 0.08 0.08 Dummy variable which equals 1 
(0.26) (0.27) if an overtime ban is in place 
permanent 0.80 0.91 0.94 Dummy variable which equals 1 
(0.40) (0.29) (0.24) if the worker is employed under 
a pen-nanent contract 
full-time 0.26 n. a. n. a. Dummy variable which equals 1 
(0.44) if the worker is employed under 
a full-time contract 
female 0.79 0.39 0.40 Dummy variable which equals 1 
(0.41) (0.49) (0.49) if the individual is female 
married 0.56 0.40 0.40 Dummy variable which reflects 
(0.50) (0.49) (0.49) marital status and equals 1 if the 
individual is married 
female*married 0.50 0.20 0.21 Dummy variable which equals 1 
(0.50) (0.40) (0.40) if the individual is a married 
female 
tenure 6.36 10.71 11.24 Job tenure of the individual 
(6.37) (7.71) (7.47) measured in years 
age 34.43 37.96 39.03 Age of individual measured in 
(11.57) (12.23) (11.84) years 
... j 
II This represents the group of workers who were continuously employed over the 78 week period 
whilst the previous column refers to all full-time employees. 
179 
F77equency 
900. 
800. 
700. 
600. 
500 
400. 
300. 
200. 
100 ý 
0, 
0 10 20 30 50 6ý 7ý 80 
Length Of Event Histories 
(expressed in weeks) 
Figure 5.3: Histogram of the Number of Event Histories of All 
Employees 
Frequency 
500 
450 
400 
350 
300 
250 
200 
150 
100 
50 
0 
20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 
Average Weekly Eaminos 
Figure 5.4: Histogram of Average Weekly Earnings of All Employees 
180 
Frequency 
300. 
250. 
200 
150. 
100. 
50. - 
o i, -- , -, 
L 
-, - II 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 6ý 65 70 
Average Age 
(years) 
Figure 5.5: Histogram of Average Age of All Employees over the 
Period of Analysis 
Frequency 
1200. 
1000. 
800 
600 
400 
200 
FM 
05 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 
Average Tenure 
(years) 
Figure 5.6: Histogram of Average Job Tenure of All Employees over 
the Period of Analysis 
181 
Chaudhury and Ng (1992) find evidence which suggests that firms with more part- 
time workers experience a lower level of absence. Ibis is consistent with the results 
of Drago and Wooden (1992) which indicate that part-time employees exhibit low 
absence. Early evidence from Flanagan et al (1974) suggests that absence rates are 
higher in industries where the weekly hours of work are relatively high. Thus, 
daily contractual hours (chrs) were included in the set of explanatory variables in 
order to determine the impact of the length of the working day on absenteeism. 
A dummy variable (permanent) which takes the value of one if the 
employment contract is pen-nanent and zero otherwise is included in the model. The 
intuition behind the inclusion of this variable is based on the a priori hypothesis that 
individuals under temporary contracts may exhibit different behaviour to the rest of 
the work force. Such individuals may, for example, be more likely to devote 
resources to job search in order to find more secure employment. Furthermore, if 
an employee knows that his/her contract will terminate in the near future, then the 
sanctions imposed on current absence behaviour may be less threatening. 
To capture the effects of the imposition of an overtime ban on absence 
behaviour, a dummy variable (overtime ban) was incorporated which takes the 
value of one if the past absence history dictates that an overtime ban is currently in 
place and zero otherwise. As highlighted in Section 5.2, absence behaviour once an 
overtime ban is imposed may differ from absence behaviour prior to the imposition 
of such a ban, thus this dummy variable is included in order to capture the effects of 
any such change in behaviour. 
In accordance with other studies [such as Allen (1981a) and Dunn and 
Youngblood (1986)], this empirical investigation is not conducted solely within the 
framework of the neo-classical labour supply model and socio-economic variables 
such as age, sex and marital status are incorporated into the empirical specifications 
accordingly. 12Personal characteristics include a dummy variable (female) which 
equals one if the individual is female, a dummy variable (married) which equals one 
if the individual is married and a further interactive dummy which equals one if the 
individual is female and married. 
A common finding in many of the labour supply based studies has been that 
females exhibit higher absence rates than males [Allen (198 1 a, 1984), Leigh (198 1, 
1991), Drago and Wooden (1992), and Paringer (1983)]. Such a finding is 
somewhat difficult to interpret in terms of the standard income-leisure model of 
labour supply. It may be that women play a larger role in domestic duties and hence 
12 The significance of such demographic factors is not, however, universally accepted. Kenyon and 
Dawkins (1989) find that variables pertaining to the composition of the labour force do not exert F, 
much influence on absence. Their results indicate that variables which affect the budget constraint 
faced by workers affect labour absence. 
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may absent themselves from work in order to gain a greater degree of flexibility. 
Indeed, it has typically been argued that women tend to assume responsibility for 
the children within a household, and so will tend to stay at home if these become ill. 
Leigh (1986,1991), for example, finds a positive and significant effect between 
absence and an interactive 'sex - young dependant' variable. A related explanatory 
variable is marital status. Evidence suggests that married people absent themselves 
less frequently [see, for example, Allen (1984), Keller (1983) and Leigh (1986)]. 
The variables age and tenure, which are time varying parameters 
incrementing over an individual's record length, are also included in the set of 
explanatory variables. 13 The relationship between the probability of absence and 
job tenure has attracted some attention in the literature. Given that job tenure and the 
level of investment in firm specific human capital are interrelated, with investment 
in firm specific human capital typically proxied by tenure [see, for example, Blau 
and Kahn (1981)], the relationship between absence and tenure may be framed in 
terms of human capital theory. 14 In the context of efficiency wage considerations, 
the individual's expected utility loss from dismissal due to excessive absence 
behaviour increases with investment in firm-specific human capital. Thus, 
individuals with low tenure may have accumulated an insignificant amount of firm 
specific human capital and may be more prone to absence behaviour. As tenure 
rises the loss associated with dismissal rises and individuals may modify their 
absence behaviour accordingly. 15 Such considerations imply a negative relationship 
between tenure and absence behaviour. On the other hand, employees with 
relatively high tenure may become bored or dissatisfied with their job as time 
progresses but may find it difficult to leave, suggestive of a positive association 
between age and tenure. A further justification for the positive association between 
absenteeism and tenure is based on the argument that if the savings rate is positive, 
13 Prior to incorporating both age and tenure into the empirical specification, the Spearman's rank 
correlation coefficient between these two variables was calculated in order to assess the degree of 
co-linearity between these two related variables. In the case of all employees (continuously) 
employed over the period of analysis the correlation coefficient was (0.55) 0.61 whilst in the case 
of full-time employees only (continuously) employed over the period of analysis the correlation 
coefficient was (0.53) 0.57. Although the positive correlation between these two variables 
confirms a prior expectations, the degree of correlation is not particularly high so both variables 
are included in the analysis of Section 5.5. 
14 It is recognised, however, that observed tenure is a complex result of numerous factors in 
addition to bui-nan capital considerations. Henley et al (1994), for example, explore the impact of 
housing equity and private pension schemes on job tenure. The results indicate that housing equity 
has a negative impact on job tenure and that the membership of an occupational pension scheme 
raises tenure. Shah (1985) also discovers that pension schemes have important implications for job 
tenure. 
15 Furthermore, this effect may be accentuated since as Allen (1981b) points out wages may proxy 
labour market experience and, as such, may rise with experience. This will exert a further 
moderating force on absence behaviour, assuming that the substitution effect dominates the income 
effect. 
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then tenure should be positively associated with net assets [Drago and Wooden 
(1992)]. The existence of such a positive relationship is supported by the findings 
of Leigh (1986). 
Furthermore, as the investment in firm specific human capital rises, the 
dismissal costs for both the employee and the employer rise [Drago and Wooden 
(1992)]. Thus, the employer may find it relatively less expensive to fire employees 
with low tenure rather than those with relatively longer tenure. Consequently, the 
threat of dismissal may be felt more keenly amongst new recruits. 
Thus, one should recognise the effect of tenure on the behaviour of both the 
employee and the employer: 
Since firm specific human capital increases dismissal costs for both the 
employer and the employee, we cannot predict what effect job tenure 
will have on absence. [Drago and Wooden (1992), p. 7661. 
Hence, as tenure rises employees may be less inclined to 'shirk' whilst employers 
may be more tolerant of any lapses in the required standards of behaviour. 
Thus, it is difficult to predict the effect of tenure on absence a priori and 
empirical analysis is required to resolve the debate. Evidence supporting a negative 
relationship between absenteeism and tenure is found by Drago and Wooden 
(1992), Fitzgibbons and Moch (1980), Watson (1981), Keller (1983) and 
Youngblood (1984). 
The age composition of the work force may also have important 
implications for absenteeism. Younger workers may, for example, turn jobs over 
more frequently and undertake job search off the job through labour absence [Allen 
(1981a) and Kenyon and Dawkins (1989)]. 16 This may be the result of, for 
example, lower commitment to either the firm or the work group. Alternatively, 
younger workers with less financial and family commitments may simply 
experience a greater opportunity cost for any foregone leisure. Dunn and 
Youngblood (1986) and Allen (1981a, 1984) find that younger workers are 
associated with a higher level of absence behaviour. These findings fit in the 
predictions of human capital theory since younger workers are unlikely to have 
accumulated much firm specific human capital. On the other hand, younger workers 
may be expected to enter into job matches of a relatively low quality due to factors 
such as labour market inexperience. Hence, an employee involved in a bad match 
may absent himself/herself in order to seek alternative employment. 
Dunn and Youngblood (1986) find that absence declines with age except in 
the case of the oldest workers. The implications of age for absence behaviour have 
16 jhis issue is discussed in more detail in the following Chapter. 
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attracted a great deal of interest in the applied psychology literature [references 
include Steers and Rhodes (1978,1984) and Hackett (1990)]. According to Steers 
and Rhodes the relationship between age and 'unavoidable' absence is direct, i. e. it 
can be explained by the positive relation between susceptibility to illness and age. In 
addition, older workers may feel that their level of investment in human capital is 
such that they are insulated against dismissal for excessive absence behaviour. 
Overall, as Allen (1984) remarks, the evidence suggests that the relationship 
between absenteeism and age is quadratic rather than linear. In order to explore 
such effects, a ten-n representing age squared is included in the set of regressors. 
Following Barmby et al (1991) absence lagged one period is included in 
order to explore the phenomenon of state- dependence. The intuition behind the 
inclusion of the lagged dependent variable lies in the hypothesis that the marginal 
rate of substitution between income and leisure may not be independently 
determined in each time period. In the context of job search, for example, absence 
in one period to complete a job application form may be followed by absence in the 
next period to attend a job interview. 17 
The set of workers employed by the firm may be broadly split into those 
who face the overtime ban system discussed in Section 5.2 and those who do not 
face this absence control system. Since overtime working is only offered to full- 
time employees, the overtime ban system is operational for this sub-sample of 
workers only. Out of the total number of 2092 employees, there are 344 full-time 
employees. 
Prior to the exploration into the determinants of absence behaviour, a logistic 
model is employed to analyse the detenninants of overtime working. The objective 
of the analysis is to determine the credibility of the threatened overtime ban by 
examining the extent to which overtime working is inhibited by the presence of an 
overtime ban. Thus, logit analysis is conducted with the dependent variable 
indicating whether or not the individual works overtime on a given day: 
wit :=I 
if the individual works overtime i=N (5.45) 
0 if the individual does not work overtime t= Ti 
Given the aim of this analysis, the overtime ban variable is included in the set of 
explanatory variables in order to determine the implications of the ban for current 
overtime working. 
17 It should be noted, however, that when analysing panel data the existence of time persistent 
unobserved effects can generate 'spurious' state dependence [Heckman (1981) and Hsiao (1989)]. 
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Once the degree of effectiveness of the overtime ban is established, the 
determinants of the absence behaviour of the sub-sample of full-time employees 
who face this specific absence control mechanism are explored. In addition, some 
empirical analysis is conducted to compare the absence behaviour of full-time and 
part-time employees. Since only the latter group faces the control scheme, such an 
exercise may yield further insights into the effect of this scheme on the observed 
behaviour of employees. 
5.5 Results 
The results presented in Table 5.5 represent the influence of the set of explanatory 
variables described in Section 5.4 on the probability of a full-time worker working 
overtime. Two sets of estimates are presented, one set contains the sub-sample of 
full-time workers who were continuously employed by the firm over the 78 week 
period. Thus, this data set forms a discrete balanced panel of data. Such an 
approach may clearly be problematic since it may induce sample selection bias. 
Individuals who are ill-suited to the job, i. e. those characterised by a large disparity 
between contractual hours and utility maximising hours, are unlikely to remain with 
the firm throughout a given period of analysis. The inclusion of all employees in the 
analysis serves to ease such a selection problem. The second set of estimates was 
estimated from a panel of data which consists of uneven record lengths for each 
individual depending on whether he/she remained at the firm for the entire period, 
started working for the firm after the start date of the study or left before the end of 
the 78 week period. 18 
In addition to providing information pertaining to the effectiveness of the 
overtime ban, this empirical analysis into the determinants of the incidence of 
overtime working is interesting given the importance of the provision of overtime to 
the British economy as outlined in Section 5.2. It is somewhat alarming, however, 
to find that there is an acute shortage of research into overtime working in the field 
of labour economics especially in the context of the British economy. Some 
analysis has been carried out in the US. 19 Trejo (1993), for example, undertakes a 
cross-sectional probit analysis in order to identify the determinants of the incidence 
18 Problems may arise if the workers who leave the firm during the period of analysis do not 
respond to the dynamic considerations specified in the model. In general, the results, however, 
from the balanced and unbalanced panel presented in this Chapter do not diverge significantly 
which suggests that the individuals who are not continuously employed over the time period do 
appear to respond to the nature of the employment contract as opposed to any additional 
6 unobserved' influences which are discussed in more detail in Appendix A5. 
19 One explanation for the greater interest in the effects of overtime among US researchers may be 
concerned with the relatively stringent control of minimum overtime premia in the US through 
Goverrument regulation [see Hart (1987) for further details]. 
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of overtime working. The results indicate that female, minority and older workers 
are characterised by significantly lower overtime participation rates. In an earlier 
study using logit analysis, Trejo (1991) finds similar evidence. Hence, the logistic 
analysis presented below is similar to that undertaken by Trejo (1991,1993) and 
may serve to expand the research into British overtime working. 
For the purposes of the present study, we are primarily concerned with the 
estimated coefficient on the overtime ban variable. It is clear from Table 5.5 that the 
estimated coefficient is significant at both the 1% and the 5% level and is 
characterised by a relatively large negative coefficient. 
Table 5.5: Standard Logistic Model: 
Dependent Variable = Overtime Working 
Sample = Full-Time Workers 
Unbalanced Panel of Data Balanced Panel of Data 
Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coe icient 
T-Ratio Estimated 
Coefficient 
T-Ratio 
wage -0.0403 -2.8747*** -0.0293 -1.9761** 
chrs 0.0619 13.8750*** 0.0576 11.5837*** 
overtime ban -0.7571 -2.9832*** -0.7893 -2.979 1*** 
permanent 0.5358 2.1422** 0.9951 3.0082*** 
married 0.0323 18.1331*** 0.1658 8.5399*** 
female -1.1948 -5.8263*** -1.2604 -5.7492*** 
female*married -0.2875 -10.2803*** -0.1858 -6.3122*** 
lag-absence -0.9535 -15.7456*** -0.9702 -15.3181*** 
tenure 0.0724 2.5151** 0.0531 1.7231* 
I 
tenure2 -0.1722E-02 -2.1132** -0.1 170E-02 -1.3555 _ 
age 0.1230 3.1023*** 0.1662 3.7785*** 
age2 -0.1503E-02 1 -3.1286*** -0.1975E-02 _-3.7349*** 
constant -5.0485 
1 
-26.4860*** -4.8370 
1 
-22.3501 
Likelihood Ratio 
Test 
21449*** 20211*** 
Maddala R2 0.1636 0.1707 
Maddala R2 / Range 0.2181 0.2279 
Cragg-Uhler R2 0.0652 0.0689 
Number Of 
L Observations I 
120106 107952 
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Thus, it appears that the probability of working overtime is significantly reduced by 
the imposition of a ban. Moreover, the size of the estimated coefficient, which is 
relatively consistent across both sets of estimates, suggests that once an individual's 
absence history dictates the imposition of a ban, then the ban will indeed be 
20 
effective. 
In addition, there are other interesting results to note. The estimated 
coefficient on the daily wage variable is negative which suggests that higher levels 
of basic pay will be associated with a lower probability of overtime working. 
Intuitively, this implies that an income effect may be operating which lowers an 
individual's incentive to work additional overtime hours as the income from the 
standard working day rises. The results also suggest that the inverse relationship 
between the wage and the incidence of overtime working is more pronounced for 
the unbalanced panel of data. The estimated coefficient on contractual hours, which 
is relatively consistent across both sets of estimates, suggests a positive relationship 
between the length of the working day and the probability of working overtime. 
This may be the result of the system introduced by the firrn whereby priority for 
any available overtime is given to those workers whose contracts are characterised 
by relatively longer hours. The estimated coefficient on the dummy variable 
representing a permanent contract suggests that priority for overtime working may 
be given to permanent employees. This may be the result of, for example, 
established work groups operating in the firm [see Drago and Wooden (1992) for a 
detailed discussion of the implications of work groups for employee behaviour]. 
Furthermore, this positive relationship appears to be stronger in the case of the 
balanced panel of data. 
Turning to the personal characteristics; being married appears to increase the 
probability of overtime working - one reason for this may be the existence of 
financial pressures. Being female appears to exert a very large negative influence on 
the probability of overtime working. Women may be reluctant to work overtime 
given that women generally play a greater role in domestic duties than their male 
counterparts. Consequently, being married and female reduces the likelihood of any 
overtime. 21 The estimated coefficient on the lagged absence variable suggests that 
20 Since the coefficient on the overtime ban variable is not equal to one, then this implies that the 
absence control rule is not perfectly observed i. e. some banned workers may indeed be undertaking 
overtime work. The proportion of days when a banned individual works overtime as a proportion 
of days when overtime is worked is, however, relatively low, 5.1%. Thus, in 94.9% of cases, 
overtime is carried out by non-banned individuals which implies that the rule is observed in the 
majority of cases. 
21 Brown et al (1986), who analyse the nature of budget constraints faced by UK workers, find 
supporting evidence which suggests that women in general, and particularly married women, 
appear to have simpler payment systems. One reason for this may be that women seem to work 
shorter hours than their male counterparts and, as such, overtime working becomes irrelevant and 
is not regarded as part of the payment schedule. 
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absence on the previous day is negatively associated with overtime working. One 
explanation for this may be concerned with the active management policy pursued 
by the company which serves to give employees the shortest possible notice of 
future overtime working in order to prevent workers from 'planning' their absence 
accordingly. Alternatively, if a positive correlation exists between absence 
behaviour over time, then an individual who absented in the previous period may be 
likely to absent in the current time period. In addition, some correlation clearly 
exists between the imposition of an overtime ban and absence history in the 
previous time period. 
Tenure is positively related to the probability of working overtime. The firm 
may, for example, offer overtime to individuals as they acquire firm specific human 
capital or, on the other hand, such individuals may be choosing to work overtime. 
The coefficient on tenure squared, in contrast, suggests that individuals with a high 
tenure may refrain from overtime working. Such a tendency may be related to the 
amount of savings accumulated by such employees [Drago and Wooden (1992) and 
Leigh (1986)]. In addition, the relationship between absence and tenure appears to 
be less pronounced in the case of the balanced panel. The relationship between age 
and overtime working appears to follow a similar pattern. 
In addition to discussing the specific implications of each variable, it is 
interesting to consider some general diagnostics pertaining to the empirical 
specification in its entirety. The likelihood ratio test statistic reported in Table 5.5 is 
significant thereby rejecting the hypothesis that the explanatory variables (excluding 
the constant) have no influence on the choice probabilities in the logit analysis. The 
goodness of fit measures presented in Table 5.5, however, suggest that the model 
is characterised by relatively poor predictive power. One explanation for this may 
lie in the fact that overtime incidence is determined by both labour supply and 
labour demand influences. Since only information related to labour supply aspects 
is available in the data set, then influential labour demand considerations may not be 
captured by the empirical specification and this may account for the low predictive 
capacity of the model. Thus, although the empirical analysis has provided some 
insight into the types of individuals working overtime, the results should be treated 
with some caution given the limited information available on labour demand 
considerations. 
Turning to the analysis of absence behaviour, the results of Table 5.6 
represent the influence of the set of explanatory variables on the probability of a 
full-time worker being absent. The estimated coefficient on the wage variable is 
statistically significant at both the 5% and the 1% level. The daily wage rate is 
negatively associated with the probability of absence in both empirical 
specifications. This result is consistent with the findings from other empirical 
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studies such as Allen (1981a), Balchin and Wooden (1992) and Chaudhury and Ng 
(1992) which produce evidence supporting a negative relationship between wages 
and absence. A negative relationship between wages and absence implies that the 
substitution effect generated by a wage increase dominates the income effect. The 
magnitude of the estimated coefficient on wages indicates that on average a one 
percent rise in average daily earnings would lead to a fall in the incidence of absence 
of 0.0113 (0.0152) percentage points for the continuously employed full-time 
workers (all full-time workers). 
Table 5.6: Standard Logistic Model: 
Dependent Variable = Daily Absence 
Sample = Full-Time Workers 
Unbalanced Panel of Data Balanced Panel of Data 
Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coe icient 
T-Ratio Estimated 
Coefficient 
T-Ratio 
wage -0.0218 -3.6625*** -0.0227 -3.6275*** 
chrs 0.0389 1.8190* 0.0221 1.9432* 
overtime ban 0.3967 5.3075*** 0.3220 4.0465*** 
permanent 0.0844 0.7526 0.1981 1.4161 
married 0.0265 0.3285 0.0536 0.6290 
female 0.2452 2.7502*** 0.1887 1.9414** 
female*manied -0.0699 -0.5699 -0.1415 1.0960 
lag-absence 4.7581 6.7734*** 4.8687 6.5263*** 
tenure 0.2210E-02 0.1768 -0.2877E-02 -0.2168 
tenure2 -0.1099E-03 -0.3262 0.2047E-04 0.0577 
age -0.0425 -2.4560** -0.0457 -2.4031** 
age2 0.5157E-03 2.4815** 0.5533E-03 2.4362** 
constant -6.3681 -6.8607*** -5.7663 -5.5902*** 
Likelihood Ratio 
Test 
5950.2*** 23746.5*** 
Maddala R2 0.0483 0.1975 
Maddala R2 / Range 0.3377 0.7131 
Cragg-Uhler R2 0.3041 0.6426 
Number Of 
Observations 
120106 107952 
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The magnitude of the estimated coefficient on wages appears to be relatively 
consistent across both the balanced and the unbalanced panels. A related point 
concerns the magnitude of the estimated coefficient on wages which is small relative 
to that found by other researchers. It is apparent, however, that the availability of 
overtime working at this specific workplace may modify the wage effect stemming 
from changes in the basic wage accordingly. 
The estimated coefficient on contractual hours indicates that the probability 
of absence rises as contractual hours increase. As described in Section 5.3, the 
results of Chaudhury and Ng (1992) indicate that contract type, as represented by 
the level of contractual hours, has an important effect on absence behaviour. Firms 
with more part-time workers are found to experience a lower level of absence. 
Hence, the estimated coefficient on contractual hours is consistent with the 
hypothesis which suggests that workers experiencing a longer working day are 
more prone to absence behaviour. The size of the estimated coefficient appears to be 
consistent across both specifications. The estimated coefficient on the variable 
representing a permanent employment contract is, however, insignificant. 
The estimated coefficient on the variable 'overtime ban' is highly significant 
and positive in sign, suggesting that the imposition of such a ban raises the 
probability of absence. The theoretical analysis of Section 5.2 indicates how the 
effective inter-temporal cost of further absence is reduced once an overtime ban is 
operational. The empirical evidence supports this theoretical prediction. 
Furthermore, one should also note the relatively large magnitude of this estimated 
coefficient which suggests that the ban variable is a ma or determinant of absence 
behaviour. 
Thus, the empirical results presented in Table 5.6 indicate that the existence 
of an overtime ban exerts a relatively large positive influence on the probability of 
going absent. Such findings suggest that the firm could alter the ban system such 
that rather than imposing a scheme whereby overlapping bans are instigated, the 
bans may be accumulated consecutively. Thus, an individual who faces a ban in 
periods I and 2 and goes absent in period 1, will have his/her ban extended to 
periods 3 and 4, rather than to period 3 only. 
The estimated coefficient on the female dummy is significant and the 
positive sign is consistent with that of other studies. Empirical studies have 
typically found, for example, that women exhibit a higher degree of absence than 
men [such as Allen (1981a, 1984), Leigh (1981,1991) and Paringer (1983)]. In 
contrast, the estimated coefficients on the marital status dummy and the interactive 
dummy variable prove to be statistically insignificant. 
The results of Table 5.6 indicate that younger workers are associated with a 
higher probability of absence. These results are consistent with those of Dunn and 
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Youngblood (1986) and Allen (1981a, 1984). In addition, Dunn and Youngblood 
(1986) find that absence declines with age except in the case of the oldest workers. 
This result is consistent with the sign of the estimated coefficient on age squared. in 
sum, the results are consistent with a quadratic rather than linear relationship 
between absence and age. Tenure and tenure squared, on the other hand, are found 
to be insignificant determinants of the probability of absence in the current empirical 
specification. 
Following Barmby et al (1991), absence lagged one period is included in 
order to explore the phenomenon of state- dependence whereby the realisation of 
sickness may be correlated over time. The estimated coefficient on lag-absence is 
positive implying that absence in the previous period exerts a positive influence on 
the probability of current absence. 
The magnitudes of the likelihood ratio test statistics suggest that the 
hypothesis that the explanatory variables have no influence on the probability of 
absence behaviour can be rejected. In addition, the goodness of fit measures 
suggest that the models are characterised by relatively good predictive powers, 
especially in the case of the balanced panel of data. 22 
As a point of reference, further empirical analysis was carried out exploring 
a data set consisting of all employees, i. e. both full-time and part-time workers. 
Due to the magnitude of the data set, a logistic analysis was carried out on weekly 
data, whereby the dependent variable took the value of one if an employee was 
absent in a given week, otherwise the dependent variable was zero. The results 
pertaining to the entire work force are set out in Table 5.7 below. Analysis at such a 
level of aggregation was conducted in order to determine the general difference in 
the absence behaviour across the two groups of workers; namely the full-time 
employees who face the absence penalty system and the part-time employees. It is 
interesting to discover that the estimated coefficient representing a full-time contract 
is negative in sign. This result contradicts the findings of other studies which 
suggest that employees working shorter hours exhibit less absence behaviour. 
Given the nature of the absence control system instigated by the company, i. e. one 
that is operational for full-time employees only, it is not surprising that full-time 
employees are less prone to absence. The findings, therefore, suggest that the 
control system is effective in the sense that it exerts a moderating influence on the 
absence behaviour of full-time employees. 
22 Since the estimates from the unbalanced panel of data will be to some extent influenced more 
heavily by the behaviour of individuals who quit the firm and that of new recruits whose behaviour 
is more likely to be conditioned by unobserved influences, one might expect better predictions 
from a model estimated from the more homogeneous set of individuals. 
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Table 5.7: Standard Logistic Model: 
Dependent Variable = Weekly Absence 
Sample = All Workers 
Unbalanced Panel of Data Balanced Panel of Data 
Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coe icient 
T-Ratio Estimated 
Coefficient 
T-Ratio 
weekly wage -0.9665E-02 -6.9837*** -0.4918E-02 -3.0264*** 
full-time -0.2232 _-2.8432*** -0.3521 -3.9808*** 
pen-nanent -0.4937 -13.6975*** -0.2044 -2.9735*** 
married -0.0806 -1.0004 0.1378 1.4597 
female 0.1345 2.7712*** 0.1141 1.5150 
female*married -0.1148 -1.3162 -0.2128 -2.0203** 
lag-absence 1.1216 27.3875*** 1.1861 19.5917*** 
tenure -0.0536 _-7.3291*** -0.0122 -1.2823 
tenure2 0.1341 E-02 5.2499*** -0.96004E-05 -0.0288 
age -0.0515 -6.1423*** -0.0592 -4.7863*** 
age2 0.6095E-03 5.1597*** 0.6789E-03 4.2473*** 
constant -1.3339 -7.8368*** -2.1484 -8.8212*** 
Likelihood Ratio 
Test 
1908.4*** 464.4*** 
Maddala R2 0.0206 0.0069 
Maddala R2 / Range 0.0571 0.0231 
Cragg-Uhler R2 0.0373 0.0163 
Number Of 
Observations 
91576 66759 
Other interesting results from Table 5.7 include the estimated coefficient of the 
dummy variable, permanent, which indicates a negative and statistically significant 
association between a permanent contract and the probability of absence. This 
implies that individuals employed under temporary contracts are characterised by a 
higher probability of absence. Individuals employed under temporary contracts, 
which are generally of a short-term nature, are more likely to devote resources to 
job search in order to find more secure employment. The extent to which the 
behaviour of individuals employed under permanent contracts differs from that of 
individuals employed under temporary contracts is explored more fully from a 
theoretical view point in Chapter 6. 
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Once again, the size of the likelihood ratio test statistic confirms the joint 
significance of the explanatory variables (excluding the constant) in the case of both 
sets of estimates. It should be noted, however, that the predictive capacity of both 
sets of estimates is poor. One might expect this to be the case since the aggregation 
from daily to weekly data clearly involves the suppression of a great deal of 
information. 
To summarise, the empirical results presented in this Section are consistent 
with the findings of other economic studies of absence behaviour which suggest 
that characteristics of the employment contract appear to be major determinants of 
absence behaviour. In addition, as Allen (1981a) discovers, age appears to be one 
of the most easily observed personal characteristics of workers which is related to 
absence behaviour. 
5.6 Concluding Remarks 
The aim of this Chapter is primarily to acknowledge the temporal nature of absence 
decisions from both a theoretical and empirical perspective. From the theoretical 
analysis presented in Section 5.3, it is evident that absence control mechanisms 
whereby current absence implies future penalties implicitly introduce inter-temporal 
links between current and future absence behaviour. The analysis of Section 5.3, 
therefore, acknowledges the existence of such links and focuses on their 
implications for the absence decision-making process. 
The empirical analysis presented in Sections 5.4 and 5.5 explores the 
determinants of absence by investigating a firm-specific panel of data. This data set 
is interesting since it presents an opportunity to analyse the determinants of daily 
absence decisions. The scarcity of such micro data sets has, unfortunately, led 
many researchers to analyse absence rates of individuals or work places observed 
over a specified period of time. It is reassuring to discover, however, that the 
results of the current study appear to confirm the findings of previous research. 
More specifically, the results are broadly in line of those of Allen (1981a) and 
Kenyon and Dawkins (1989) which suggest that characteristics of the employment 
contract are key determinants of absence behaviour. 
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A5 Appendix: The Logistic-Normal Mixture Model 
It is important to acknowledge a particular shortcoming of the logistic model 
specified above for the analysis of daily absence decisions. This weakness 
concerns the fact that the logistic model does not take account of unobserved 
heterogeneity. 1 This implies that the model may be mis-specified since it is clear 
that individuals may differ in systematic but unobserved ways. Moreover, given 
the relatively small amount of information regarding the personal characteristics 
of employees available in the personnel records of the firm, it is apparent that 
omitted variables such as the presence of dependent children may have important 
consequences for absence behaviour. Hence, it is important to distinguish between 
systematic variation, which can be attributed to missing explanatory variables, 
and pure random variation due to other factors. A second type of model based on 
the logistic function but with an additional case-specific random error term 
included in order to account for omitted variables and, hence, unobserved 
heterogeneity, is analysed in this Appendix. The analysis is undertaken in order to 
test the robustness of the empirical results presented in Tables 5.6 and 5.7, once 
one accounts for unobserved heterogeneity. Thecase specific random error term is 
incorporated into the model by including an additive random variable in the 
intercept of the regression equation. 
In terms of the analysis presented in Sections 5.4 and 5.5, emphasis was 
placed primarily on exploring the determinants of the probability of absence (i. e. 
the probability that dit = 1) which can be expressed as follows: 
pr(di, = 1) = F(PXit) (A5.1) 
where F(P'Xj represents the specified distribution function which is a function 
of the set of explanatory variables (including the intercept term, flo). Clearly, 
variables which are not contained in the data set may exist which influence 
absence behaviour - such variables, however, have to be regarded as 
unobservable. In order to allow for the existence of such variables, a random 
intercept term, Poi 9 
is incorporated into the set of explanatory variables and can be 
defined as follows: 
Poi 
:A+ -'i (A5.2) 
I The simulation study of Davies and Pickles (1985) indicates that it is important for this type of 
discrete choice model to incorporate an effor structure which represents the effects of omitted 
variables. 
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i. e. a random intercept term, Poi, exists for each individual where the error term 
r, is characterised by zero mean and constant variance: 
E(Ei) =0 (A5.3) 
E(ei2) = a2 (A5.4) 
Hence, the modifications imply that the probability of an individual being absent 
can be expressed as follows: 
pr(di, = 1) = F(ß'Xi, + ei) (A5.5) 
where the additional variable, ej, allows for observationally equivalent 
individuals to differ systematically in their choice probabilities. 
In order to estimate such a model, a specific distribution for the E's over 
the population has to be assumed, Ae). Such a 'random effects' model, the 
logistic normal mixture model, has the following marginal likelihood for the 
series of events for the ih case: 
Ti [exp(fl"Xit + E)]di, 
I 
f 11 
1+ exp(p-Xit + E- t=l 
)i (A5.6) 
where f (e) is the probability density function or 'mixing' distribution of the error 
term, E, and T, represents the length of the sequence of events. Thus, in order to 
allow for unobservable variables, an additive random variable, e, is introduced 
across individuals which is incorporated in the intercept of the regression 
equation. 
Models which incorporate individual-specific error terms are difficult to 
apply to empirical analysis. One major problem concerns the fact that the 
individual specific error terms and the structural parameters cannot be estimated 
simultaneously. Further problems arise with computing the individual specific 
error terms due to the potentially very large number of such parameters to be 
estimated. If it were computationally possible to estimate both sets of parameters 
simultaneously, the estimates of the structural parameters would, however, be 
biased since the number of individual error terms would rise with the number of 
observations [Neyman and Scott (1948)]. Thus, the error terms have to be 
eliminated prior to the maximisation of the model. 
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In order to estimate such a model, a specific distribution is assumed for 
the additive random variable over the population. The SABRE program [see 
Barry et al (1990)], which uses quadrature to numerically evaluate each likelihood 
integral assuming that f (e) is normally distributed, was employed to implement 
the regressions. 2 Tables A5.1 and A5.2 below present the results obtained by 
specifying the logistic-normal mixture model. 
The results presented in Table A5.1 are comparable to those presented in 
Table 5.6. It is apparent from the results presented that the daily wage and the 
overtime ban variable appear to be the most robust determinants of absence 
behaviour once one allows for unobserved heterogeneity. The estimated 
coefficient on wages suggests a negative association between wages and the 
probability of absence which confirms the results from the analysis of the logistic 
model which suggests that the substitution effect dominates the income effect. In 
addition, the estimated coefficient on the overtime ban confirms the previous 
result which suggests that once a ban is in place, an individual may have a 
relatively greater incentive to engage in absence behaviour. To summarise, once 
one allows for unobserved heterogeneity, it appears that the characteristics of the 
employment contract remain important deten-ninants of absence behaviour. 
The analogous exercise was conducted in order to explore the robustness of 
the results presented in Table 5.7 which presents the results of the analysis of the 
determinants of absence behaviour of all employees of the firm (i. e. both part-time 
and full-time). The results from specifying the logistic non-nal mixture model are 
presented in Table A5.2 below. Analysis at such a level of aggregation was 
conducted in order to determine the general difference in the absence behaviour 
across the two groups of workers; namely the full-time employees who face the 
absence penalty system and the part-time employees. The results from the logistic 
normal mixture model support those from the standard logistic model, in that the 
estimated coefficient representing a full-time contract remains negative in sign. 
Hence, even accounting for unobserved heterogeneity, it would still appear that 
the control system is effective in the sense of moderating the absence behaviour of 
2 Quadrature techniques are frequently used with unconstrained optimisation problems when the 
objective function contains sub-problems such as an integral. Assume that F(x) is to be 
maximised with respect to x: 
F(x) = O'f 
(x, t)dt f 01 Numeral quadrature can be used to approximate the integral by a weighed sum of function values 
at selected points which lie between the range of integration: 
fIM 
, f(m)dt = 
Y69jf(X'tJ 
j=1 
where wi. represents a set of weights and tj represents a set of values of t which lie on the unit 
interval, i. e. 0!! ý t, tm !ýI [see Gill et al (1981) for further discussion of quadrature 
methods]. 
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full-time employees. Furthermore, the coefficient estimated from the mixture 
model is larger than that estimated from the standard logistic model, which 
implies that allowing for unobserved heterogeneity leads to an even more 
pronounced difference between the behaviour of the two types of worker. 
Table A5.1: Logistic-Normal Mixture Model: 
Dependent Variable = Daily Absence 
Sample = Full-Time Workers 
Independent 
Variables 
chrs 
overtime ban 
t 
married 
female 
female*married 
-absence 
tenure 
tenure2 
constant 
end pointo(4fo)3 
end point I (Wý)" 
Number Of 
Observations 
Unbalanced Panel of Data 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
T-Ratio 
-0-0196 -2.1219** 
0.1385E-01 0.4742 
0.1943 2.3551** 
0.8395E-01 0.5443 
0.167 1 E-0 1 0.1542 
0.1999 1.6561* 
-0.1356 -0.7914 
4.6066 7.8422*** 
-0.3019E-02 -0.1491 
0.1293E-03 0.2227 
-0.0331 -1.4275 
0.4042E-03 1.4991 
-5.3738 -3.9930*** 
0.1691 4.8207*** 
O. OOOOE+00 I 
120106 
Balanced Panel of Data 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
T-Ratio 
-0.0198 - 1.9402* 
0.59404E-02 0.1800 
0.1817 2.0619** 
0.2170 1.1015 
0.9827E-01 0.7925 
0.1523 1.1361 
-0.1915 -1.0248 
4.7188 7.3503*** 
-0.9824E-02 -0.4064 
0.3331E-03 0.4743 
-0.0299 -1.1062 
0.3593E-03 1.1557 
-5.2399 -3.4439*** 
0.1639 4.3878*** 
O. OOOOE+00 
107952 
The estimated end point parameters can be used to estimate the proportion of stayers in either 
state zero or state one. The estimated proportion of perfect attenders characterised by di, always 
equal to zero is as follows: 
PO 
I+ vo + V, 
Thus, p,, for the unbalanced panel of data equals 0.144 and for the balanced panel of data equals 
0.141. 
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Table A5.2: Logistic-Normal Mixture Model: 
Dependent Variable = Weekly Absence 
Sample = All Workers 
Unbalanced Panel of Data Balanced Panel of Data 
Independent 
Variables 
Estimated 
Coefficient 
T-Ratio Estimated 
Coefficient 
T-Ratio 
weekly wage -0.3616E-02 -1.6542* -0.6804E-02 -2.3386** 
full - time -0.4063 -3.2265*** -0.4200 -2.7617*** 
permanent -0.6309 -9.7623*** -0.1844 -1.4806 
married -0.1253 -1.0678 -0.1630 -1.0815 
female 0.2273 3.0993*** 0.1976 1.7933* 
female*married -0.1324 -1.0148 -0.2433 -1.4275 
lag-absence 
I 
0.6944 16.6397*** 0.7655 12.0074*** 
tenure -0.0606 -4.7363*** -0.0125 -0.8499 
tenure2 0.1487E-02 3.2229*** -0.1085E-04 -0.0232 
age -0.0430 -3.2613*** -0.0491 -2.4381** 
age2 0.4976E-03 2.6981*** 0.5480E-03 2.1309** 
constant -1.7344 -6.52128*** -2.6483 -6.6005*** 
end point 0 
(Nf 
0)4 0.3070E-01 2.4464015** 0.66231E-01 3.0869*** 
end point 1 (Vj) 0.87223E-03 0.9667062 O. OOOOE+00 
Number Of 
Observations I 
91576 
I 
66759 
I 
It should be stressed, however, that there is a major shortcoming with the logistic- 
normal mixture regression model which concerns the fact that if the distributional 
specification for f (E) is incorrect, then the estimates derived from the model may 
be inconsistent [Barmby et al (1991b)]. Thus, the analysis presented in this 
Appendix should be regarded as illustrative rather than definitive, with the aim 
being to explore the robustness of the results presented in Tables 5.6 and 5.7. To 
summarise, it appears from this analysis that the characteristics of the 
employment contract are relatively important determinants of absence behaviour. 
4 The estimated proportion of perfect attenders characterised. by dit always equal to zero is equal 
to 0.029 for the unbalanced panel of data and 0.062 for the balanced panel of data. 
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Chapter 6: Absenteeism, On-the-Job Search and Quit 
Behaviour 
6.1 Introduction 
The empirical results presented in Table 5.7 of the previous Chapter suggest that 
differences exist between the absence behaviour of workers employed under 
permanent contracts and of those workers employed under temporary contracts. To 
be sure, the results indicate that individuals who are employed under a permanent 
contract are significantly less prone to absence than their temporary counterparts, 
the absence rate (i. e. days absent as a proportion of total work time) for each type 
of worker being 0.021 and 0.038 respectively. 1 
It is interesting to explore such differences from the view point of job search 
theory. As highlighted in the introductory Chapter of this Thesis, economists have, 
in general, modelled absence behaviour within the neo-classical labour supply 
framework. Recently, however, attempts have been made to analyse absence from 
the worker discipline view point according to which voluntary absence on the part 
of the worker attracts a penalty if detected. A major distinction between this and the 
conventional approach concerns the role of the wage rate. In the labour supply 
framework an increase in the wage generates conflicting income and substitution 
effects whereas, according to efficiency wage considerations, a wage increase 
unambiguously reduces absence. Furthermore, efficiency wage considerations 
introduce the effects of expected unemployment duration, a prominent feature of job 
search theory, into the realm of absence behaviour [Drago and Wooden (1992)]. 
Allen (1981a) analyses the fusion of the labour supply model and the job 
search model from a purely descriptive and speculative view point. He argues that if 
some degree of absence is a 'by-product' of job search activity, then higher wages 
will clearly reduce the chance of finding a better opportunity elsewhere which, in 
turn, would imply a moderating effect on absence - the result postulated by the 
efficiency wage approach. Hence, within this framework higher wages and longer 
expected unemployment duration concur to reduce absence. 
Drago and Wooden (1992), who analyse absence behaviour using self- 
reported survey data, include a dummy variable in their analysis which equals one if 
'the individual perceives the availability of alternative employment opportunities to 
1 It is important to analyse, the labour market behaviour of temporary workers since there has been 
a dramatic increase in temporary employment over the last decade [Golden and Appelbaum (1992) 
and Dale and Bamford (1988)]. One explanation for this rise lies in the claim that temporary 
employment contracts enhance the flexibility of the firm over the business cycle [see Pollert 
(1988) for further discussion of this issue]. 
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be good'. This is regarded as a proxy for the expected duration of unemployment. 
As predicted by both efficiency wage and job search considerations, the estimated 
coefficient for this variable is found to be positive and significant, lending support 
to both hypotheses. Such findings suggest that a fruitful line of enquiry may be to 
examine the inter-relationship between absence behaviour and job search at a more 
formal level. 
This Chapter is set out as follows. Given the impact of job search behaviour 
on quits, the following Section sets out some background issues relating to these 
two activities. Section 6.3 introduces the theoretical model analysed in this Chapter 
and motivates the salient features of the model. Section 6.4 explores the empirical 
relationship between quit rates and absence behaviour using a panel of firm-level 
data. Section 6.5 concludes with a discussion on policy implications and avenues 
for further research. 
6.2 Background 
On-the-job search and quit behaviour have been modelled extensively in the 
economic literature as a means for workers to counteract dissatisfaction with current 
employment contracts. Mobility between jobs has attracted attention from both 
theorists and empiricists. Empirical evidence suggests that on-the-job search is an 
important phenomenon; analyses by Mattila (1974) and Clark and Summers (1979), 
for example, suggest that 50-60% of employees who change jobs secure their 
future jobs prior to leaving their current employer. Layard et al (199 1) report the 
results of Daniel (1983) who analyses a cohort survey; one-third of the participants 
said that they continued to engage in job search after finding employment. 
Furthermore, three-quarters of those who conducted on-the-job search changed job. 
According to some of the respondents, job offers are often accepted as a 'stop-gap' 
since they provide a more secure base than unemployment from which to obtain a 
more satisfactory job-match. 
Similarly, Pissarides and Wadsworth (1994) remark that voluntary job 
quitting accounts for the majority of labour turnover with job-to-job changes 
accounting for approximately two-thirds of job quits. Moreover, such decisions are 
rational on the part of job seekers in the context of the evidence presented by Layard 
et al (1991) which suggests that employed job seekers obtain job offers at a faster 
rate than their unemployed counterparts despite the fact that the unemployed have 
more time available to devote to search activities. The suggestion that search is more 
effective if employed may be due to employers discriminating against unemployed 
job seekers. A survey analysed by Meager and Metcalf (1987) indicated that one- 
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half of employers regarded unemployment as an undesirable characteristic of an 
applicant. 
It is apparent, therefore, that interdependencies exist between quit behaviour 
and on-the-job search both of which have implications for job tenure. It has been 
established empirically that the probability of quitting a job declines as tenure 
increases [references include Marshall and Zarkin (1987), BorJas and Rosen (1980) 
and Mincer and Jovanovic (198 1)]. Thus, it is not surprising that job tenure is an 
important determinant of on-the-job search with a negative relationship between 
tenure and the incentive to engage in job search. Pissarides and Wadsworth (1994) 
find evidence which supports this hypothesis, on-the-job search being very low 
amongst full-time employees with long tenure. 
The decline in quit rates with respect to tenure may be due to the positive 
relationship between wages and tenure. One explanation for this latter alliance may 
lie in the accumulation of a worker's firm specific human capital over time with the 
causality running from tenure to remuneration [see, for example, Becker (1962)]. 
Job search theories, however, suggest the opposite causal relationship with a high 
relative wage reducing an individual's propensity to quit. Burdett (1978), for 
example, presents a theory of optimal wage search in which some employed 
workers search. If these workers receive an offer which is superior to their existing 
employment contract they will quit. Clearly, the higher is the individual's current 
wage, the more likely it is that he/she will remain with the current employer. 
The association between tenure and turnover has also been explained by the 
existence of a 'productivity effect' intrinsic to the match of worker and firm with the 
value of any particular match imperfectly observed by both parties [Flinn (1986)]. 
As tenure increases both the worker and the fin-n gain more knowledge regarding 
the match. The accumulation of information is typically modelled as a Baysian 
learning process which is characterised by the property that additional infon-nation 
leads to ever declining revisions in the posterior evaluation of the quality match. 
Thus, turnover is more likely to occur at low tenure levels when received 
information leads to relatively larger revisions in the estimated quality match. 
A similar approach is adopted by Wilde (1980) and Lippman and McCall 
(1978) according to which workers learn about characteristics of the job after 
accepting the offer of employment. If the value of such characteristics is low 
enough, the worker quits. Clearly, non-wage job characteristics such as working 
conditions may affect turnover in this way [Viscusi (1979)]. It is apparent that job 
search is unlikely to yield much information on such aspects of the employment 
relationship. Hence, in order to ascertain such conditions the searcher will have to 
accept the job and observe what transpires. Holmlund and Lang (1985), who 
explore the relation between quits and tenure by incorporating an element of 
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learning into their model, assume uncertainty regarding non-wage characteristics 
within a search framework. The non-wage characteristics can only be evaluated 
from job experience. If the non-wage characteristics turn out to be 'satisfactory' the 
individual will remain with the employer whilst if this is not the case the individual 
will engage in further job search. Holmlund and Lang demonstrate how the 
probability of quitting falls as tenure rises with wage rates held constant, since 
individuals with longer tenure are more likely to be those who found the non-wage 
2 attributes 'satisfactory'. 
To summarise, an individual will accept an offer of employment if the 
expected utility from the contract exceeds that from alternative options. If the 
contract is such that the individual is over-employed if he/she accepts the contract 
then the following lines of action may be taken. The individual may go absent in 
order to supply an amount of labour which is in 
, 
accordance with that which 
maximises his/her utility. The individual may also engage in job search in order to 
find a contract which implies a higher level of utility. If an individual has accepted a 
job offer then 'on-the-job' search may be undertaken. Furthermore, an employee 
may absent himself/herself from the workplace in order to engage in job search. If 
3 this is the case, then absence behaviour may precede the quit decision. 
Burke and Wilcox (1972) explore the notion that a spate of absences may 
precede the decision to quit. As argued by Johns and Nicholson (1982) the extent to 
which this may be the case depends on factors such as the opportunities for 
alternative employment, which will determine the individual's perceived benefits of 
job search. Furthermore, the extent to which job search can be performed at work 
will determine the observed pattern of behaviour: 
... the likelihood of absence preceding the act of quitting will 
depend 
partly on job search opportunities in one's present job (e. g. access to a 
telephone). [Johns and Nicholson (1982), p. 149]. 
It is apparent that on-the-job search may not be possible for some workers. 
Production workers, for example, typically have little or no access to facilities such 
as telephones. Faced with such constraints an individual may go absent in order to 
search 'off-the-job'. Since sick pay is generally greater than unemployment benefit, 
2 Datcher (1982), however, analyses how knowing someone at the place of employment before 
being hired provides information about the workplace which is difficult to determine prior to 
hiring. Such information may improve the quality of match between individuals and jobs and, 
thereby, lower the probability of quit behaviour. 
3 Reza (1974) remarks that '... employees have the option of quitting their jobs or to practise 
absenteeism if they are dissatisfied with their employer's requests. ' [Reza (1975), p. 2381. The 
latter action is ignored by Georgellis (1994) who analyses the implications of non-wage attributes 
for tenure. Georgellis assumes that any deviation between desired and actual hours of work leads to 
job dissatisfaction which in turn leads to workers quitting their jobs and, therefore, implicitly 
ignores the option of absenteeism. 
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sick pay may in fact be serving to subsidise off-the-job search activities. Such 
behaviour would indeed imply that a spell of absences will precede the quit 
decision. 
It is apparent that the extent to which an individual has an incentive to 
engage in off-the-job search when absent is influenced by a number of factors. 
Kenyon and Dawkins (1989), for example, comment that the composition of the 
work force may have important implications for absenteeism: 
... younger workers turn over jobs more frequently and job search might be undertaken off-the-job through labour absence. [Kenyon and Dawkins 
(1989), p. 235]. 
In terms of search theory, relatively inexperienced, younger workers are more 
likely to engage in 'job-hopping' in an attempt to find their most preferred match. 
Although on-the-job search is certainly feasible, it may be rather more problematic 
for younger, less tenured workers [Layard et al (1991)]. Moreover, it has been 
argued that the individuals most likely to conduct off-the-Job search are those, such 
as the relatively low paid young, with relatively high replacement ratios [Joll et al 
(1983)]. Indeed, the costs of searching for such workers will be generally small, 
with low foregone wages and long potential income streams to successful matches. 
The economic climate may also affect an individual's incentive to engage in 
job search. Chaudhury and Ng (1992) point out that during a recession workers 
may absent themselves less often on account of the increased perceived costs of 
dismissal. On the other hand, workers may predict future lay offs. Hence workers 
may go absent more frequently in order to search for alternative, more secure, 
employment. 
Job search and quit behaviour have been modelled extensively in the 
economic literature as a means for workers to counteract dissatisfaction with 
employment contracts. Likewise, absence behaviour should be recognised as a 
symptom of dissatisfaction with the employment contract since it implies a degree 
of mismatch between the employment contact and the individual's 'ideal' or utility 
maximising strategy. Absenteeism should, therefore, be analysed within the 
broader context of the manifestation of worker behaviour which is a consequence of 
dissatisfaction with contractual requirements. Kenyon and Dawkins (1989) argue 
that absenteeism is a warning of job dissatisfaction, and may be regarded as a 
substitute for industrial action or, indeed, a signal for future industrial unrest. This 
hypothesis is tested by the inclusion of a variable representing working days lost 
per worker due to industrial disputes. This variable is found to exert a significant 
Positive effect on absence. 
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In a similar vein, Hyman (1972) regards absenteeism and turnover as forms 
of industrial conflict along with other forms of conflict such as strikes and go- 
slows. Absenteeism and turnover, however, are regarded as 'unorganised' conflicts 
where the worker takes action as an individual. This is suggestive of an inverse 
relationship between 'organised' and 'unorganised' conflict since they may be 
regarded as substitutes. 4 It is apparent that workers may, in the short term, turn to 
absenteeism as a means to counteract dissatisfaction with contracts. In the long 
term, however, workers may take collective industrial action in order to deal with 
their dissatisfaction. 
In the field of applied psychology much research has been undertaken into 
the relationship between job performance and job retention [See Kanfer et al 
(1988)]. 5 Absence behaviour has been regarded as one determinant of performance 
assessment. Keller (1984) and Stumpf and Dawley (1981), for example, conduct 
studies of clerical and professional turnover and found that 'stayers' were less 
prone to absence than 'leavers'. The basic premise behind such studies relies on the 
existence of a progression of behavioural withdrawal from absenteeism to turnover. 
Rosse (1988) explores the progression of this 'withdrawal hypothesis', according 
to which an individual may exhibit a hierarchical sequence of withdrawal - 
specifically lateness to absence to quitting. The hypothesis was tested by comparing 
the conditional probability of subsequent behaviour given the past behavioural 
record. The results suggest a simple progression from lateness to absence, whilst 
turnover progression only occurred after multiple absence or lateness. 
Kanfer et al (1988) conduct an investigation into the relationship between 
performance and retention at different levels of tenure. The relationship between 
performance and retention was found to be of greater significance at inten-nediate 
levels of training i. e. after an initial level of training. These results were consistent 
with those of Ferris and Rowland (1987), the basic hypothesis being that as 
workers learn more about job and working conditions, they are more likely to 
respond to organisational influences such as absence control mechanisms. 
There are, however, critics of the withdrawal approach who argue that 
absenteeism and turnover reflect two distinct and unique types of behaviour and 
which should, therefore, be analysed as separate phenomena [see, for example, 
Steers and Mowday (1981) and Price and Mueller (19801. Indeed, the positive 
relationship between absenteeism and turnover, as hypothesised by the withdrawal 
4 Turnbull and Sapsford (1992) explore the relationship between absenteeism and other 
forms of 
industrial conflict for British dock workers. The evidence suggests that strikes, absence and other 
fOrrns of conflict were 'additive' as opposed to 'alternative' ways of expressing 
dissatisfaction. 
5 11, the seminal paper by Steers and Rhodes (1978), for example, tenure was included 
as an 
influence on absence behaviour. 
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approach, has not been universally accepted. Absenteeism has been regarded as an 
alternative to turnover which implies a negative association between these two types 
of behaviour [see, for example, Fitzgibbons and Moch (1980)]. In addition, 
absence may increase only after a decision to quit has been made [Farell and 
Peterson (1984)]. 
Mitra et al (1992) adopt a meta-analytic approach in order to determine 
whether or not absence behaviour and turnover should be analysed on a joint basis. 
Their empirical results indicate a positive relationship between absenteeism and 
turnover which suggests support for the withdrawal hypothesis. Despite such 
debates one should note that the applied psychology literature, in contrast to the 
economics literature, has identified the importance of a link between absence 
behaviour and turnover. It should be stressed, however, that although the applied 
psychology literature has recognised this link it may have suffered from the lack of 
formal theoretical foundations (recall Section 2.3.2, Chapter 2). 
In this Chapter the implications of job search for absence behaviour are 
analysed adopting a partial equilibrium approach in order to highlight the interaction 
between these types of worker behaviour which to date have been analysed as 
separate phenomena. The interaction between absence behaviour and job search is 
analysed within a two-period framework in the context of two distinct employment 
contracts; a single-period 'temporary' employment contract and a two-period 
6permanent' employment contract. In the case of employment under the temporary 
contract, the individual is aware of when the contract ends and this knowledge may 
serve to encourage job search prior to the expiration of the contract [see Burgess 
and Low (1992) who discover that pre-unemployment search propensities are 
higher in groups where notice was given than in groups where no notice was 
given]. In the case of employment under the permanent contract outlined in Section 
6.3 below, the individual has already secured employment for the following period. 
The undertaking of job search in such a context is, therefore, more akin to the 
Burdett (1978) model where, if the costs of search are outweighed by the perceived 
benefits, the individual will seek a more attractive contract and, if such a contract is 
discovered, will quit the current job. 
6.3 The Interaction Between Absenteeism and job Search 
6.3.1 Introduction 
The aim of this Section is to explore the theoretical implications of job search for an 
individual's absence behaviour in the context of a two period model; period one 
represents the present and period two represents the future. Individuals are 
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assumed, for simplicity, to be risk neutral with utility functions of the following 
form: 
Ui= (I - ori)ci + ai 
(ii) where i=1,2 
where i represents the time subscript, ci represents consumption in period i, 1, 
represents leisure in pefiod i and (Tj represents an index of sickness in period i. 
Utility is assumed to be increasing with respect to consumption and leisure and 
decreasing with respect to sickness. 6 As has been the case throughout this Thesis, 
individuals are assumed to value leisure (consumption) more (less) the sicker they 
are. 
In Section 6.3.2 the analysis is firstly concerned with a worker who is 
employed in period one under a single period 'temporary' contract. This contract 
specifies that the individual is employed by the firm in period one with wage it,, 
sick pay s and contractual hours h where w>s. Sick pay is assumed to be set at 
some minimum level, s, exogenously deten-nined by the government (such as 
statutory sick pay). Once period one has commenced, the individual has two 
decisions to make; whether to attend work or not and whether to engage in job 
search or not. In the following Sections the aim of the analysis is to demonstrate the 
interaction which exists between these two decisions. 
For simplicity, it is assumed that on-the-job search is not possible. As 
mentioned in Section 6.2, this may be a plausible assumption to make in the case of 
production workers. It is further assumed that if the individual does not devote any 
resources to job search, then he/she will not receive an offer of employment in 
period two. Such an approach is also adopted by Amott et al (1988) who assume 
that a worker cannot effortlessly receive an offer of employment. It seems plausible 
to assume that in order to receive a job offer the individual must make some 
sacrifice. This may entail sacrificing some non-work time in order to, for example, 
complete an application form or attend a job interview. Similarly Ito (1988), in a 
1'rarnework where search and quit decisions are endogenously derived, assumes that 
Outside opportunities are revealed to the worker only after costly on-the-job 
search. 7 
Search intensity is denoted by r. For simplicity, r is assumed to be a 
discrete variable which equals either 0 or a where a represents the proportion of 
611, the case of the form of utility function specified in (6.1) a necessaý, and sufficient condition fol at'00<0 is C>I. 7 In contrast, Kahn (1985) assumes that outside opportunities are revealed to the 
individual 
ývithOut search costs. 
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non-work time devoted to job search activities. 8 Table 6.1 below presents a detailed 
inventory of the relationship between search costs and the probability of specific 
outcomes: 9 
FTýable 
6.1: Search Intensity and the Successful and Unsuccessful Probability of Search 
Ir prob(U2 = U2"') prob(U2 
U2unP 
a 0 (1 - 
0 0 1 
where U, "' 
(Uu"P) represents the level of utility available to the individual in period 
two from employment (unemployment) and P (I - P) represents the probability of 
ernployment (unemployment) given r=a(, r = 0). 
The individual is assumed to choose his/her search intensity in period one 
given the probability of obtaining employment in period 2. Search is assumed to be 
costly in terms of leisure and hence reduces current period utility [ (dU, Idr) <01. If 
the individual decides to search when absent in period one then utility in period one 
will be reduced, i. e. the costs of search are incurred in period one whilst any 
potential benefits will be reaped in period two. If the individual employed under a 
single period contract in period one goes absent and chooses to devote resources to 
job search, then utility in period one will be as follows: 
UJA lr=a 
= (I - al)s + a, (1 - a)T (6.2) 
It is apparent from Equation (6.2) that utility in period one falls as the value of a 
increases. Moreover, the higher is the realisation of sickness, the greater is the 
reduction in utility caused by an increase in a. Intuitively this makes sense, as an 
individual becomes sicker the greater is the fall in utility experienced as he/she 
devotes non-work time to job search as opposed to recuperation. It seems 
Particularly plausible to assume that off-the-job search is costly in terms of leisure 
as opposed to income since individuals who are absent or unemployed are relatively 
well-off in terms of leisure time but are relatively poor in terms of income. 10 Hencc 
8 SiInilarly, Ito (1988) models search intensity as an all or nothing decision. 9 The event 'being offered a contract' can be regarded as a random variable with a 
binomial 
distribution where the number of trials is one, i. e. only one search is undertaken and the worker 
is 
eoncemed with the probability of a single success. 10 EmPirical evidence analysed by Layard et al (1991) indicates that the majority Of unemploYCd 
PMPIC spend relatively small amounts of money on job search. 
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due to the assumed diminishing marginal utility of leisure and income an absentee 
will experience a smaller decrease in utility by giving up an hour of non-work time 
than if he/she incurred the equivalent cost in terrns of money. 
Sections 6.3.2 and 6.3.3 below explore how the individual's absence 
decision in period one is affected by the possible future consequences of the 
individual's decision to attend work in period one and the individual's decision to 
devote resources to job search, if absent, in period one. Once period one starts the 
individual knows the value of a,, the realisation. of sickness in period one, and the 
nature of the probability density function of or,, f (c72). For simplicity, the 
realisation of sickness in both periods is assumed to be determined by f (ari) which 
represents the uniforrn distribution: 
1 
(dri) = 
10 o< Ci <1 
otherwise 
(6.3) 
As soon as period two begins, the individual knows the value of a2. Hence, the 
analysis collapses to the single period case. 
6.3.2 Case One: The Nature of a Job Offer is Known with Certainty 
In order to make his/her absence decision the individual uses the concept of the 
reservation sickness level. The reservation sickness level in period one is defined as 
the value of or, such that utility from attending work in period one plus expected 
utility in period two conditional on attendance and, therefore, no job search in 
period one, is equal to utility from absenting oneself in period one plus the expected 
utility in period two conditional on going absent and engaging in job search in 
period one. In this Section the implications for the reservation sickness level if the 
individual chooses r=a in period one are analysed. Given that attendance in 
period one precludes the possibility of job search and, therefore, guarantees 
unemployment in period 2, the reservation sickness level, a. is the value of (71 1 
lr=a' 
such that: 
a, (T - h) +(I 
)E[U2" 
*lr=a) 
I+p 
a)T+ 
1 E[U2searrh 
r--a)]S 
+ 
(a, IT-a )(I 
I+pI 
(6.4) 
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where 
E[U2"arch ] is the expected utility available to the individual in period 2 given 
search in period 1. Equation (6.4) can be rearranged as follows: 
w-s+ 
I )IE[U2P] 
- E[ 
U2,, arch 
+p 
al*lr=a 
w-s+h-aT 
(6.5) 
where p represents the individual's subjective rate of time preference. 
The reservation sickness level is defined as the value of (TI such that the 
expected lifetime utility from attendance in period one is equal to the expected 
lifetime utility from absence in period one. This pivotal level of sickness is used as 
the absence decision making rule. If (T, is greater than the reservation sickness level 
then the individual maximises utility by being absent and engaging in job search 
activities, i. e. the individual places relatively more weight on leisure time as 
opposed to income. If (7, is less than the reservation sickness level then the 
individual maximises utility by attending work since the individual places relatively 
more weight on income as opposed to leisure. In the context of this model, the 
individual is assumed to face an either/or decision regarding attendance. Once the 
individual has decided to attend work, he/she is not able to adjust the amount of 
labour supplied. 
It is assumed that contractual hours exceed the proportion of time devoted to 
job search activities (i. e. h> aT). 11 It is also assumed that s>b where b 
represents unemployment benefit. 12 In Equations (6.4) and (6.5), 
E[U2 P] 
represents the expected utility in period two if the individual does not engage in job 
search in period one - that is, the expected utility of unemployment in period two. 
search ] represents the expected utility in period two if the individual Similarly, E[U2 
devotes resources to job search in period one. Expected utility in period two is 
assumed to be discounted at the individual's subjective rate of time preference, p- 
If a job offer is made, expected utility in period two is expressed as a weighted 
average of the expected utility of an attender and the expected utility of an absentee 
where the weights are the probability that (72 < (72 and the probability that 
(1"2 ýý 6' 
11 This may be a plausible assumption to make since empirical evidence presented by Layard et al 
(1991) indicates that there is a skewed frequency distribution of search intensity with the majontly 
of individuals spending relatively little time searching for a job. 12 This also seems a plausible assumption to make. If weekly earnings are in excess of 
f 58. for 
exaMple, statutory sick pay is equal to f52.50 per week whereas unemployment 
benefit I-or an 
indn'idual of 15 years and over is f44.65 per week. For individuals under the age of 
25, 
unemPloyment benefit is set at an even lower level. 
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respectively, where q2 represents the reservation sickness level in pefiod m, o, 13 
The individual is assumed to evaluate the expected value of consumption and leisure 
in the case of attendance and absence using the conditional probability distributions 
to determine the expected value of a2. In the case of an absentee the expected value 
0f ar2, conditional on q2 being between a2 and one, is substituted into the utility 
function. Conversely, to determine the expected utility of attending work the 
expected value of c2, conditional on (72 being between 0 and U2 , is used. Hence, 4 search ] and E[U2`] can be expressed as follows: U2 
E[ U2, earch 
]= PIE[U2eP]l + (I - 
P)JE[U2P]l 
(6.6) 
where: 
_(a 
* 
2W+ (72 E[U2"'] =1 
*)(T-h) 
+ C2 22 
*)T 
(6.7) f 
U2 
G2 
)]s 
11 
22 
W-S 
U2 = 
w-s+h 
(6.8) 
E[U2""P] 
)[b 
+ T] (6.9) 
2 
search The expected utility function E[U2 is based on the premise that if an '3 
employment contract is offered it will specify with certainty wage w, sick pay s 
and contractual hours h. This implies that there is no risk regarding the 
characteristics of the contract, an assumption that is relaxed in Section 6.3.3. This 
simple specification of the model, however, serves to demonstrate some of the 
important implications of job search for absenteeism. Substituting Equations (6.6), 
(6.7), (6.8) and (6.9) into Equation (6.5) yields the following: 
(Tl* 
I 
W-S+ 
Ih- 
aT)[(w - 
s) - (I +P) 
(6.10) 
13 Note that if no search is undertaken in period one then the period one resen, ation sickness level, 
Ori*jr=O, will be equal to Equation (6.8), i. e. C. *I, 
=o 
= C2*' 
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where: 
(s - b)(-h) + (w - b)(s - w) 
2(s -w- h) 
(6.11) 
From Equations (6.10) and (6.11), it becomes apparent that incorporating the effect 
of the individual's current decisions on the future, 00, serves to reduce the 
reservation sickness level relative to that of a single period scenario and hence, in 
the context of this model, make absence more likely. 14 If the difference between the 
income received in period one when attending work and that received when absent, 
net of search costs, is less than 00 / (I + p), the discounted difference between 
expected utility if unemployed in period two and expected utility in period two if job 
search is undertaken in period one weighted by the probability of successful search, 
then or, I 
r=a 
will be negative which means that the individual will never attend work 
in period one. On the other hand, the costs of job search represented by aT exert a 
positive effect on the reservation sickness level and raise the probability of 
attendance. 
The existence of two contrasting effects makes it interesting to explore the 
comparative statics of cy, *l r=a 
in order to determine how the probability of absence 
is affected by the relative costs and benefits of job search. The differential specified 
in Equation (6.12) demonstrates how an increase in P, the probability of receiving 
a job offer in period two, affects the reservation sickness level: 
I 
r=a) 
= -[ 
61 1 
-: ý 0v .1E [0,1] (6.12) do (I+p)(w-s+h-aT) al r=a 
Clearly, an increase in 0 decreases the reservation sickness level i. e. if the 
probability of receiving a job offer increases with the cost of search held constant at 
aT, then this increases the expected benefits of job search and, therefore, makes 
absence more likely. 
14 As mentioned at the start of this Section the analysis presented holds for the case when r=a. 
Ille individual will choose to search when absent if the expected gains from search are outweighed 
by the costs of search incurred in period one: 
E Usearch 
]-E[U"P]- 00 
>crl(l-a)T= 
(UAII. 
= 0)_(UA 
ý2 
(1 + P) II 
Ir 
=c 
ti e the If the above condition holds then the individual will maximise, the sum of u lity ov r two I Ys Periods when absent in period one by devoting resources to job search. A critical 
level of s ckne , 
can be derived where the costs of search equal the expected benefits: 
a, = 
fle 
' (I + p)(I - a)T' 
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Similarly the effect of an increase in a, the fraction of leisure time devoted to 
search with P held constant is demonstrated below: 
d( I+p all 
(W S) 
-I 
v E[O, I --I 
>0a (6.13) da (w -s+h- aT)' 
Equation (6.13) illustrates that an increase in cc raises the reservation sickness level 
and, therefore, reduces the probability of absence. An increase in a increases the 
costs of search associated with the expected benefits of search held constant. Since 
the costs of search rise, the impetus to go absent in order to search off the job is 
reduced, hence, the probability of attendance rises. 
The differential below illustrates how the reservation sickness level is 
influenced by an increase in p, the individual's subjective rate of time preference: 
fie 
[0,1] 
d lr=a 
=>0 IV 1* 
lr=a 
dp 
_(I 
+p)'(w -s +h - aT)] 
oll 
It is apparent from Equation (6.14) that an increase in the individual's rate of time 
preference serves to increase the reservation sickness level and, therefore, to reduce 
the probability of absence. An increase in p implies that the individual attaches 
more importance to the costs of job search incurred in the present pefiod and less to 
the expected future benefits. 
The relationship between P and a may be explored in more detail. The 
total derivative of the reservation sickness level defined by Equation (6.15) below is 
set equal to zero in order to illustrate how an increase in P must be compensated by 
an increase in a in order to keep the reservation sickness level constant. 
d(* d( ý*j da, * La- 
(71 
lr=a) 
da+- 
a, r=a) do =0 (6.15) da do 
Condition (6.15) can be rearranged to yield: 
do 
Tad., 
*I, 
=. 
=0 
dal I 
r=a 
da 
dp 
a, d 
*Ir=a 
T[(l + p)(w - s) - PO] 
I 
lr=a 
ý= 
--Vaý 
[0,1] 
- 
O(w -s+h- aT)' 
(6.16) 
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it is apparent that the individual is choosing between two alternatives; devoting no 
time to job search which, therefore, implies no prospect of employment in period 
two and buying a probability of a job offer, 0, at a price aT. Condition (6.16) 
indicates that a locus of pairs of 
(P, a) exists which hold the reservation sickness 
level constant. This locus is upwards sloping illustrating how an increase in P must 
be accompanied by an increase in a in order to hold the reservation sickness level 
constant. Further infori-nation regarding the shape of the locus can be extracted from 
the following second derivative: 
d 2ß T2+ p)(w - s) - 
ßo] 
da2 da, 1, 
=. 
=O 
O(w -s+h- aT) 
2> 
() (T, 
r=a 
EE [0, l] 
Hence, Equation (6.17) demonstrates that the slope of the locus is increasing with 
respect to a implying a convex relationship between a and 0- Figure 6.1 below 
illustrates the nature of the locus. 
Thus, the locus of combinations of a and P which maintain a constant reservation 
sickness level becomes steeper as a increases. Intuitively, increasingly larger 
expected benefits to search are required to compensate for successive increments 
in 
current period search costs. 
Clearly in terms of the benefits to search specified in this Section an 
individual employed under a two period contract specifying vv, s and 
h in each 
Period would not benefit from search in period one. If search was undertaken there 
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Figure 6.1: The P -a Trade-Off 
would be no expected gain to offset the costs incurred in period one. Hence, a 
worker employed under such a two period contract has no incentive to devote 
resources to job search when absent from work in period one. An individual 
employed under such a two period contract would determine the value of the 
reservation sickness level in period one, cl*l, =O, 
assuming T=0 for all values of 
q,. Since absence behaviour in period one does not affect expected utility in period 
two, then the reservation sickness level in period one reduces t a* 02 
In the context of the model described in this Section, the analysis illustrates 
firstly how the potential benefits of search affect the absence behaviour of workers 
employed in period one under a contract which lasts for one period; the potential net 
benefits of job search serve to raise the probability of absence. Assuming that on- 
the-job search is ruled out and that sick pay is greater than unemployment benefit, 
sick pay serves to subsidise off-the-job search and, hence, to increase the incentive 
to absent from the work place. Moreover, the individual will only engage in job 
search if his/her value of sickness exceeds the reservation sickness level despite the 
fact that the employment contract expires prior to the following period. The absence 
of search leads to unemployment in the future. This is in accordance with the 
analysis of Burgess and Low (1992) which indicates that whether advance notice 
stimulates pre- unemployment search is still dependent on factors such as length of 
notice, unemployment benefit and the relative efficiency of employed versus 
unemployed search. 15 In terms of the theoretical framework developed here some 
employees will not search with advance notice of job loss. Burgess and Low 
(1992) also find that higher unemployment benefit significantly reduces pre- 
unemployment search for men. Similarly, in the model described in this Section, 
higher unemployment benefit in the future would increase the current period 
reservation sickness level, making current search less likely. Workers employed 
under a two period contract, however, do not have an incentive to engage in search 
activities since expected gains to search do not exist. 
6.3.3 Case Two: The Nature of a Job Offer is Subject to Risk 
In Section 6.3.2 the individual, when embarking on search activities, faces only 
one type of risk in addition to that regarding health realisations. This is the risk 
concerning whether an offer of employment will be made. It was implicitly 
assumed that if an offer is forthcoming then the characteristics of the offer, the 
15 See Burgess and Low (1992) for a critique of the early studies of advance notice which generall) 
assume that on-the-job search is only conducted by notified workers who immediately start 
to 
search after notification. 
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vvage, sick pay and contractual hours, will be known with certainty. This is clearly 
an unrealistic assumption to make; there may be a range of possible wages, for 
example, which search may yield. The analysis presented below assumes that the 
individual faces risk regarding the wage specified in a given job offer. Both sick 
pay and contractual hours are assumed to be known with certainty, the former being 
set at the statutory minimum s and the latter at the technologically constant h. 16 
With respect to contractual hours the number of potential employment contracts 
faced by an individual is typically relatively low, i. e. workers generally face a 
choice between either full-time or part-time hours. Hence, the assumption of 
certainty with respect to contractual hours may be plausible in some areas of 
employment. 
If the individual chooses r =a, then the wage specified in potential 
employment contracts is denoted by a random variable, o), with a discrete 
distribution such that: 
if an offer is made then prob(co = w) = (I - rl) 
prob(co = i7v) = 71 
(6.18) 
where ýv- > w. The relatively high wage, ýv-, represents the maximum value of 0), 
i. e. the individual does not expect to be offered a wage in excess of Hence, 
there is a chance that an individual who devotes resources to search in period one 
may be offered the maximum wage in period two. This may give workers 
employed under the two-period contract an incentive to engage in search in period 
one since the two period contract is assumed to be characterised by the relatively 
low wage, w. 
The analysis below first explores the implications of specifying a discrete 
distribution of potential wage offers for the absence behaviour of a worker 
employed under the single period contract in period one who chooses to search in 
- CO period one when absent. The reservation sickness level, I, is defined 
arl 
lr=a 
implicitly as the value of sickness such that utility in period one from attendance 
plus expected utility in period two conditional on attendance in period one is equal 
to utility from absence in period one plus expected utility in period two conditional 
on being absent in period one and engaging in job search in period one: 
16 This assumption is made for simplicity. If the wage rate and contractual hours are both random 
Variables, the question arises as to whether they are jointly or independently dist-ributed. 
The 
POssibility of tied wage-hours packages implies that these variables should be regarded as jointly 
distributed, i. e. a high wage may compensate for a rigid hours constraint which serves to over- 
employ an individual and vice versa [see Lundberg (1984)). 
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h) + 
I+p 
E[U2P 
searchl ýl 
-(* 
)]s 
+( a)T + 
1+p)E[U2 
all. 
r= 
a, 
r= 
5 
If the individual chooses to search in period one when absent then expected utility 
in period two will be as follows: 
searchl E[U2 flT7JE[U2eP(i7v)]j + fl(I - ? 7)jE[U2"P(w)]j + 
(I 
-P)JE[U'P (6.20) 2 
where E[Ue-P (ýv-)] reflects the expected utility from a contract which specifies i7v, s 
and h which is defined as follows: 
em$V-)] 
C2 U2 
E[U2 C2 
("2* )]7v 
+( 
2* 
)(T 
- h) + 
(6.21) 
)]s 
++ 
C2 )T 
22 
17V s a2 = 
ýv- +h 
(6.22) 
Expected utility from a contract which specifies ýv-, s and h is a function of U2 
where > since: (T2 U2 
d&2 h> 
dýv (ýv- -s 
(6.23) 
i. e. the relatively high wage generates the greatest disparity between income 
received when absent and income received when attending work. Hence absence 
becomes less probable. The reservation sickness level in period one of an individual 
who chooses to search when absent, in the context of this discrete distribution of 
potential wages, is denoted by: 
(Ti *10) *lr=a 
r=a 
Uý 
0770 
(I +p)(w -s+h - aT) 
(6.24) 
where: 
217 
4U2"'(w)] 
- E[U2P 
(w - '7v)[('7v - s)(w - s) + h(iý + vv - 2s)] 
<0 2[ýv--s+h][w-s+h] 
(6.25) 
The prospect of job search yielding the maximum wage rate adds a further impetus 
to lowering the reservation sickness level in period one and, hence, to increasing 
the probability of absence. This further impetus to engage in job search in period 
one is represented by the additional term, 0770, which reflects 4U2"P(w)] 
- E[U2"P (iv')] weighted by Pq, the probability of receiving a job offer 
specifying the maximum wage, ýv-. 
It is apparent from Equation (6.25) that 0 is negative, implying that the 
chance of receiving a job offer with the maximum wage serves to reduce the 
reservation sickness level. Therefore, the probability of absence in period one, for 
workers employed under the single period contract, increases since 
T=a. 
This result may be compared to the absence behaviour of an individual 
employed under a two period contract. Such an individual has to decide between 
three possible situations: 
(i) to attend work; 
(ii) to absent oneself and not to engage in job search, i. e. to choose r=0; 
to absent oneself and to engage in job search, i. e. to choose z=a. 
In both cases (i) and (ii) the individual's period one reservation level will be equal 
to 
0 
(Ti (T2 Hence, emphasis will be placed on the third case when the 
individual chooses r=a. The reservation sickness level in period one for the 
worker employed under the two period contract, * Ir= a, 
is defined as the (71 
realisation of sickness such that utility in period one from attendance plus the 
discounted expected utility in period two conditional on attendance in period one is 
equal to utility in period one from absence plus the discounted expected utility in 
period two conditional on absence and undertaking job search in period one: 
17 The analysis in this Section assumes that if the individual goes absent he/she will engage ii, 
job search. This will be the case if the expected gains in period two exceed the costs of search 
incurred in period one: 
E[Usearch] 
- E[U'P] 
710) 
> a, (I - a)T = 
uA uIA 
22+PII 
IT= 
0)-( 
If the above condition holds then the individual will choose to search when absent in period one. 
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, *10) W-S + 
9170 
(6.26) a'-r=a-w-s+h-aT 
[(l+p)(w-s+h-aT) I 
such that: 
+ 
fle 
(6.27) r=a +p)(w -s+h- aT)_ 
The additional term in Equation (6.26), P770, represents E[U2emP (ýV-) ]- E[ U2emP 001 
weighted by the probability of receiving a job offer which specifies the maximum 
wage. It is clear that 0 is negative since expected utility is increasing with respect to 
the wage. Hence the inclusion of the extra terrn, &0, into the reservation sickness 
level of an individual employed under a two period contract serves to increase the 
probability of absence. 18 
Thus, although the prospect of search leading to the relatively higher wage, 
ýv, lowers the probability of attendance, the impetus to search amongst the 
temporary employees exceeds that of the permanent employees, as illustrated by 
(A) 
Equation (6.27) since &I'l a> 
(TI 10) as 0>0. r= r=a 
In this Section, the analysis of Section 6.3.2 has been extended in order to 
incorporate the possibility that the worker, when devoting resources to job search 
faces risk with respect to the wage rate specified in a job offer. For simplicity, a 
discrete distribution of wages is assumed. Despite this simplifying assumption the 
analysis demonstrates that when one allows for the possibility of search yielding the 
maximum wage, ýv-, the reservation sickness level for workers employed under 
both contracts falls, thereby increasing the probability of absence. This negative 
influence on the probability of attendance stems from the term, P710. Clearly the 
higher is 77 , the probability of receiving a 
job offer characterised by the relatively 
high wage, the lower is the reservation sickness level. Furthen-nore, the higher is 
the maximum wage, ýv-, the lower is the probability of attendance. 19 Hence the 
18 Die analysis above deals with the effect on the reservation sickness level in period one when 
the individual chooses to search for a job when absent. Ibis will be the case if the costs of search 
incurred in period one are outweighed by the expected gains in period two, i. e. if the condition 
SPecified below holds: 
E[Usearch E[U" (IV)] > a, (I - a)T = 
(UAII. 
0) 
_ 
(UAIr 
=a 221+PII 
then individual will choose to search if he/she goes absent in period one. 19 The higher is the maximum wage rate, the greater is 0 in absolute terms and the more negative 
ExPression (6.25) becomes. This is demonstrated formally by the following differential: 
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greater the expected utility from outside opportunities the lower is the current 
reservation sickness level. 
6.3.4 Concluding Remarks 
In the context of the model analysed in this Section, the interaction between absence 
and job search leads to a situation whereby sick pay serves to subsidise off-the-job 
search. Moreover, the potential benefits from search activities may lead to an 
increase in the probability of absence. In this Section, two types of contract have 
been compared; a single period contract and a two period contract. An individual 
employed under a single period contract has a relatively large incentive to devote 
resources to job search since failure to do so wifl render the individual unemployed 
in the subsequent period. This is consistent with the empirical evidence found by 
Pissarides and Wadsworth (1994) which suggests that temporary employment 
encourages on-the-job search by male workers: 
Those temporary workers who do search, do so more extensively than 
other workers. Not only are temporary workers more likely to pursue 
indirect or random search, they also utilise more search methods in the 
process. The imminent termination of a job would indeed appear to 
induce greater search efforts. [Pissarides and Wadsworth (1994), p. 393]. 
An individual employed under a two period contract, on the other hand, will only 
have an incentive to engage in job search if there is a chance of receiving a job offer 
with a wage in excess of the current level of remuneration. 
Typically search behaviour is assumed to be the private knowledge of the 
worker. If the firm believes that workers employed under two period contracts are 
less likely to go absent than workers employed under a single period contract then 
the firm may prefer two period to single period contracts. It seems plausible to 
assume that workers employed under single period contracts have a relatively 
stronger incentive to go absent and search for a job since otherwise they will be 
unemployed in period two whilst individuals employed under the two period 
contract, on the other hand, do not face unemployment in the future period. 
Moreover, employers typically find quits costly. Costs may arise due to 
factors such as re-advertising vacancies and re-training replacements. In the context 
of a heterogeneous work force, however, if a worker finds that he/she is not suited 
to the job then the individual may have a strong incentive to go absent in order to 
djol 
= 
(i7v - s)(2h + ýT, - s) 
xv I (ý-v -s+ h)' 
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search for alternative employment. The employer may find it beneficial to encourage 
such an individual to search for an alternative job in order to replace the individual 
as soon as possible with someone who has less incentive to absent from the work 
place. Strand (1985), for example, presents a model in which the firm subsidises 
the search activities of certain employees who are poorly adapted to the job. 
Finally, the employer may find it beneficial to weigh up the costs of 
providing the means to facilitate on-the-job search and absenteeism. If the firm 
finds absenteeism more costly than the worker's on-the-job search activities then 
the firm may find it beneficial to encourage such activities by, for example, 
providing access to telephones in the work place. 
To summarise, the results of the theoretical analysis illustrate the influences 
which arise from the interaction between the related aspects of job search and 
absenteeism, which in general have been analysed as separate phenomena. In the 
model presented in this Section this degree of interaction serves to encourage 
absence behaviour and, furthermore, the theoretical results suggest that absence 
behaviour may precede the decision to quit (the outcome of 'successful' search) 
suggestive of a positive association between absence rates and quit rates. The 
empirical analysis presented in the following Section aims to explore the 
relationship between quit rates and absence rates utilising an informative panel of 
firm level data. 
6.4 Empirical Analysis 
The aim of this Section is to explore the relationship between absence behaviour 
and quit rates by analysing a panel of firm level data constructed and originally 
analysed by Peel and Wilson (1991) to ascertain the implications of profit sharing 
schemes for absenteeism and quit rates. The data set is industry specific, covering a 
sub-sample of 52 firms operating in the engineering and metal-working sector of 
the United Kingdom over a five year period (1978 to 1982). Pooling the data set 
across firms over time creates a panel of data characterised by 260 firm level 
observations. Given the relative paucity of data pertaining to absence behaviour, the 
panel represents one of the few infon-native firm level data sets available. Interviews 
were conducted with senior managers, supervisors and shop floor employees to 
elicit information pertaining to areas such as unionisation, the extent of profit 
sharing arrangements and the nature of the remuneration schemes implemented by 
these firms. In general, the results of Peel and Wilson (1991) suggest that 
firms 
operating employee participation schemes are characterised by lower rates of 
absenteeism and quits. 
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The aim of this Section is to ascertain the determinants of quit rates with 
reference to a set of explanatory variables pertaining to work place and work force 
characteristics. In contrast to Peel and Wilson (1991), the absence rate prevailing at 
the work place is incorporated into the set of explanatory variables in order to 
explore the interaction between absence behaviour and quit behaviour. Instrumental 
variable techniques were employed in order to analyse these two types of worker 
behaviour from the perspective of a simultaneous equation system. Summary 
statistics relating to the set of regressors are presented in Table 6.2 below. 
Following Peel and Wilson (1991) and Mobley (1987), the dependent variable, 
quit, is defined as the number of employees giving notice as a proportion of total 
employees in a given year. 
F 
Table 6.2: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
Absence Rate 0.0338 0.0762 
Wage 5.3528 0.9549 
Fringe Bene its 0.1706 0.0413 
Unemployment Rate 8.0673 3.5481 
Blue Collar 0.6649 0.1320 
Overtime 0.0528 0.0472 
Apprenticeships 0.1969 0.2177 
Shift Working 0.0694 0.1174 
Profit-Share Scheme 0.4039 0.4916 
Workers Per Supervisor 13.4910 6.7408 
Unionisation 0.7839 0.2918 
Training Expenditure 0.1980 0.7158 
Unskilled 0.4409 0.2378 
Male 0.8000 0.1711 
Firm Size 1153.1000 1800-0000 NEE, 
In order to derive estimates from the panel of firm-level data, the 
Dynamic 
Panel Data (DPD) Gauss matrix programme was employed [see Arellano and 
Bond 
(1988,1991)]. The DPD programme is particularly appropriate 
for these 
requirements having been designed for situations where the number of time series 
observations is small yet the number of cross section observations is relatively 
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large. Instrumental variable techniques were employed given the simultaneous 
determination of quit rates and wages and the simultaneous determination of quit 
rates and absence rates which may afise. 20 
Although the aim of this Section is primarily to explore the implications of 
absence behaviour for observed quits rates, there have been a number of studies 
suggesting that quits rates are influenced by a myriad of factors. The 'exit-voice' 
hypothesis, for instance, proposed by Freeman and Medoff (1984) predicts a 
negative association between unionisation and quits. Essentially, an aggrieved 
union member can take his/her complaint to the trade union instead of quitting - the 
only method of resolution available to non-union workers - thereby, acting to 
reduce the firm's level of turnover. 21 The basic idea is that unionisation encourages 
workers to communicate their dissatisfaction, but that such dissatisfaction does not 
lead to quits since it represent the effects of politicising union members as opposed 
to the manifestation of genuine grievances. Bodas (1979) and Kochan and Helfman 
(1981) present evidence which supports this claim, with the association between 
job dissatisfaction and the propensity to quit being weaker for union than for non- 
union employees. 
The exit-voice hypothesis has attracted considerable empirical support [see, 
for example, Sloane and Theodossiou (1993), Georgellis (1994), Hersch and Stone 
(1990) and Miller and Mulvey (1991,1993)]. Similarly, Blau and Kahn (1981) 
control for collective bargaining coverage by incorporating a dummy variable which 
equals one if the respondent's wages are determined by collective bargaining. The 
impetus behind the inclusion of such a dummy variable is concerned with the effect 
of collective bargaining on the nature of fringe benefits, working conditions and the 
provision of grievance procedures which may affect quit behaviour. The estimated 
coefficient of this variable suggests a negative association between collective 
bargaining coverage and the probability of quitting. Following this lead, a variable 
20 The first stage regressors of the instrumental variables estimates include all explanatory 
variables except the logarithm of the wage (in the case of the wage equation) and the absence rate 
(in the case of the absence rate equation). Tlie instrument vector includes a set of output market 
characteristics, such as the perceived market share of the firm, direct exporting and 
import 
penetration, which may influence wage setting behaviour and the stringency of absence control. 
Other instruments include those related to the technology of the firm yielding information as to the 
nature of technology such as flow/assembly line production which in turn may condition wages 
and absence behaviour. In each case, the magnitude of the Sargan Test 
Statistic (recall A3, Chapter 
3) endorsed the use of such instruments. 
21 Similar work has been undertaken in the field of applied psychology where research 
has centred 
on the issue as to whether the existence of grievance procedures provides a voice 
through which 
Workers can express their dissatisfaction without resorting to absenteeism and 
exit behaviour. 
Neglect and turnover are regarded as consecutive phases in the process of withdrawal. 
An individual 
who voices his/her complaints and is unsuccessful may turn to neglect and 
then ultimately to exit 
[Withey and Cooper (1989)]. 
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representing the extent of unionisation - the proportion of employees at the work 
place belonging to a trade union - is included within the empirical specif-icafion. 22 
Competitive wages and training programs have also been proposed as 
important determinants of quit rates. Pencavel (1972) specified quit rates as a 
function of wages, educational attainment and unionisation. The results of Datcher 
(1982) suggest that higher wages lower the probability of quitting. Similarly, 
Parsons (1977) argues that quit rates decline as the wage rate and general skill level 
rises. Human capital considerations may also play a prominent role in the decision 
to quit with the quantity of employee-owned specific human capital exerting a 
negative influence on quitting. Furthermore, Stromback (1988) argues that the 
growth of wages over a worker's life cycle is partially due to the accumulation of 
specific human capital. Thus, the amount of expenditure on training per employee 
and the ratio of apprenticeships to the total number of employees are incorporated 
into the set of explanatory variables in order to capture such human capital 
considerations. 
The labour turnover model proposed by Salop (1979) suggests that, within 
an efficiency wage framework, firms may under certain circumstances pay wages in 
excess of market clearing rates to reduce costly labour turnover. The higher is the 
relative wage paid by the current firm and the higher is the unemployment rate, the 
more reluctant workers will be to quit. In a model of identical firms, turnover may 
be diminished if all firms pay the same wage which is in excess of market clearing 
levels. Thus, a variable representing the average real wage at the workplace is 
included in the analysis - this variable represents the average basic wage plus any 
bonus payments which may be available. Since local labour market conditions are 
expected to influence quit rates through the perceived influence on job search 
outcomes, the regional unemployment rate, which gives an indication the 
availability of alternative employment, is also incorporated. A priori expectations 
would predict a negative relation between the regional unemployment and the quit 
rate. 
It is apparent, however, that the wage rate is not the only important 
dimension of the employee's remuneration package. Other aspects are of 
considerable importance including the level of fringe benefits such as pension and 
share option schemes. Allen et al (1993) present evidence supporting the hypothesis 
-)') The relationship between unionisation and job tenure is further complicated by the apparent 
ability of unions to protect members against lay-off. Abraham and Medoff (1984) present survey 
evidence indicating that such protection increases with tenure, with senior workers benefiting 
from 
better protection in union rather than non-union firms. Similarly, Addison and 
Castro (1987) 
utifise micro data to estimate retention rates and life-time tenure probabilities for union and non- 
union workers. Their results suggest that union workers are characterised by a higher probability of 
life-time employment than their non-union counterparts. 
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that workers in jobs characterised by pension schemes are less likely to quit, oiven 
the potential loss of pension wealth. Thus, non-wage costs per employee are 
entered into the model as a proxy for the level of fringe benefits. In addition, Allen 
(1981b, 1983) treats absenteeism as a non-pecuniary characteristic of the 
compensation package by developing the hedonic framework initiated by Rosen 
(1974) which suggests that absenteeism may implicitly represent one aspect of the 
employee's remuneration package. Similarly, Turnbull and Sapsford (1992) cite 
evidence supporting the claim that, historically, some groups of workers view 
absenteeism as a job characteristic. Thus, the absence rate at each work place was 
included in the specification as a proxy for the extent to which employees may be 
able to withdraw temporarily from the work place. In contrast, Peel and Wilson 
(1991) treat quit and absence behaviour as separate phenomena. 
Following Wilson et al (1990) and Peel and Wilson (1991), a dummy 
variable denoting the existence of a profit share scheme covering all employees is 
included according to the hypothesis that firms operating such financial involvement 
schemes will experience lower quit rates. Hammer et al (1981) explore the 
hypothesis that voluntary absenteeism declines following a transfer to worker 
ownership. If absenteeism is regarded as detrimental to organisational 
effectiveness, employee-owners should be motivated to attend work since financial 
and psychological commitment to the firm are of interest. The results suggest a 
decline in voluntary absenteeism following such a transfer. 
Hashimoto and Raisian (1985) who consider the implications of firm size 
for job tenure and, therefore, for quit rates present evidence suggestive of a positive 
association between firm size and job tenure in the US and Japan. One explanation 
given for this relationship relates to the relatively high failure rate of small firms. 
Cable and Wilson (1990) argue that the implications of firm size for quit behaviour 
are ambiguous since large firm size may dilute group incentives and increase the 
incentive for free-riding. In addition, communications problems may arise and, 
consequently, employees may feel more alienated. On the other hand, a negative 
relation between firm size and quit rates may predominate since large firms may be 
characterised by more internal promotion opportunities and more attractive 
remuneration packages. Thus, in order to explore the implications of firm size for 
quit behaviour, a firrn size variable - the number of employees at the work place - 
is 
incorporated into the analysis. 
In addition, the level of supervision at the work place may influence quit 
behaviour. The effect of the degree of supervision on quit behaviour is, however, 
ambiguous. A high level of supervision may reduce the potential for employees to 
act on their own initiative, perhaps lowering the degree of job satisfaction and, 
thereby, raising quit rates. On the other hand, a high degree of supervision may 
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imply that the supervisor is able to form closer links with his/her supervisees which 
may lead to a more appropriate and effective allocation of tasks within the firm. To 
attempt to resolve the debate, a variable denoting the number of employees per 
supervisor is included in the analysis. 
According to Jovanovic (1979) the least qualified employees tend to be 
characterised by higher quit rates. This is somewhat paradoxical since empirical 
evidence suggests that these individuals are characterised by the highest probability 
of unemployment [see, for example, Brown and Sessions (1994) and Pissarides 
and Wadsworth (1990)]. Thus, the proportion of unskilled employees is included 
in order to consider this proposition. In addition, the proportion of blue collar 
employees is included in the analysis. 
The provision of overtime working presents a further important dimension 
of labour market behaviour as outlined in the previous Chapter. Thus, overtime 
hours as a proportion of standard hours are included in the analysis. Two 
potentially conflicting influences of overtime working for the level of quits can be 
cited. Firstly, overtime working may lower the quit rate via the opportunity it 
provides to enhance one's earnings. On the other hand, overtime working may 
lengthen the working day and, thereby, lower the degree of job flexibility which in 
turn may stimulate quit behaviour (see Section 5.2, Chapter 5 for a fuller discussion 
of these issues). A related variable which pertains to the proportion of employees 
involved in shift-working is included in the empirical specification. Once again 
ambiguous predictions concerning the influence on quit rates can be cited. Firstly, 
since shift-working involves frequent changes in the nature of the work schedule, it 
may be associated which enhanced flexibility which in turn serves to lower quit 
rates [Chaudhury and Ng (1992A. On the other hand, the absence of a regular 
working routine may be regarded as a negative job attribute acting to increase quit 
rates. 
Finally, Blau and Kahn (1981) explore micro data in order to determine the 
influence of race and sex on the probability of quitting. The results suggest that quit 
rates are higher for women and approximately the same for whites and blacks. The 
standard explanation for the higher quit rates amongst females lies in the nature of 
the traditional division of labour within the family with women being mainly 
responsible for domestic affairs and marriage and fertility decisions expected to 
exert a large impact on the quit behaviour of women. When other personal and job 
characteristics are controlled for with a probit specification, however, the quit rates 
of the sample of men and women appear to be the same whilst blacks appear to quit 
less frequently than whites. Evidence presented by Bradley and Wabe (1988) 
supports the hypothesis that the female quit rate has exceeded the male quit rate 
throughout the post-war period. Following this lead, a variable pertaining to the 
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proportion of male employees in the work force is included In the analysis. 
Unfortunately, information is not available regarding the ethnicity of the work 
force. 
The results from the estimation procedure are presented in Table 6.3 below. 
Although the significance of the regressors taken individually is somewhat 
disappointing, the magnitude of the Wald Statistic lends some support to the joint 
significance of the regressors. 
Table 6.3: Dependent Variable = ln(quit,, ) 
Variable Estimated Coefficient T-Rati023 
In(Absence Rate) 0.1701 1.9987** 
In(Wage) -0.3330 -1.7230* 
In(Fringe Benefits) 0.9743 1.3436 
In(Unemployment Rate) -0.6877 -1.7535* 
In(Blue CoHar) -0.0501 -0.7147 
In(Overtime) -0.0013 -0.0131 
ln(Apprenticeships) 0.1912 2.0723** 
In(Shift Working) 0.1617 1.8849* 
Profit-Share Scheme 0.3054 0.8779 
In(Workers Per 
Supervisor) 
0.2785 1.4828 
In(Unionisation) -0.1271 -0.9775 
In(Training Expenditure) -0.0039 -0.0533 
In(UnskiHed) -0.0758 -0.6002 
ln(Male) 0.3476 1.0225 
In(Firm Size) -0.6578 -6.0787*** 
Constant 0.8674 1.9046* 
Number of Observations 260 
Sargan Test Statistic 
(df = 12) 
26.736778*** 
Wald Test Statistic 
(df. = 16) 
66.162978*** 
23 The standard errors are corrected according to White's (1980) heteroskedasticity consistent 
Covariance matrix. 
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it is apparent that the estimated coefficient on the variable representing the absent 
rate prevailing at the work place is significant at the 5% level and, moreover, the 
sign of this explanatory variable accords with a priori expectations suggestive of a 
positive relation between absence rates and quit rates. 
Other variables which attain significance include the wage variable which is 
just significant at the 10% level. The sign of the estimated coefficient gives some 
support for the prediction from job search theory that remuneration and quit rates 
are inversely related. In addition, the negative coefficient on the variable 
representing regional rates of unemployment yields further support to the job search 
framework. The large and highly significant coefficient on the firm size variable 
supports the hypothesis that an inverse relation exists between quit rates and firm 
size. 
Somewhat surprisingly human capital investment, which is proxied by the 
proportion of apprenticeships to total employment, appears to exert a positive 
influence on quit rates. One explanation for this may be that apprenticeships equip 
young, mobile employees with general rather than firm specific human capital. On 
the other hand, firms may be failing to retain apprentices once they are eligible for 
higher levels of remuneration which may be the consequence of a time 
inconsistency problem [Kydland and Prescott (1977)]. 
Unlike Bell and Hanson (1984), Peel and Wilson (1991) and Wilson et al 
(1990), however, the profit share dummy variable and the variable representing the 
extent of unionisation do not appear to exert a significant influence on quit rates. 
The insignificant results pertaining to the variables representing the skill and 
demographic composition of the work force tie in with those of Allen et al (1993), 
however, who find that sex and union membership are not significantly associated 
with turnover. 
The results presented in Table 6.2 provide some support for the existence of 
a positive association between absence and quit rates. It is apparent, however, that 
the levels of significance are not particularly high and that the strength of such an 
association may be questioned. The data set is, however, characterised by some 
serious shortcomings, the main weakness being the limited number of cross- 
sectional observations curbing the extent to which generalisations may made from 
these results. Despite the fact that the data set contains detailed information 
regarding work place characteristics, information relating to the demographic 
composition of the work force is somewhat limited - information relating to the 
average age and ethnic origin of the work force, for example, is not available. In 
addition, the data set does not allow a distinction to be made between involuntary 
and voluntary absence which is of considerable importance to any empirical study 
of absence behaviour. 
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6.5 Conclusion 
The aim of this Chapter was to consider the hypothesis that some absence may be 
undertaken for the purpose of engaging in job search. The theoretical analysis 
presented in Section 6.2 illustrates how incentives may arise which induce 
employees to absent from the work place and essentially to sacrifice leisure time for 
job search activities. If job search is a by-product of absence behaviour, then one 
would predict a positive association between absence and quit rates. Moreover, the 
fact that absence behaviour and quit behaviour are both symptomatic of job 
dissatisfaction further endorses the prediction of a positive association between 
such activities. 
The empirical analysis presented in Section 6.3 suggests that such a positive 
association may, indeed, exist. These results should, however, be treated with a 
degree of caution since the data set analysed, which is characterised by relatively 
few cross-sectional observations, is by no means ideally suited to this task. A 
micro-data set would clearly be preferable since absence and quit decisions are 
predominantly the outcome of an individual's decision-making process. Since such 
a data set is not available, then the analysis had to be conducted using one of the 
few data sets containing information as to quit and absence behaviour, albeit at a 
firm level. The empirical results, however, are suggestive of a degree of interaction 
between these two consequences of job dissatisfaction which, hopefully, may be 
the subject of future research once a more appropriate data set becomes available. 
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
It has become almost customary for economists to introduce their analysis of 
absence behaviour by citing evidence highlighting the significance of absenteeism 
for the industrial labour costs of developed economies - the current Thesis was no 
exception. It is important to acknowledge the magnitude and implications of these 
costs in this concluding Chapter in order, hopefully, to encourage future research 
into both the causes and consequences of labour absenteeism. 
In Great Britain, the percentage of employees reported absent due to 
sickness absence in the given survey week in 1993 was estimated by Regional 
Trends at 5.075% [Regional Trends (1994)]. In 1993, the total number of 
employees in employment was 21,551 thousand which implies that approximately 
1094 thousand individuals reported absence in the given survey week. The 
number of working days lost in 1993 due to industrial disputes (649 thousand in 
all industries and services over the entire year) pales into insignificance by 
comparison [Employment Gazette (1994)]. Such figures clearly suggest that 
absenteeism is a significant labour market phenomenon and as such warrants 
further research. 
Related issues arise since the extent of absence behaviour does not appear 
to be uniform across regions, industries and occupations. Moreover, there has 
been very little research into the causes of the apparent regional, industrial and 
occupational disparities in absence rates. On the other hand, economists have 
invested significant resources into the analysis of unemployment; more 
specifically, much attention has been paid to the analysis of the extent and 
implications of disparities in unemployment rates across regions and demographic 
groups [see, for example, Pissarides and Wadsworth (1990) and, for a more recent 
analysis, Brown and Sessions (1994)]. Given the symmetry between the concepts 
of under-employment and over-employment, as highlighted in Chapter 3, it would 
appear that more attention should be paid to the analysis of over-employment 
which may manifest itself into absenteeism. It seems paradoxical and somewhat 
inefficient that certain groups of individuals in the economy actually desire to 
work fewer hours whilst individuals concentrated in other areas actually desire to 
supply more hours of labour. 
It is apparent from Figure 7.1 below that there appears to be some 
variation in the absence rates across the northern and southern regions of the 
UK. 
In addition, the magnitude of the absence rates indicates that a significant 
percentage of working days were lost across all regions in the survey week. 
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The regional disparities become even more evident when one considers the 
absence rates prevailing across Great Britain which are shown in Figure 7.2 
above. The country with the lowest absent rate in Great Britain was England with 
an absence rate of 4.7% in 1993, whilst Northern Ireland was characterised by the 
highest absence rate in 1993 of 5.7%. 
Further disparities in observed absence rates appear to exist across 
occupations and industrial sectors with manual workers in manufacturing sectors 
recorded as having higher rates of absence than managerial staff in the service 
sector [Employment Gazette (1992)]. The CBI (1994) also calculates rates of 
sickness absence across industrial sectors. The oil/coal mining sector and 
Government agencies appear to register the highest rates of sickness absence at 
5.1% in 1993 whilst the media and broadcasting sector is characterised by the 
lowest rate at 2.0%. In general, the rate of absence appears to be higher in the 
manufacturing than in the service sector. 
To summarise, it appears that not only are the costs associated with 
absenteeism substantial, but in addition, such costs are not uniform across 
geographical regions, industrial sectors and demographic areas. Thus, questions 
immediately arise as to why absence rates are not uniform across regions. One 
explanation may lie with efficiency wage considerations, for example, which 
suggest that regional unemployment rates play an important role in determining 
an individual's perceived expected costs of displaying 'unreasonable' workplace 
behaviour such as excessive rates of absence. Such questions and related 
explanations remain, however, largely unexplored and unchallenged. 
As the EC is currently introducing initiatives in order to encourage 
movements towards standardising employment policies throughout Europe, it is 
apparent that, in addition to analysing absence behaviour across industries and 
regions, one should ideally aim towards a pan-European analysis. 
The blame for the lack of economic interest in labour absence does not, 
however, lie entirely with economists. The paucity of economic research into 
absence behaviour may be partially explained by the distinct shortage of data 
pertaining to the absence behaviour of individuals. There is a shortage of not only 
microdata sets containing information related to individual absence behaviour but 
also of more highly aggregated data sets pertaining to absence rates across regions 
or industrial sectors. 2 Consequently, researchers into absenteeism have often 
2 The lack of information on labour absenteeism is not only problematic for academic rescarch, 
'Given that absenteeism cost data are not published for industries in the same way that wage 
surveys, for example, are, there is little in the way of comparative data available for organisations 
to determine if their costs are out of line with some standard. ' [Steers and Rhodes (1990), p. 301. 
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relied on the relatively few employers who are willing to supply information on 
the absence behaviour of their employees for academic research. 
Although these data sets provide an interesting and indispensable insight 
into observed absence behaviour, problems may arise since the results are 
consequently employer specific and, therefore, any generalisations made from 
such empirical analysis should be treated with caution. In addition, there may be a 
sample selection problem since employers experiencing difficulties controlling 
absence may be more likely to allow academics to analyse their records of 
employee behaviour than employers who are less concerned about absence 
behaviour. Even after putting such problems to one side, the gathering and 
cleaning of such data is a rather time consuming and financially costly process, 
since an employer's records are highly unlikely to be in a format which directly 
lends itself to academic research. Furthermore, employers do not necessarily 
gather the type of information a researcher may ideally require access to. The 
more widespread use of data base systems within companies may, however, 
address some of the more practical issues raised. Thus, shortages over the 
availability of data may provide some explanation for the limited amount of 
research in the field of labour economics. 
The aim of this Thesis was broadly to redress this imbalance by exploring 
the implications of some established areas of labour economics research, e. g. 
overtime provisions and job search, for absence decisions. To be specific, the 
series of models presented have explored the microeconomic aspects of an 
individual worker's incentive to adopt absence behaviour. The range of absence 
control mechanisms introduced by the employer seek to modify this tendency to 
absent from the work place by manipulating such an incentive. 
The empirical analysis presented in Chapter 3 suggests that a significant 
proportion of employees are constrained with respect to the amount of labour 
supplied. The results indicate that research into concepts such as labour 
absenteeism which are modelled as a direct response to constraints leading to 
over-employment may yield valuable insights into the way in which labour 
market contracts are established. Furthermore, it is apparent that employers may 
find absenteeism a costly phenomenon and, hence, may, if the expected benefits 
exceed the costs of the implementation of absence control, take measures to curb 
the extent to which individuals have an incentive to engage in absence behaviour. 
The results pertaining to the influence of two specific means of absence 
control presented in Chapters 4 and 5- the provision of experience rated sick pay 
and the operation of the overtime ban system - highlight ways in which employers 
may attempt to condition the absence behaviour of the work 
force by making 
future remuneration conditional on past absence behaviour. Moreover, the results 
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also suggest that employees, under some circumstances, may benefit from any 
'loop-holes' which may characterise the control schemes operated by employers. 
In the case of the overtime ban system, an individual who is banned from 
engaging in overtime working is characterised by a higher probability of absence 
behaviour due to the nature of the scheme which leads to the accumulation of 
6overlapping' rather than consecutive bans. 
The nature of these two schemes highlights a further potential area of 
interest which concerns expanding the time horizon over which absence decisions 
are made. Although some progress has been made in this Thesis by setting the 
analysis within a multi-time period framework, there is still a long way to go in 
order to catch up with other areas in the literature. Current research is being 
undertaken in this area which places absence decisions into a more general 
dynamic context. Barmby et al (1995), for example, are currently exploring the 
implications of the overtime ban system explored in Chapter 5 for the absence 
decision making process in the context of a stochastic optimisation problem. The 
analysis presented in Chapter 6, which focuses on the implications of contract 
duration for absence behaviour - more specifically the implications of permanent 
and temporary contracts, represents a further important aspect of the temporal 
nature of absence behaviour. It is particularly important to explore this issue 
related to the nature and duration of employment contracts given the emphasis 
placed in the labopr economics literature on the theoretical developments 
advanced to explain the observed decline of spot market contracts since the mid- 
1970's in favour of long-term contracts. Theories put forward to explain the 
existence of long-term contracts include human capital theory based on the 
investment in firm-specific training, implicit contract models based on different 
degree of risk aversion across workers and employers and models based on effort 
inducing factors such as bonding mechanisms. 
In addition to placing the theory of absence behaviour into the realm of 
contract design, it also appears to be the case that the role of trade unions in the 
regulation of absenteeism is a further aspect to be explored more fully. As 
mentioned in Chapter 5, the overtime ban system proposed to curb excessive 
absence behaviour is regarded as a joint venture between the employer and the 
trade union. Moreover, the empirical evidence suggests that the presence of 
unionisation appears to exert a considerable influence on absence behaviour and it 
appears to the case that trade unions themselves may have vested interests in 
restraining the absence behaviour of specific poor attenders. There has been a 
partial recognition of the role of trade union behaviour in contract theory over the 
1980s, but this is still an area of labour economics which is characterised by slow 
growth. Addison and Castro (1987), who utilise micro data to estimate retcntion 
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rates and life-time tenure probabilities for union and non-union workers, remark 
that: 
... there is a pressing need to incorporate unions more fully within the 
corpus of contract theory. [Addison and Castro (1987), p. 4031. 
Thus, the acknowledgement of the significance of both trade unions and absence 
behaviour in the question of contract design may stir interest into this important 
area of labour economics. 
The theoretical and empirical analysis conducted in this Thesis has indicated 
that observed absence behaviour appears to be conditioned by the employment 
contract which underlies the employer-employee relationship. Moreover, the 
evidence presented in this Thesis suggests that the employer is able to exert some 
degree of control over the employee's absence decision-making process. This 
further endorses the argument that research into absence behaviour focusing on 
the interaction between labour demand and labour supply may be a particularly 
fruitful line to pursue. 3 Similarly, Steers and Rhodes (1990) conclude from their 
analysis that: 
If there is a lesson to be learned from our analysis it is that managers 
and organizations can do something to reduce absence at work if they 
are willing to approach the problem systematically and constructively. 
[Steers and Rhodes (1990), p. 163] 
Furthermore, as the responsibility for the provision of statutory sick pay falls 
further and further into the domain of the employer, rather than the Government, 
the employer's control over absence behaviour may be enhanced. 
Since employers appear to recognise that influence may be exerted on the 
absence behaviour of the work force, it is worth emphasising that measures to 
reduce absence behaviour may, under some circumstances, impact negatively on 
the firm's performance. The analysis conducted in Appendix A4.1, Chapter 4, 
illustrates how employees, who are 'acceptably' ill may attend the work place due 
to the penalties which absence behaviour attracts. If employees who are unfit to 
carry out their duties attend the work place, then this may have adverse 
consequences for the firm, such as a decline in the productivity of the work force 
[see, for example, Kenyon and Dawkins (1987)]. Furthermore, the pressure to 
attend the work place is intensified during periods of recession when the prospect 
of securing alternative employment if dismissed for absence behaviour 
is not 
particularly high. 
3 The applied psychology literature is starting to focus on specific areas of the employee -employer 
relation which relate to contractual arrangements. One area of current 
interest, for example, 
concerns the implications of shift-working for absence behaviour which 
directly targets changes in 
the individual's hours of work regime [Steers and Rhodes (1990)]. 
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In sum, the research conducted in this Thesis suggests that employers may 
be able to influence the absence decisions of their work force by altering 
characteristics of the employment contract. One should, however, acknowledge 
the potential adverse effects which may arise if employees who are 'involuntarily' 
as opposed to 'voluntarily' absent are subject to rigorous measures of absence 
control. Penalties which induce such individuals to attend the work place may be 
to the disadvantage of the firm as well as to the employee. 
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